

PHILOSOPHY OF THE VEDANTA.

BY

PRIYA NATH SEN M. A., B. L.,
PREMCHAND ROYCHAND SCHOLAR;
VAKIL, HIGH COURT,
CALCUTTA.

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
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
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the *Upanishads* to signify a System of Philosophy, and it may be safely asserted that its use in that sense did not come in vogue before Indian Philosophy began to be systematised.

Philosophical thoughts at first assume a poetical form or appear under a poetical garb ; it takes some time before they are systematised. The '*Devas*' (literally the shining ones) of the Vedic literature are but poetic forms typifying attempts of the human mind to go behind phenomena and grasp the essential realities underlying them. These attempted unifications, however, are not thoroughgoing ; they (the *Devas*) are therefore superseded by or rather subsumed under an all-embracing unity the *Brahman*.* The growth of the Vedánta Philosophy is due to an endeavour to comprehend the nature of Brahman, so far as it is knowable by our reason, and its relation to the world and men. The *Sûtras* of *Vyása* are therefore known as the *Brahma-Sûtras*, and the System itself is known as Brahma-Mîmáṅsá. We shall see, as we proceed, that if the attainment of unity is the goal that reason, from its very nature, sets before itself, the realisation of that end can be found in the Vedánta Philosophy. If, in going so far, human reason has not gone too far, we may safely assert that it could not go any farther. The search after unity

* इन्द्रं मित्रं वरुणमग्निमाहुरथो दिव्यः स सुपर्णो गरुत्मान् ।
एकं सद्विप्रा बहुधा वदन्त्यग्निं यमं मातरिश्वानमाहुः ॥
—ऋग्वेदसंहिता ।

is either a self-delusion of reason, or the Vedánta Philosophy contains full-grown truth of which the doctrines of the other Systems of Philosophy are but approximations.

The Vedánta is a दर्शन. The word दर्शन literally signifies sight ; in its present reference it means insight, that is, insight into the essence of things and the nature of the self. Philosophy therefore is दर्शन in so far as it is a means to this insight, and as the amelioration of miseries is a necessary consequence of this insight, it follows that philosophic darśana is insight and foresight at the same time.

To begin with, we have to start from the crude notions which common people entertain about the nature of the subject and the object and their inter-relation. The different Systems of Philosophy have their origin mainly with a view to correct these crude notions by substituting in their place more adequate notions on those points. This end is succinctly designated by some of the Hindu Philosophers as हालिक-प्रत्यय-निराश or the correction of the ploughman's standpoint. But while the positions taken up in the several Systems are generally in advance of the crude notions of the vulgar, they are not all equally thoroughgoing and adequate. The relative estimate of these Systems, therefore, depends upon a thorough comprehension of the goal, that is, the ultimate or most complete standpoint towards which all the Systems are moving. It therefore seems that although the several principal Systems

of Indian Philosophy are in certain respects antagonistic to one another, they are yet capable of being regarded as forming so many stages in the constitution of one comprehensive System of philosophic knowledge.

Sáṁkhya, Pátañjala, Nyáya, Vaiśeshika, Pûrva Mîmáṅsá, and Uttara Mîmáṅsá or Vedánta are the six Systems of Indian Philosophy which are collectively known as षड्दर्शन. This separate and distinctive position assigned to them arises partly from the fact that they are more comprehensive and systematic, and partly from their recognising the authority of the Vedas.

In Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha Mádhavácháryya notices ten other Systems. Some of these such as रसेश्वरदर्शन and पाणिनिदर्शन hardly deserve to be called *Systems* of Philosophy. They generally deal with some one or other of the philosophical topics in a new way, and were therefore separately treated by the author. There are a few, however, which deserve special mention, for instance, Bauddha Philosophy and Chárváka Philosophy, as they occupy a prominent place among the atheistic and *avaidika* Systems of India. We should also notice the Rámánuja System named after its founder Rámánuja, Pûrṇaprajña System started by A'nandatîrtha, and Saiva System expounded by Nîlakanṭha and others; these were indeed founded upon the *Brahma Sûtra*s of Vyása, and indicated different modes of interpreting those sûtras, as they, owing to their aphoristic character, were capable of being differently interpreted; but

nowadays when one speaks of the Vedánta as a System of Philosophy, one generally refers to the System as expounded by *S*aṁkara and his followers whose characteristic doctrine is known as शुद्धाद्वैतवाद or the doctrine of pure nondualism.

In this work also I will treat of the Vedánta Philosophy with special reference to the exposition of *S*aṁkara and his school ; this line of procedure does not, in my opinion, require any special apology, for whatever may be the real import of the Sûtras of Vyása, the Philosophy of *S*aṁkara has now been unalterably identified with the Vedanta Philosophy ; it is the Vedánta *par excellence*.

INTRODUCTION.

CHAPTER II.

Classification of the Systems of Indian Philosophy.

When one thinks of arranging the principal Philosophical Systems of India, the question naturally suggests itself,—Is it possible to arrange them chronologically? —In India, everything relating to chronology is in the utmost confusion. When one looks into the matter, it becomes at once apparent, that according to the current traditions the authorship of works which seem to have been composed at different periods is often ascribed to the same person which makes one suspect the trustworthiness of the evidence on which those traditions were based. In some cases these accounts seem to lead to glaring absurdities. It is indeed true that attempts are sometimes made to explain them away either by representing some of the writers as immortal, or, at any rate, as of extraordinary longevity, or by maintaining, with a sort of perverse sincerity, that with one whose power of foresight has been developed by the practice of esoteric meditation historic anachronism has no place;—but explanations of this character are hardly sufficient to allay the doubts of a rational mind. The confusion is again worse con-

founded when we remember, that in India several persons often went by the same name, so that even assuming that we have got the name of the real author of a certain work, the difficulty of fixing his identity is not fully obviated thereby.

Let us take an illustration with reference to the present question. It is wellknown that there is a Commentary on the *Yoga* System of Patañjali ascribed to the authorship of *Vyása*. If this *Vyása* be the same person as the author of the *Vedànta Sûtras*, we get practically sufficient datum for determining the relative position of the two Systems. But, then, there arises a difficulty in the way of accepting the suggested conclusion ; as is wellknown, the *Mahábháshya* of Paṇini's Grammar is attributed to the authorship of Patañjali ; now Paṇini's Grammar contains a reference to one Párášarya as the author of *Bhikshu Sûtras*, and it has been thought that this relates to *Vyása* and the *Vedánta Sûtras* attributed to his authorship. So then the conclusion which we had once reached again slips out of our hands, and the anomalies remain to be solved by different persons in different ways.

I therefore regard it to be a hopeless task to ascertain the relative position of the several Systems in point of time by referring to the names of the Sages who are reputed to be their founders.

There is yet another fact which renders the task harder still. I am referring to the cross-references which are found in the several Systems: thus the

characteristic doctrines of the *Vedánta* are sought to be refuted in the *Sáṁkhya Sûtras*, and the Sáṁkhya doctrines are similarly treated in the *Vedánta Sûtras*, and so on. It can hardly be maintained that all the aphorisms containing these attempted refutations are subsequent interpolations, because, some of them at least are inextricably interwoven with the rest of the works. The real solution of this apparent anomaly seems to be that the several Systems had been developed with reference to one another to a pretty good extent before they were systematised in an aphoristic form, and when they were so systematised the collections of aphorisms were ascribed to the authorship of some of the reputed founders of the schools.

External evidence of chronological order being thus unavailable, it remains to be seen if it is possible to indicate a certain order by reference to the internal cast of the doctrines. If greater simplicity and closer kinship to ordinary modes of thought be a test of priority then the Nyáya and the Vaiśeshika Systems would seem to be prior to the Sáṁkhya and the Vedánta Systems; if, on the other hand, implicit reliance on the authority of theVedas be regarded as a characteristic of an older type of thought, the inference would be just the reverse of the above. Speaking for myself, I am unable to choose between these two lines of argument, and think it safer not to express any definite opinion. As between the Sáṁkhya and the Vedánta doctrines, it seems that the Sáṁkhya doctrine, or at least the greater portion of it occupies a position

anterior to the Vedánta doctrine in the evolution of philosophic ideas, for a comparison of the main Sáṁkhya tenets with those of the Vedánta makes it clear that the Vedánta System involved a further progress in advance of the Sáṁkhya standpoint; but it must not be forgotten that this does not *necessarily* imply a priority in point of time, for history illustrates a combination of liberty and necessity, and great minds are not fettered by the conditions of their time. As regards the Pátañjala System, it bears strong indications of being posterior to the Sáṁkhya, its enumeration of the *Tattwas* or cardinal principles being a mere reproduction of the Sáṁkhya doctrine upon this point. I do not, however, think it necessary to prolong this discussion, as I do not see the utility of advancing plausible guesses based on arguments of a rather shadowy nature on a question like this, when the solution of the question does not affect the merits of the doctrines themselves.

The Systems of Indian Philosophy have often been divided into two classes: *Ástika* and *nástika*. Etymologically a System would be termed *ástika* (realistic) if it recognises the existence of the soul after death; otherwise it would be called *nástika* (nihilistic). In this sense, it is the Chárváka System alone that can be unhesitatingly declared as *nástika*.

The two words *ástika* and *nástika* are often used to signify theistic and atheistic, but we would prefer to adopt the words Seśwara and Nirîśwara in this sense. From this standpoint the *Sáṁkhya* System

of Kapila, the *Mîmánsá* System of Jaimini, and the *Bauddha* Systems, not to speak of the *Chárváka* System, may be classed together as nirîśwara or atheistic, while the Vedánta, the Pátañjala, the Nyáya, and the Vaiśeshika Systems may be characterised as seśwara or theistic. It is, however, doubtful, as we shall see in the sequel, whether the Sáṁkhya and the Mîmáṅsá Systems are strictly nirîśwara or not.

The Indian Systems may also be classified with reference to the question as to how far they recognise the authoritative character of the Vedas. Those that recognise the authority of the Vedas may be called *Vaidika*, while those that repudiate their authority may be called *Avaidika*. The words A'stika and Nástika are also used to mark this distinction, but it is perhaps better to adopt the above terms to prevent possible ambiguity. Classified on this principle the *Chárváka* System, the *Bauddha* Systems, and the *A'rhata* System would come under the head of Avaidika, while all the six Systems which are collectively known as षड्दर्शन should be treated as Vaidika. But although none of these six Systems distinctly repudiate the authority of the Vedas, there is a remarkable difference between them as to the use which they make of the Vedic texts. The Vedánta and the Pûrva Mîmáṅsá maintain that revelation contains an independent source of knowledge, and that in dealing with transcendental spiritual questions you should use your reasoning mainly for the purpose of elucidat-

ing the import of the Scriptural texts, although you may subsequently employ your reasoning independently to corroborate and verify the truths inculcated in them. The Nyáya and the Vaiśeshika Systems, however, proceed on a different basis ; while recognising the authority of the Vedas in theory, they do not seem to make much use of them in enunciating and supporting their doctrines. The same remark may also be made with reference to the Yoga System in so far as it contains an independent philosophical doctrine.

It is somewhat difficult to understand the exact position of Kapila's System on this point. It is indeed true that he often rests his doctrine upon the authority of Vedic texts and recognises revelation as a separate source of true knowledge; but he does not agree with the Mîmáṅsakas when they say that the Vedas are eternal, nor can he maintain that they contain the words of God, his position that the existence of God is incapable of being proved clearly debarring him from adopting that view. Curiously enough, notwithstanding all this he does not attribute the real authorship of the Vedic texts to the individual *Rishis*; they are merely the vehicles through which eternal truths have manifested themselves, the channels through which they have emerged. But if so, what guarantee is there that the Vedas are free from error ? They prove themselves by the manifestation of their intrinsic powers—answers Kapila.* It is hard-

* निजशक्त्यभिव्यक्तेः स्वतःप्रामाण्यम् । सांख्यसूत्रम् ।

ly necessary to observe that this answer does not seem to be fully satisfactory, for if the authority of the Vedas rests upon the intrinsic strength of their tenets, how is this strength to be verified, or the truth tested? To say that this is to be done by reference to some other criterion is to admit that the probative value of the Vedas is subsidiary, if not superfluous. It has been suggested by a learned writer that the Sáṁkhya aphorisms recognising *S*abda or revelation as an independent source of true knowledge (pramáṇa) are later interpolations; but I am not prepared to accept this view as it is opposed to the traditional account and incompatible with the fact that there are certain portions of the Sáṁkhya doctrines almost exclusively based upon the authority of revelation. All that can be said is that this System does not employ itself in interpreting and reconciling the texts of the Vedas for the purpose of establishing its doctrines to the same extent as the Vedánta does.

On the whole we conclude that among the Vaidika Systems the Vedánta and the Pûrva Mîmánsá are *primarily* interpretative, while the others are *primarily* argumentative.

There is yet another way of classifying the Systems *viz.*, in accordance with the different philosophical principles adopted by them with regard to the nature of the world in relation to its cause. As this method of classification is based on a consideration of one of the cardinal problems of Universal Philosophy it may be said to be more philosophical than the

others mentioned above. It has been adopted by Mádhavácházrya in his *Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha*, Madhu Sûdana Saraswati in his Commentary on *Mahimna Stotram* *, and, Brahmánanda Yati in his *Adwaita-Brahma-Siddhi*.

Following this line of classification, Systems of Philosophy may be divided into four classes :—

1. Asadváda or Asat-kárana-váda—the theory that everything that seems to exist has come out of nothing, so that you need not assume the existence of an original non-phenomenal cause to explain the appearance of phenomena. This view is supposed to have been adopted by the Buddhistic School.

2. Asat-kárya-váda or A'rambha-váda—*i. e.*, the theory that a previously non-existent effect arises out of a previously existent cause, or, in other words, that the action of causes gives rise to something that did not exist, and moulds it in the shape of an effect. This view is ascribed to the Naiyáyikas, the Vaiseshikas and the Mîmánsakas.

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* It may not be altogether out of place to notice in this connection that some European Scholars have fallen into a mistake in thinking that what is known as *Prasthanabheda* of Madhu Sûdana is an independent tract, for it is really a portion of his Commentary on Mahimna Stotram and bears reference to the Stanza :—

त्रयी सांख्यं योगः पशुपतिमतं वैष्णवमिति
प्रभिन्ने प्रस्थाने परमिदमदः पथ्यमिति च ।
रुचीनां वैचित्र्यादृजुकुटिलनानापथजुषां
नृणामेको गम्यस्त्वमसि पयसामर्णव इव ॥

3. Pariṇáma-váda or the theory of evolutionary transformation.—According to this theory the effect is only a modification of its cause, and exists in a potential state (अव्यक्तावस्थ) even before its evolution. The activity of the cause only serves to bring about its manifestation. This is the theory of the Sáṁkhyas and the Pátañjalas, and is also known as Satkárya-váda strictly so called.

4. Vivartaváda or the theory of evolution without substantial mutation.—According to this theory the ultimate Cause which is without a second gives rise, through its own power of Máyá, to the appearance of the phenomenal Universe ; but the appearance of manifoldness which conceals the unity of the cause is only phenomenal, and therefore in one sense unreal; it does not involve any alteration of the substance of the cause. The world, as an effect, may thus be said to have an eternal reality, as its essence is non-different from the immutable cause, so that this view also is regarded as a form of Sat-kárya-váda. From another standpoint it may be said that according to this theory the world as it appears has no reality apart from its cause, and is therefore devoid of ultimate independent reality. This is the doctrine maintained by *S*aṁkara, and his school, and will find fuller exposition in the sequel.

INTRODUCTION.

CHAPTER III.

Pramanas or the Sources of True Knowledge.

In this Chapter I propose to deal shortly with the Pramáṇas or the sources of true knowledge as recognised by the several Philosophical Systems of India. The different opinions that prevailed among Indian Philosophers on this question are found summarised in a verse which runs as follows :—

प्रत्यक्षमेकं चार्व्वाकाः कणादसुगतौ पुनः
अनुमानञ्च तच्चापि सांख्याः शब्दञ्च ते उभे ।
न्यायैकदेशिनोऽप्येवम् उपमानञ्च केवलम्
अर्थापत्त्या सहैतानि चत्वार्य्याहुः प्रभाकराः ।
अभावषष्ठान्येतानि भट्टा वेदान्तिनस्तथा
सम्भवैतिह्ययुक्तानिल्विति पौराणिका जगुः ।

The Chárvákas acknowledge only one source of knowledge *viz.* perception; Kaṇáda and Sugata (Buddha) recognise inference in addition ; Sáṁkhyas add trustworthy affirmation to the two mentioned above ; the Naiyáyikas do the same and also add comparison ; the followers of Prabhákara recognise the above four along with necessary presumption as the fifth ; the followers of Bhaṭṭa and the Vedantists add non-pre-

ception as the sixth ; and the Pauráṇikas further add implication and tradition.

I. The Chárvákas maintain that direct observation is the only source of true knowledge. They repudiate the validity of all inferences which are dependent on the formation of universal propositions on the basis of particular observations. The arguments which they advance in support of this view are curious specimens of suicidal subtlety. The possibility of an inference rests upon the possibility of forming a universal proposition affirming the constant accompaniment (अविनाभाव) of one thing by another, an accompaniment which is independent of all further adjuncts (उपाधि). Thus, to infer the existence of fire from the appearance of smoke you have to make out two things : (1) that smoke is constantly accompanied by fire (व्याप्ति), and (2) that the existence of fire in this constant conjunction is independent of the existence of any adjunct (उपाध्यभाव), for if the conjunction were not so independent, the non-existence of the conditioning adjunct would entail the non-existence of fire inspite of the existence of smoke, thus rendering it impossible to draw any certain inference therefrom. Now, the Chárvákas argue that neither of these two things can in any case be made out. In the first place, the constant accompaniment cannot be established by direct observation for it obtains only within a limited range of time and space. Assuming that your past observations have been all one way, who knows that even the instance at hand is not an ex-

ception ? To endeavour to cure this intrinsic defect of direct observation through the assistance of inference would be futile, because the validity of all inferences being questioned, you cannot make use of any inference to support this validity without being involved in a vicious *progressus ad infinitum.* In the second place, it is impossible to be sure about the non-existence of any conditioning adjunct limiting the constancy of the accompaniments, for although you may say that there is no such adjunct so far as your observation goes, there is no rule that all the adjuncts must be open to your observation, and they may still exist unobserved by you. Hence inference and the rest except direct observation are not valid sources of knowledge. If they sometimes give correct results, those instances should be regarded as cases of accidental coincidence.

II. The Bauddha Philosophers have refuted these objections of the Chárvákas. They have not only tried to show the absurd and self-destructive character of the Chárváka doctrine, but have also proceeded to explain and justify the basis of all legitimate inferences.

In the first place they point out that the conduct of the followers of Chárváka indicates that their repudiation of all inferences is a mere pretence ; thus, though the presence of an object, or rather an object as present, may be perceived, the absence of an object is never perceived, but is inferred from its non-perception, so that if a follower of Chárváka ever regards an object as non-existent he thereby admits the pro-

priety of an inference of this character ; so again the very fact that he tries to prove the invalidity of all inferences indicates that he must have inferred the existence of a contrary opinion or, at least, of a doubt in the minds of other persons with regard to this question from their demeanour or other indices. In this manner good many instances of their surreptitious use of inference may be pointed out notwithstanding their theoretical disavowal.

In the second place, in answer to the obejections against the possibility of ascertaining constant accompaniment, the Bauddha Philosophers maintain that this can be ascertained by reference to the uniform connexion that exists between a cause and its effects, and to the unalterable identity that marks the same object in all its variations. The possibility of exceptions, therefore, finds a check (व्याघात) when it comes into conflict with either of these two principles; to borrow one of J. S. Mill's expressions, these two principles may be said to constitute the grounds of induction. The observations which taken together indicate the existence of a causal nexus are five in number :—(1) nonperception of the effect at the outset, (2) perception of the cause, (3) subsequent perception of the effect, (4) perception of the disappearance of the effect, and (5) perception of the disappearance of the cause. These five steps are collectively denominated as पञ्चकारणी because it is only when you perceive them in succession that you can affirm the existence of a causal relation between two phenomena.

On these grounds, then, the Bauddha schools maintain that it is possible to have valid inferences, for when you find an effect you may safely infer the pre-existence of its cause, and when you can identify an object you may attribute to it all the essential attributes known to characterise an object of that class.

III. Kapila maintains that áptavákya or trustworthy affirmation is a separate source of true knowledge; the Vaiśeshikas however regard it as furnshing a special kind of anumána or inference based on the trustworthiness of the speaker.

In so far as words (śabda) incorporate the results of the experience of the speaker their probative value is at best indirect and derivative, for the actual sources of knowledge on the last resort are observation and inference. The important question therefore, is, can śabda be regarded in any case as an independent source of knowledge, that is, can it establish the truth of propositions which cannot be directly substantiated by any from of *laukika* (secular) proof?

The sphere of revelation may be said to have reference to two kinds of topics: (1) that which is (*siddha*), and (2) that which ought to be done (*sádhya*).

The Vaidika Philosophers of India maintain that with regard to the latter topic the usual laukika sources of knowledge, that is, observation and inference must necessarily be imperfect, for the rightness or wrongness of an action is not one of its sensible characters that can be directly perceived; and, moreover, if in ascertaining the ethical character of

an action one has to refer to its result, even then the shortcoming of observation and inference is apparent, for although they may enable a person to measure approximately the effect of an action so far as it exhibits itself during the short space of a man's life, there remains an illimitable region beyond which they cannot encompass within their range. This shortcoming, they maintain, has to be mended by reference to the Vedas which contain injunctions and prohibitions indicating what actions should be performed and how they should be performed. Nay, Pûrva Mîmáṅsá goes farther and maintains that these injunctions and prohibitions form the only proper subjectmatter of the Vedas, so that statements about matters of fact that are found therein are only incidental statements outside their main scope ; but then this view has not been adopted by the other Systems.

Realities may be divided into two kinds : empirical realities, and transcendental realities. With regard to the former it is readily admitted that the correctness of the Vedic statements may very well be tested by the application of other criterions of truth. It is not the special object of the Vedas to inculcate empirical knowledge ; when statements about empirical facts are incidentally made therein, they are made for the purpose of illustration or with some such object, and it is enough if they are so far correct as to satisfy that purpose ; if, therefore, they are sometimes found to be wanting in rigorous precision, that should not be regarded as incompatible

with the infallibility of the Vedas on their own proper subject-matter.

With regard to transcendental realities, the Vedántists contend that they are from their nature beyond the reach of the laukika sources of knowledge. The nature of Brahman, His relation to the world and the individual souls, these are matters which outreach the resources of observation and inference, for they, being no better than human resources are limited by the conditions of their operation to the empirical sphere. The Vedantists, therefore, maintain that with regard to these, revelation furnishes the primary source of knowledge, and if any one dispute its authority he is cast adirft upon a sea of speculations which must ultimately end in agnosticism. It must not however be understood that intuitions and inferences have nothing to do with any discussion about transcendental questions; had that been maintained by the Vedânta, it could hardly be regarded as a *System* of Philosophy, that is, as a System founded on reason, and not merely on faith. The real position of the Vedântists seems to be, that in arriving at a definite conclusion about these questions, one should follow the guidance of the Vedas, and use his reasoning in their wake avoiding all arbitray and haphazard procedure. Reasoning will then be found, as they undertake to show, to be consonant with and corroborative of the truths disclosed by revelation.

In this view, *S*abda or revelation may well be

regarded as a distinct and independent source of knowledge ; a fuller discussion of this question is however reserved for a different place.

IV. The Naiyáyikas consider Upamána to be an additional source of knowledge. It operates through the recognition of similarity as it enables one to identify an object through its known similarity to a known object. So far as this process leads to a correct conclusion, it may be regarded as a class of anumána, for the recognised similarity may very well be considered as the characteristic sign (li*m*ga) which invariably indicates the objects of a particular class and thus validates the inference.

V. Arthápatti is regarded by some as an additional source of attaining knowledge. It is a sort of indirect process in which a certain conclusion is reached by showing that had it been otherwise it would have been incompatible with certain known facts. Thus, to take the staple example, from the fact that a person continues stout although he does not take any food in daytime you may infer that he takes food during night, for were it otherwise, his continued stoutness would be inexplicable. Most of the Naiyáyikas attempt to reduce this process to a kind of anumána although the great Naiyáyika of Bengal, Raghunátha *S*iromoṇi, was of opinion that it should be classed apart. I need not reproduce the manner in which or the standpoint from which they discuss this question, for it properly belongs to

a logical disquisition ; it seems to me that here we have not got a simple piece of reasoning, but several pieces put together.

VI. The Vedántists add *anupalabdhi* as a separate class of pramáṇa. Anupalabdhi or nonperception of a thing at a certain place or time proves the nonexistence of that thing at that place or time, provided there is no hindrance to its being perceived, if it be present. To this it is objected that the absence of an object is as much perceived as its presence, so that what proves the absence is not nonperception but perception. But it is replied that pure absence cannot be perceived, for it is nothing positive and is thus incapable of coming into contact with the senses ; the absence of an object is therefore not perceived, but inferred from nonperception. It seems that this is really a case of anumána in which the absence of the cause is inferred from the absence of the effect.

VII. and VIII. The Pauráṇikas recognise two other sources of knowledge, viz. Sambhava or implication and Aitihya or tradition. The first hardly deserves to be called a source of new knowledge ; as to the second, its authority, where it is valid, is found on ultimate analysis to rest on correct observation and inference.

The above exposition will make it clear that if we do not unnecessarily restrain the scope of anumána by giving it a narrow definition, pratyaksha, anumána, and śabda will exhaust all the ultimate and independent kinds of pramáṇas, the rest being either derivative or reducible to these.

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INTRODUCTION.

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CHAPTER IV.

An account of some of the chief Philosophical Systems of India.

The Charvaka System.—I have pointed out in the last Chapter that according to the Chárvákas Pratyaksha or direct perception is the only source of knowledge. The rest of the views of theChárvákas may be traced out logically from this opinion. According to them the body endowed with consciousness constitutes the self. It is impossible for them to maintain that there is a soul apart from and independently of the body, for no such thing is or can be perceived. Earth, water, fire (heat), and air, are the elements which being combined in certain ways give rise to the bodies, and from this combination springs consciousness, just as the intoxicating property of liquor arises from the fermentation of certain objects. Consciousness being thus a product of the structural formation, it follows that it must be extinguished along with the dissolution of the body. There is therefore no life after death. Hopes of rewards and threats of punishment after death are but hollow sounds; they are but the inventions of deceitful priestcraft.

What therefore we should take into account are but pleasures and pains as they are undergone in this life. In Ethics, therefore, the Chárvákas are Hedonists of the coarsest type. While you are alive, enjoy yourself as best as you can; do not mind what are the means you adopt, for when after death your frail body is reduced to ashes there is an end of everything. But then it may be said that these worldly pleasures are not pure, for they are almost always attended with or followed by pain; what does that matter? rejoins Chárváka. Should we renounce such pleasures as are available, because forsooth they are mixed with pain, in expectation of unseen pleasures in the life to come which nobody has seen, and nobody can establish by proof? You must take the world as it is, and make the most of it. Does any sensible man throw away good corn because of the husk? The Chárvákas have no religion: they can have none: they are down-right atheists. Materialism, extreme Hedonism, and Atheism are thus found blended in this curious philosophical doctrine.

The Bauddha Philosophy.—It is found subdivided into four different schools,—Mádhyamika, Yogáchára, Sautràntika, and Vaibháshika. Though all these schools try to trace their respective doctrines to the teaching of one master, *viz.* Buddha, they differ in several important particulars which will be shortly noticed as we pass on. We will first mention those points about which they agree:—

The Buddhists recognise Anumána as a source of

true knowledge. The grounds upon which they do so have been stated in the last Chapter.

This world, according to the Buddhists, is full of miseries; to ascertain the means of extinguishing them was the aim of Buddha's meditations. To do this, it is necessary to go to the root of the evil. The ultimate source of all our miseries is to be found, the Buddhists maintain, in *avidyá* or ignorance whence proceed all the desires that send us after the ephemeral objects of the world forgetting their true nature. To eradicate these desires one should keep steadily before his mind the real nature of this world; for this purpose the Buddhists prescribe four kinds of meditation (Bhávaná): one should always keep in mind that everything that is is momentary, that this world is full of miseries, that no two things are exactly alike so that one thing cannot serve to define another, and lastly that everything is empty or devoid of real existence. (The last position is most rigorously maintained by the Mádhyamikas alone, the other schools allowing, as we shall see, certain qualifications.) When these meditations are properly pursued, the world ceases to produce its baneful influence upon the man, for, in one sense, there is nothing good or bad, but thinking makes it so; all the desires are thenceforward pacified; and at last the human soul, free from avidyá which is the source of individual existence and its consequent miseries, merges itself into the formlessness (*S*ûnyatá) from which it originally sprang. This is the Nirváṇa, the summum bonum of the Buddhistic Philosophy.

It will be seen that I have not attempted to reproduce the details of the Buddhistic *pratîtyasamutpáda* or causal chain showing the gradual sequence of the worldly life and its miseries from the ultimate antecedent avidyá, as they cannot be properly understood without such an amount of exposition as I cannot include within the range of this short sketch. I may now try to give my readers some idea as to the nature of the arguments by which the Buddhistic Philosophers seek to establish the momentariness of all existing things :—

A thing exists, says the Buddhist, in so far as it does some work or produces some result ; the power to produce results may therefore be said to constitute the reality of a thing ; entire passivity cannot be distinguished from nihility. That being so, it follows that you cannot ascribe continued existence to a thing, unless you can maintain that at every moment of its supposed continued existence there exist inhering in it, either actually or potentially, the powers of producing all the effects which are manifested by it during the subsequent moments of its continuance, for, were it otherwise, the powers manifesting themselves at different moments would seem to be severed from one another, thus disproving the continued existence and operation of one identical thing, for it is the powers in action which constitute the essence of a thing. Now, the existence of such powers in actuality cannot be maintained, for if they did so exist, why did they not manifest themselves at the time? Nor

can it be said that they existed potentially, for the potential existence of a power amounts practically to its non-existence. But may it be said that the assertion of the existence of those powers may be made consistently with their non-manifestation at the time, by assigning this latter fact to the absence of certain co-operating agents? To this the Buddhists reply in the following way *: You say that the connexion of the stationary object with the auxiliary agents serves to enable its dormant powers to manifest themselves; now, does this connexion produce any new modification in the stationary object? If it does not, then the connexion is infructuous, and cannot be held as determinant of any new result. If, on the other hand, it does, is the new modification so produced incorporated in the old object or not? If you adopt the former alternative, my position is almost conceded, for, then, it is not a stationary object that produces a new result, but it is what you call a modified object that does so; may we not say, then, that here there has been a cessation of the old object and a supervention of a new one? If you adopt the latter alternative, and say that the modification which serves to bring about the new result is something existing apart from the stationary object, and always severable from it, then you really denude your stationary object of all causal connexion with the new result, for it is the separable modification which determines it that should

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* See नासतोऽदृष्टत्वादिति—वेदान्तसूत्रे भामती।

be designated as its cause. Then, again, it often so happens that in spite of the existence of the socalled stationary object in conjunction with the auxiliary agents the new result does not come out at once; it takes some time, therefore, to produce the modifications in the stationary object which determine the happening of the new result. How then are we to account for this delay? Must we not say, if we follow the old line of explanation you brought forward, that it so happens because the stationary object wants *some* modifications in its condition to enable it to receive those *other* modifications which will give rise to the new result? These modifications, again, as they do not come off at once, must have stood in need of some further modifications, and so on. You are thus reduced to admit a chain of successive modifications which you cannot bring to a close, a something in the nature of a *progressus ad infinitum* shoved in between two events in time, which vitiates your position. On the whole, therefore, the Buddhists conclude that everything that is is momentary, and that the appearance of continuity arises from the succession of a series of similar momentary objects linked together by a chain of causation.

The four Buddhistic Schools differ chiefly in their views regarding the existence of the external world. The Mádhyamikas are nihilists; they repudiate all forms of real existence, without making any distinction between the external and the internal worlds. The Yogáchára School, while denying the existence

of anything external to consciousness (vijñána), maintain that ideas have temporary but real existence, and that they do, under certain circumstances, appear as if they were external things ; this view therefore amounts to a sort of Subjective Idealism. The Sautrántikas are representationists, that is, inferential realists ; they admit the existence of the external world, but maintain that it is not directly perceived but inferred from certain states of consciousness which could not otherwise have arisen. The Vaibháshikas are natural realists, to adopt Sir W. Hamilton's expression ; they maintain that the external objects are directly perceived, and that their existence is substantiated thereby. Readers of English Philosophy may compare these views with those of (1) Hume (2) Berkeley or Mill, (3) Brown, and (4) Hamilton respectively. I cannot conveniently reproduce the arguments which the followers of these four Schools urge in support of their respective positions, but I venture to assert that they are specimens of most ingenious subtlety and deserve a careful study.

The Samkhya Philosophy.—The Sáṁkhyas endeavour to explain the evolution of the cosmical world as it appears to us out of one initial cause, (*Prakriti*). The Purushas or intelligent souls however coexist unaffected by the mutations necessarily involved in this course of evolution. Prakriti and Purusha are thus the two initial principles according to the Sáṁkhya System, and their conjunction gives rise to the evolution of the cosmical world. The

mutation and activity involved in this process are of Prakriti alone ; Purusha is immutable inactive pure intelligence (Chaitanya) ; it may be regarded as an initial factor in the evolution in so far as it determines the genesis and progress of the evolution by its very presence, for were it not for its presence Prakriti which is unintelligent would not act at all, as it has no purpose of its own. There is thus a relation of interdependence between Prakriti and Purusha in determining the course of evolution. Action implies two things : purpose and activity; in the evolutionary action the purpose is that of Purusha who is intelligent, but the activity belongs to Prakriti alone. Their interdependence is likened to that of a blind and a lame man ; one cannot see, the other cannot walk, but the two together by mutual assistance can manage to arrive at the destination.

When speaking of this interdependence, the Sáṁkhyas must not be understood to admit the existence of God as intelligently determining the course which Prakriti would take ; they broadly assert that the existence of such a God is incapable of being proved, and go further to maintain that such a position would be inconsistent with the conception of God as entertained by the advocates of divine perfection, for agency or activity consciously directed towards some unrealised end implies mutation as well as want or imperfection.

But then was the founder of the Sáṁkhya System a thoroughgoing atheist ? It is often assumed that he was ; but Vijñána Bhikshu, the famous Commentator

of the Sáṁkhya Sûtras, maintain that he was not. It is remarkable that nowhere in his aphorisms * does Kapila say that God does not exist; all that he says is that His existence is incapable of being proved. Hence argues Vijñána Bhikshu, Kapila was not at heart an atheist; what he intended to maintain was that *prakriti-purusha-viveka* or discrimination between nature and soul would result in the realisation of the ultimate end of existence, *i. e.*, in the complete extinction of all sorts of unhappiness irrespective of the existence of God. Kapila's repudiation is therefore explained by Vijñána-Bhikshu in the light of *abhyupagama-váda*, or a minor concession in favour of an opponent which would not prejudice the main argument. A careful perusal of the aphorisms bearing upon this question, however, leads me to think that it was not as a mere concession to an opponent's standpoint that Kapila said that the existence of God was incapable of being proved; whether he was an atheist or not, he meant to maintain and did main-

* I may here mention that there is an opinion that Kapila is not the author of the Sáṁkhya Sûtras as they are known to us: He was the author of a short tract called तत्त्वसमास which is no longer extant, and it is said that the Sûtras were elaborated on its basis by some subsequent author. If I recollect correctly, some modern European Scholar has attributed the authorship of these Sûtras to Vijnana Bhikshu. Whatever truth there may be in the view that the Sûtras were not composed by Kapila, which, by the way, it is very difficult for us to ascertain, there is none whatsoever in the assertion that they are the work of Vijnana Bhikshu; it is a pure surmise, contradicted by the latter's own assertion that Kapila himself was their author; moreover, had he been their author, he would not have proceeded to argue that Kapila was a theist on the basis of the wording of the aphorism 'ईश्वरासिद्धेः' which *ex hypothesi* had been composed by himself.

tain that neither pratyaksha nor anumána could establish the being of God. It is however true that he did not endeavour to show definitely that revelation was equally silent upon this point; and this along with the fact that he did not, in so many words, deny the existence of God might lead one to suspect that notwithstanding his unqualified denial of proof in the aphorism "ईश्वरासिद्धेः", he did really believe in the existence of God on the authority of Scripture. But this position seems to be too shaky to be unhesitatingly relied on, for it may well be asked, that if such were Kapila's real opinion why did he not avow it? To this question an answer has indeed been returned, and it is this: in all probability Kapila thought that the open admission of God as a Being endowed with supreme power and unmixed happiness might dazzle and delude a man to think that his endeavours should be directed after the attainment of power and happiness, and thus make him forgetful of the real summum bonum and the only means whereby it can be realised; he therefore refrained from making the avowal, and as his principal doctrines do not turn upon it, he did not feel any embarrassment in developing his System. All these however, are mere surmises, and it is perhaps safer not to base any final judgment thereon.*

* Mark however the aphorism 'समाधिसुषुप्तिमोक्षेषु ब्रह्मरूपता.' Does it not seem likely that Kapila drew a distinction between ब्रह्म and ईश्वर, and recognised the former while denying the existence of the latter? If so, then he was not a thoroughgoing atheist for he denied the existence of God only in a particular sense.

To revert to our main discussion : I have already pointed out that the purpose of evolution can have reference to Purushas or souls alone, but it is Prakriti that actively works it out. In this view a difficulty very naturally suggests itself : how can Prakriti blindly work out purposes which are not its own, and why should it do so ? To this enquiry, the only answer is that it does ; the interrelation between Prakriti and Purusha is an ultimate fact, and incapable of further explanation.

I will now briefly indicate the course of evolution according to the Sáṁkhya Philosophy.

Prakriti consists of three factors which are termed guṇas because they are the causes of the bondage of men ; it must not be understood that they are so many qualities of Prakriti for they together constitute Prakriti itself. The guṇas are called *sattwa*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, and they may be regarded as so many forces having different characteristics. The characteristic of sattwa is selfmaintenance, that of rajas is activity and hence opposition, and that of tamas is inanity and regulation ; the first determines happiness, the second pain, and the third ignorance. When the three guṇas are in equilibrium, we get Prakriti in its unevolved primordial condition (अव्यक्तावस्था); when this equilibrium is broken, Prakriti marches on in its course of evolution. In this course we may primarily mark out two stages ; first, an intermediate stage where the evolved effects are themselves determinant of further evolution (prakriti-vikriti), and second, the

final stage where they are not so (vikriti). On the whole, therefore, the totality of existence may be divided into four classes: Prakriti (the initial cause), Prakriti-vikriti (intermediate caused causes), Vikriti (lowest effects), and Anubhaya (*i. e.*, immutable Purusha or soul who is neither a cause nor an effect).

The intermediate causes are seven in number. The first step in the evolution of prakriti gives rise to Mahán (the principle of understanding); from Mahán proceeds Ahaṁkára (the principle of selfassertion); and from Ahaṁkára with a preponderance of tamas or inanity proeeeds pañcha-tanmátras, *i. e.*, the five subtle forms of sensible matter in correspondence with the five senses of intuition.

The vikritis are sixteen; the eleven Indriyas or organs consisting of mind, the five sensory organs, and the five motor organs; and the five Mahábhûtas or great elements *viz.* earth, water, fire, air, and ákáśa or ether. The former eleven proceed from ahaṁkára with a preponderance of sattwa, and the latter five from the pañcha-tanmátras.

Altogether therefore we get 24, or rather (including purusha) 25 tattwas or cardinal principles according to the Sáṁkhya Philosophy.

We will now turn to the next important topic of the Sáṁkhya Philosophy, *viz.* its doctrine of bondage and salvation. Life in this world is pervaded by different sorts of miseries; there can be no question that there is a preponderance of pain over pleasure; these miseries may, of course, be to a certain extent

alleviated by the adoption of secular remedies suited to meet individual cases, but they are only limitedly efficacious for they cannot produce any permanent result, as they do not go to the root of the real disease. Complete extinction of all sorts of unhappiness constitutes the summum bonum of the Sáṁkhyas; the question is how to attain this end. To solve this question it is necessary to ascertain the ultimate root of all the miseries, for if you want to eradicate these you must strike at that place. The Sáṁkhyas maintain that non-discrimination (aviveka) of prakriti and purusha, and consequent reflection of the mutations of buddhi or understanding into the self which is in itself immutable, and therefore free from afflictions, are the ultimate causes of all our miseries; coming in contact with different objects understanding undergoes various transmutations; so long as the purusha continues forgetful of his own nature he thinks those transmutations as his own, and is consequently affected thereby. To get rid of this evil, one has to ponder upon the nature of the self as distinguished from prakriti with its effects and functions, and thus eliminate their erroneous identification. The wise man who has succeeded in doing this becomes imperturbable; the conceit of agency loses its hold upon him; prakriti ceases to produce his fruition owing to the extinction of its auxiliary, the ignorance; and at last when the moving force of the present life works itself out, there is no rebirth, and no recurrence of the miseries which are so abundant in

this world. Thus freed from extrinsic bondage the purusha abides in his own nature; words cannot fitly describe this state, it transcends the narrow limits of thought. A pure intellect (chid) having no antithetic object, without mutation, without beginning, without end, a something that is not invested with any definite form, and yet is not absolutely void; such is the thing that subsists, and subsists eternally.

I may add that the Sáṁkhyas recognise the plurality of purushas on the ground that if it were otherwise the salvation of one would entail the total extinction of all bondage, and consequent dissolution of the universe, for when all purushas are free, the purpose of the universe is at an end; but this is not what takes place, for freedom can only be attained by the acquisition of knowledge, in each individual case.

The Patanjala System.—In enumerating the tattwas or fundamental principles, and describing their evolution, the Pátañjala System closely follows the Sáṁkhya; the only difference is that the Pátañjala distinctly recognises the existence of God which the Sáṁkhya does not. * God is a purusha untouched by pain, action, mutation and desire; in Him has knowledge found its perfection; He is the allpowerful efficient cause of this universe, and the ultimate instructor of the wise. Complete extinction of unhappiness constitutes the summum bonum, and is attain-

* Hence this System is sometimes called the 'Seswara Sáṁkhya' System.

able by the constant pursuit of true knowledge and meditation on God. The principal topic of the Pátañjala System is *Yoga* whence the system is called the Yoga System. By Yoga is meant the regulation of mind with the object of controlling its functions. The system lays down the ways and means of Yoga, describes its constituent elements and different stages, and pictures its ultimate consummation in *Samâdhi* or meditative self-absorption which when realised gives rise to pure subjective bliss. The tenets of the Pátañjala System are more practical than theoretical, and can seldom be tested by pure reflection unaided by practice.

The Mimansa System.—The Pûrva Mîmáṅsá of Jaimini deals principally with the rules of interpretation of the ritualistic portion of the Vedas. Injunctions and prohibitions with reference to action constitute, according to Jaimini, the proper subjectmatter of the Vedas, so that if there be anything in them not ancillary to that main purpose it may be considered as unprofitable and unauthoritative. Extinction of all empirical relations is the summum bonum according to the Mîmáṅsakas, and it is attainable by the constant performance of actions ordained by the Vedas. Salvation, however, does not involve the extinction of mind, for the soul enters into a blissful state in conjunction with it. The souls are many, and they reap the fruits of their actions; actions bear their own fruits without any external divine intervention; the stream of interrelations

between actions and their results is without a commencement like the interrelations between seeds and sprouts. The Mîmáṅsakas do not admit the existence of gods invested with various forms; mantras or mystic words, they say, constitute, so to say, the bodies of gods, for through these they manifest their actions. They further maintain that the existence of a creator of the universe determining the results of human actions can not be established by any of the known modes of proof; actions themselves are competent to produce their own results, and thus explain the varied fortunes of men. It is, however, maintained by some that the prominence attached by Jaimini to the performance of action is intended to suit the requirements of worldly people who are not competent to pursue the quest after higher knowledge; for the performance of right actions wipes away the perplexities and impurities of mind, and thus facilitates the pursuit of truth, and prepares the mind for the reception of the highest knowledge as inculcated by the Vedánta. This view is advocated by Mádhavácháryya in his *S*aṁkara-vijaya. With reference to Jaimini's apparent repudiation of God, Mádhavácháryya maintains that it was not Jaimini's intention to deny the existence of God, but merely to prove that the nonscriptural arguments advanced by the Vaiśeshikas to establish His existence are in themselves insufficient or inconclusive. Rámánuja Swámî also holds that the Pûrva Mîmáṅsá of Jaimini and the Uttar Mîmáṅsá of Vyása are not separate

Systems, but that the two together constitute one entire System, the former forming a prelude to the latter. The traditional story that Jaimini was a pupil of Vyása also lends colour to this view.

The Vaiseshika System of Kanada.—The Vaiśeshikas maintain in opposition to the Vedantists, that Divine Reason can not constitute the material cause of the universe on the principle that properties inherent in the material cause must be found in the effect, just as white threads can only make white clothes. If Divine Reason had been the material cause of the material universe, intelligence would have been one of its inherent properties ; insentient atoms must therefore be admitted as constituting the ultimate materials out of which this cosmical universe has taken its shape; these are the indivisible smallest particles of matter, and are of four different kinds corresponding to the four kinds of elements *viz.*, earth, water, fire, and air. A'káśa, although it is one of the elements, has no atoms corresponding to it, for it is *nitya* or eternal, and has not arisen out of a conglomeration of molecules. The cosmical universe has arisen from the conjunction of the atoms, and their disjunction will lead to its dissolution. At the commencement of creation there takes place, owing to the operation of a mysterious agency (adrishṭa), a commotion in the aerial atoms ; this process joins one atom to another, and thus generates air first in a molecular and then gradually in a massive form. The growth of the other elements is also

explained in a similar way as a result of the conglomeration of atoms. Atoms are therefore regarded as eternal, although they do not always exist in a cosmical from. This portion of the Vaiśeshika theory is thus akin to the Atomism of Democritus.

A'tmá or soul is eternal and pervading ; its existence is inferrible form the existence of feelings, desires, etc, which are directly perceived by us. The Vaiśeshikas recognise the multiplicity of souls on the ground that the variety of conditions and circumstances characterising different individuals would be incompatible with its denial. *Chaitanya* or cognitive intelligence is not a constituent of the soul, but is one of its attributes. Salvation consists in the severance of the soul from its connexion with attributes; on its attainment the soul subsists like the ethereal space (ákáśa) free from all mutations pleasurable or painful. The attainment of salvation depends on the acquisition of true knowledge with regard to the six (or seven) orders of nameable things (padárthas), which is necessary for contemplative selfknowledge. This acquisition is, on its turn, farthered by the performance of right actions in a right spirit, so that Ethics and Metaphysics are ultimately connected with each other.

The Nyaya System of Gautama.—The doctrines of the Naiyáyikas are in many respects similar to those of the Vaiśeshikas. They try to establish the existence of God as an inference from the existence of the world, for the existence of a thing having a

definite shape and consisting of different parts necessarily implies the existence of a maker. Apart from this cosmological argument, they also make use of what may be called the ethical argument, and maintain that it is necessary to admit the existence of God to explain the requital of desert, for a past action cannot be requited in future without the intervention of an intelligent regulator. Creation is an act of divine grace; the existence of misery in this world does not conflict with the mercifulness of God, for it is but the result of human action. Salvation consists in the complete extinction of misery, and is attainable, through the grace of God, by the acquisition of perfect self-knowledge, for it is ignorance of the real nature of the self which is the ultimate source of all desires and aversions, and through them of miseries. When self-knowledge dissipates ignorance, desires, aversions, and consequent hankerings after action gradually disappear, and the course of metempsychosis comes to an end; the wise man, therefore, becomes free from all sorts of miseries incidental to worldly life, or, in other words, attains salvation.* After thus characterising the nature of salvation, and the means of its acquisition, the Naiyáyikas proceed to deal with sixteen different categories or topics of discussion, consisting of the

* There is some doubt as to the exact nature of the Naiyáyikas' view as regards the character of the self in a state of salvation, which will be discussed when I come to deal with the Vedantic theory of summum bonum.

sources of knowledge, the objects of knowledge, and so forth, for they maintain that the acquisition of self-knowledge depends upon the knowledge of these topics.

The Naiyáyikas also maintain the multiplicity of souls. Chaitanya or cognitive intelligence is one of the attributes of soul ; it arises from the interconnection of the soul (átmá) and mind (manas) ; and when this connexion is in temporary abeyance during the state of sound sleep, chaitanya also, for the moment, ceases to subsist.

The Bhatta-Doctrine—According to the Bhaṭṭas, a School of the Mîmáṅsakas, intelligence and unintelligence both blended together go to constitute the nature of the self, for in a state of deep sleep, when the self is denuded of all extraneous influence, intelligence and unintelligence are found to coexist. This position,as it stands, is scarcely intelligible ; it may however be regarded as an epigrammatical way of saying that a sort of subjective consciousness may exist without the accompaniment of objective discrimination, and that this is what characterises the self in a state of deep sleep when it is divested of adventitious attributes. The Bhaṭṭas do not admit the existence of God, as the creator of the universe ; for they say, that the existence of a creator would involve the existence of some purpose in the creator inducing Him to action, and a purpose implies some want and thus evidences an element of imperfection. The highest good consists in a constant flow of superlative happiness;

it can only be attained by the performance of actions (including the ceremonies) enjoined in the Vedas. The life of a householder (grihastha) is therefore best suited to this course, and asceticism is reprehensible except for those who are incapable of performing the duties of a householder.

The Ṡaiva and Pasupata Doctrines—God is the efficient cause of the universe; this causality is not contingent upon the coexistence of vestiges of action in individual souls for its operation. God and the Jîvas (individual souls) are essentially different from one another; there is such a contrast between them that if the former be compared to light, the latter may almost be likened to darkness. God is omniscient and all-powerful, the Jîvas are ignorant and weak. Out of mercy God has imparted instructions about yoga or meditative communion, which when pursued results in acquisition of power and extinction of pain.

I refrain from giving in this Chapter an account of the Viśishṭádwaitaváda of Rámánuja and Pûrṇaprajña System of A'nandatîrtha, as I think they will find a more appropriate place in a subsequent Chapter.

Before I conclude this Chapter it will not be out of place to say a few words with regard to the manner in which a Hindu mind tries to reconcile the several Systems, which, as we have seen above, are in some respects antagonistic to one another, and thus justify their separate existence. The name of Vijñána Bhikshu, the celebrated commentator of the Sáṁkhya Sûtras is often mentioned in connexion with such an

attempt, but he is by no means the originator of the method of reconciliation he adopted. A Hindu mind is essentially tolerant and synthetic ; it tries to grasp the practical utility of varying doctrines, and in so far as they are efficacious it assigns to them a relative validity. The same instruction is not adapted to the requirements of all persons ; difference of tendencies and capacities in the pupil must be met by a corresponding difference in the modes of training as well as in the instructions imparted in order that they may be fruitful, and a view which is strictly speaking only approximately correct must often be represented as true if the exigencies of a profitable instruction so require. The highest good, whatever it may be, is not attainable at a step ; one must ascend higher and higher through successive stages to reach it, so that instruction suited to one on a higher level of spiritual life is not adapted to another occupying a lower plane. It is therefore necessary that you should pause to ascertain whether your pupil has obtained a secure position where he is, before you should try to give him a further lift, for by too much of haste you may tumble him down.

This method of cautious and gradual instruction is explained by Hindu writers by likening it to the method by which a teacher would train his pupil's eye to fix a small indistinct star, and is called Arundhatî-darśana-nyáya. Arundhatî is a small indistinct star, but close to it there is a bigger star which can be more easily fixed ; the teacher who wishes to train his

young pupil to find the star may at first point out the bigger star as Arundhatí; and when the pupil has been able to fasten his gaze upon it, the next step would be to correct his mistake, and show the smaller star by its side which will then be easily identifiable.

It therefore follows that before you venture to stigmatise a System as false, the real purpose of the System should be attended to, and it is enough if the statements made in it are sufficiently precise to meet that purpose. The Hindu Philosophers never forgot their duties as teachers, and they knew it perfectly well that one single cap cannot fit every one's head; the highest Philosophy is not that which refutes other Systems, but that which maintains and transcends them at the same time. How far the Vedánta fulfils this condition is to be seen later on.

BOOK I.

THE TOPICS OF THE VEDANTA.

The topics (anubandha) of the Vedánta System, as enumerated by the A'cháryas, are four in number:—(1) who is a fit person to be initiated into the System; (2) what is the subject-matter of the System; (3) the relation (*i. e.* fitness) of the sources of instruction to the subject-matter to be taught; and (4) the purpose of instruction. I think it will be convenient to make a few observations on each of these topics at this place.

I. Who are fit for instruction?—I have already pointed out that it does not follow that because a doctrine is true, every one should be instructed in it. On the other hand the doctrine of the Vedantists that there is nothing but Brahman, may, if wrongly understood, be productive of injurious consequences, for it may be regarded as subversive of all distinctions between higher and lower, and thus create confusion of ideas and perplexisties in conduct. At the very threshold, therefore, there arises the question, who are fit for appreciating the Vedánta doctrine, and realising the the Vedantic ideal. The very first aphorism of the Vedánta Sûtras* deals with this question, and it is there pointed out by the commentators that there are

* अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा

four requisites which must be possessed by one in order that he may become properly qualified for divine enquiries; they are these:—(1) discriminative knowledge of eternal and accidental existence; (2) freedom from desire for worldly pleasures; (3) preparatory virtues, such as control over mind and sense-organs, renunciation of distractive pursuits, patience, earnestness, and perseverence, and (4) longing after salvation. Only a person endowed with these qualifications may fully comprehend the truths inculcated by the Vedánta, if he studies it from a properly qualified teacher, follows the discussion, and meditates upon it. The acquisition of these qualifications, again, depends in their turn upon an antecedent moral training, *i. e.* upon observance of enjoined and avoidance of prohibited actions, which result in the purity of the mind.

I have stated above the affirmative conditions of requisite training; I may also add a few words about the impediments to the acquisition of true knowledge. In the first place, vestiges of past inclinations often cling to the mind, and retard the pursuit and attainment of knowledge. Apart from these there are four other impediments which may be specifically mentioned: they are:—(1) dulness of intellect, (2) excessive attachment to secular objects, (3) irreverant overscepticism, and (4) perverse dogmatism. It is due to these that many persons do not feel any inclination to pursue spiritual enquiries, and many fail to get at the truth even after diligent study. These are to be overcome by the practice of moral virtues, and constant medi-

tation. Those who are at the moment unable to comprehend the lofty doctrine of the Vedánta, and realise its ideal, should practise devotional meditation, for, of all actions, it is the one which is most keenly connected with spiritual knowledge.

Devotional meditation, again, is of two kinds:—(1) meditation on the attributes of God contemplated as a personal being (Saguṇa-Brahmopásaná), and (2) meditation on God as the impersonal absolute spirit (nirguṇa-Brahmopásaná). The Vedántists assign a superior position to the latter, because they consider it to be more closely and directly connected with the ultimate end, viz, the attainment of true knowledge.

It will appear from the above that while the Vedánta attaches great importance to the attainment of rational knowledge, it leaves room for action and devotion as well. In a certain stage of spiritual existence, the performance of duty must constitute the highest proximate end; in another, love and devotion occupy the chief place; while the person who has passed through these stages becomes fit for receiving the highest spiritual knowledge which alone, according to the Vedánta, leads directly to salvation. In this way the Vedánta doctrine unifies and reconciles several doctrines by combining them in one harmonious whole; Ethics and Religion of Love thus become two moments in the complete evolution of Spiritual Religion.

II. What is the subject-matter of the Vedánta?—The foundation of the Vedánta System is laid on the

Vedic saying 'तत्त्वमसि' 'That art thou'. The aim of the Vedánta is to establish the essential nondifference of the Individual Soul(Jîva)from the Supreme Spirit(Brahman.) To do this, the Vedantists discriminate between an empirical and a transcendental standpoint, and contend that although from the former standpoint the Individual Souls appear to be finite and limited in every possible relation, yet from the latter they are no other than the Supreme Spirit appearing under the conditions of space and time, so that when you eliminate those conditions as nonessential, you are brought face to face with the ultimate unity, the indivisible infinitude of reality, reason, and bliss.

The primary evidence as to the existence and nature of Brahman is furnished by the Vedas. The function of human reason, in this regard, is to follow up the trail, *i. e.* develop the Scriptural truth, and show its connexion and consonance with its independent conclusions. Reason and revelation thus justify, supplement, and support each other. The existence of soul, on the other hand, is evidenced by self-intuition (*ahampratyaya* or *átmánubhava*). It is as absurd, says the Author of Pañchadaśî, for a person to deny the existence of the self, as to declare with his own tongue that he has no tongue, for the very act of denial contradicts the denial ; the existence of self is thus beyond all dispute, and if a person dispute that, no one can controvert him, for the foundation of all sane reasoning is thereby taken away. In one sense, therefore, it may be said that self-intuition proves the

self ; from another standpoint it has been declared to be beyond all proof, (1) for by what instrument can you know the knower ? (2) As *S*aṁkaráchárya puts it, in order that a thing may be proved there must be some one to receive the proof : If you have to prove the self who is to receive the proof ? Whoever receives it is the self. The existence of self being, thus, the constant condition of every form of knowledge proves itself, for were it not so, the demand for proof would want one of the indispensable conditions of its possibility, or a regressus ad infinitum would be the consequence.

Having thus established the existence of Brahman and Átman (or the self), the Vedánta next proceeds to consider the relation between the two, and this constitutes the main subjectmatter of the System. The point is dubious, and therefore worthy of enquiry. On the one hand there are passages in the Vedas declaring that Brahman is the sole reality and that the individual soul is not in its essence an entity separate from it ; on the other hand our normal ideas apparently militate against the acceptance of such a view. To solve the problem by showing the error of the ordinary notions and explaining the real import of the denial of difference between the individual soul and the Supreme Spirit is one of the principal aims of the Vedánta Philosophy.*

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(1) एतदप्रमेयं ध्रुवम् । (2) विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात् ।

* It must be borne in mind that this account of the subjectmatter of the Vedánta is not intended to be exhaustive; it only refers to what is considered to be the most important point of the Vedánta Philosophy.

III. The third topic of the Vedánta is the relation (*i. e.* fitness) of the sources of instruction to the subjectmatter to be taught. I have stated above what is the main point of enquiry with the Vedantists; but, then, is the enquiry likely to lead to any satisfactory conclusion? Is the doubt capable of being resolved? Unless we can answer this question in the affirmative it is clear that we cannot escape agnosticism or scepticism. The question, therefore, reduces itself to this: can we point out sources of knowledge capable of furnishing a satisfactory and reliable solution of the enquiry? The Vedantists maintain that whatever may be said as to the frailty and fallibility of dry human understanding unassisted by revelation in grappling with transcendental questions that are strictly speaking not directly within its sphere, the same remark cannot be made about the conclusions of reason supported by the authority of the Vedas. The old Vedantists unanimously recognised the infallibility of the Vedas; they contained, in their opinion, the revelation of divine knowledge through the utterances of sages, who, for the time, were the vehicles, so to say, of lofty truths which are ordinarily beyond the reach of human knowledge, and offered solutions of the most intricate problems of life which baffle the efforts of dry unaided understanding, solutions which are found to be consonant with reason, and free from many objections that may be raised against other conflicting theories.

In our days, reliance upon the infallibility of the Vedas may be regarded by many persons as unphilo-

sophical, if not superstitious. I cannot pretend to say that the grounds on which some of the old Vedantists attempted to substantiate the position are very convincing; for instance, it has been maintained that the Vedas are eternal, and as such not the production of the individual Rishis, but that their appearance at any particular moment of time is but their remanifestation through them; and it has been attempted to support this position on the ground that *śabdas* or words are eternal though their vocal manifestations (dhwani) are not so. I do not wish to trouble my readers with these arguments because I cannot say that I have as yet been able to understand them as they stand; nevertheless, I maintain that one should not disregard the Vedas in conducting an enquiry into spiritual subjects. In the first place, are not the sages, the Rishis of the Vedas, superior guides about these matters? Did not they devote their mind and soul to these enquiries, and meditate constantly upon them disregarding the secular concerns of life? And if so, why should we not revere their teaching as the words of the wise? If there are experts in other fields of learning, why not in this? But it may be objected, why should we adopt second-hand instruction when we can pursue the enquiries ourselves, and why should we rely on authority at the sacrifice of reason? This sort of objection assumes that we stand in need of no guidance in pursuing our enquiries, and that reliance on authority involves a sacrifice of reason; but these assumptions are not correct. Even conceding that

reason unassisted is always competent to solve spiritual problems, the very problems will not often suggest themselves unless you follow the lead of those ancient forerunners in the spiritual world ; the utility of the Vedas can therefore be hardly gainsaid. The next question is, does an unflinching reliance on their authority involve a sacrifice of reason ? I should think it does not, if the Vedantists are correct in their contention that the truths inculcated in the Vedas are consonant with reason while they explain the enigmas of spiritual life. It is one thing to say that a certain statement must be regarded as true because it is contained in such and such a book although it is contray to reason, and quite a different thing to maintain the truth of propositions on the twofold ground (1) that they have the sanction of sages who devoted their lives to these enquiries, and (2) that while not being opposed to reason, they satisfy the demands and cravings which reason, from its very nature, is unable to renounce.

It will be seen that in attempting to justify the reliance placed by the Vedantists on the texts of the Vedas, I have put their case as mildly as possible ; but this justification may appear to some to be inadequate to make out that the doctrines satisfying the conditions mentioned above meet the requirements of strict proof. Those, however, who make this objection forget that all kinds of truth are not amenable to the same modes of proof ; transcendental truths are from their very nature incapable of being established by empiri-

cal evidence alone in the same manner as empirical phenomena. Those who are not prepared to accept any doctrine as established unless it can be made 'scientifically' certain may satisfy themselves by comparing the relative validity of the several possible transcendental doctrines treating them in the light of hypotheses ; upon that footing they may judge which of these is the most rational, *i. e.* most free from incongruities and redundancies, best calculated to explain the difficulties connected with the subject, and most harmonious in itself as well as with the demands of reason. If among them there are men who cannot be persuaded to base their judgment on an enquiry of this character, they are doomed to agnosticism, and the benefits of a spiritual religion are not open to them. With reference to such persons one may say in the words of Udayanácharya :—"यदि न स्यात् ततः किं स्यादस्ति चेन्नास्तिको हतः" 'If it be not, no harm to us ; but woe to *nástika* if it be.'

In my attempt at justifying the Vedantists' reference to the Vedas as a source of instruction, I have advisedly reserved for the last place one further ground on which their reliance may be based. I have done so because I do not think it likely that those who see nothing in the grounds enumerated above will feel much scruple in rejecting this as well. My readers will perhaps understand that I am referring to the theory of inspiration. If the sages of old bent on discovering the hidden truths of the universe unceasingly devoted their thoughts

after that one enquiry, may not they thereby have acquired a sort of extraordinary experience in that subject ? May we not credit them with a higher form of insight, or to advance a step further, may we not say that in their case divine knowledge manifested itself through a human medium overflooding the barriers of narrow human understanding ? These are the questions which suggest themselves when we turn our attention to the possibility of inspiration. I must admit that it is rather difficult to return a positive answer to these questions ; yet I may assert that it is at least possible to conceive a state of mind, when through unwearied meditation it reaches such an ecstatic condition, and attains such a height of feeling, that it is suffused with a new radiance, is sublimated, so to say, so that the barriers set up by a narrow dualising understanding are blown up, and a single presence pervades and penetrates all. In that state of profound concentration the sage realises truths which ordinarily transcend our dry understanding, and he cries out, "वेदाहमेतं पुरुषं महान्तमादित्यवर्णं तमसः परस्तात्" "I have known the great one who shines beyond the limits of darkness as glorious as the sun," and his language though often couched in a pictorial or metaphorical form reveals mysteries which often baffle the efforts of our reflection ; immediate intuition thus takes the place of mediated ratiocination. Inspiration thus understood not only contains a negative movement by which the finite is outstripped, but it also contains a positive movement by which the infinite

is apprehended and realised. From this standpoint, therefore, we may have a stronger reason for justifying the reliance placed by the Vedántists on the Vedas as a source of instruction on spiritual subjects.

IV. The next topic of the Vedánta is the end of instruction or the ultimate aim of Philosophy. The Vedantists characterise it as the elimination of ignorance about the relation of the Individual Soul (Jívátmá) to the Supreme Spirit (Paramátmá) which conceals the real unity or essential identity that exists between them, and the attainment of unmixed bliss consequent thereon. It will be observed that the Vedantists' summum bonum has a double aspect, cognitive and emotive, and the two elements are supposed by them to go together, pure self-knowledge and pure self-enjoyment being, in their opinion, the same thing viewed from two different standpoints. A comparison of the different theories of summum bonum advocated by Philosophers, Indian as well as European, will show that the Vedántic ideal is fuller and richer than the rest, and, if I may say so, the loftiest of all. I may also point out that the close connexion between the summum bonum thus set forth and the subjectmatter of the Vedánta system clearly demonstrates its eminently practical character; it was not the result of the speculative effort of an acute mind to satisfy its clingings after speculation, but the outcome of the earnest efforts of sages bent on unravelling the mysteries of existence for the welfare of man-

kind. It will also be observed that the Vedantic summum bonum is not an adventitious result due to some sort of excellence superimposed upon the self, but is really the complete realisation of the essence of the self upon elimination of extraneous imputed mutations. It is in one sense a gain, in another a recovery. You become what you always are in knowing what you are, so that self-knowledge is identical with self-realisation.

A review of the principal doctrines upon the point leads me to think, that Philosophers have put forward three distinct things as the summum bonum, extinction of unhappiness, attainment of pleasure, and realisation of self. There can be little doubt that all these three things partake of the nature of the good ; the question is, can they be so combined and harmonised as to constitute the summum bonum or the highest good? For, if they cannot be so combined, the highest *possible* good will still remain imperfect. Some Philosophers have maintained that the attainment of perfection is the highest good ; but this answer paraphrases the question itself, and does not, unless further elucidated, solve the problem. Some, however, have identified it with the performance of duty or the attainment of virtue ; but when they have done so, they have generally viewed it as intimately connected intrinsically or extrinsically either with the attainment of pleasure, or with the extinction of pain, or with the realisation of self. I may here endeavour

to justify my position by reference to some of the principal doctrines of summum bonum.

Among the ancient Greek Philosophers, the theory of summum bonum as maintained by Plato is somewhat indefinite and vacillating. His vacillation is most conspicuous as to the place of pleasure in constituting the ultimate good ; it is true, he sometimes deprecated pleasure as being dependent on the sensuous and so nonsubstantial part of our nature ; but he also considered a life without enjoyment as too abstract and monotonous. His notion of the highest good, therefore, held in combination the elements of pleasure and virtue both, and he did not clearly realise the possibility of the two existing in antagonism to each other, or demonstrate why the two should always go together.

Aristotle designates the highest good as 'eudaimonia,' which consists, according to him, in a perfect activity in a perfect life. The highest life, he says, is the 'life philosophic'; but at the same time he considers the possession of such external goods, as riches, friends, beauty and so forth, as being a condition of happiness. So, then, the acquisition of the highest good is to a certain extent dependent on contingencies over which a man has no complete control. The nature of 'eudaimonia' is therefore not well defined; it sets forth an ideal of which rational activity and pleasure are the chief elements, and the inseparability of the two is rather assumed than strictly proved.

Among the Post-Aristotelians, the Stoics and the Epicureans advanced antagonistic theories; but to my mind, the antagonism seems to be more verbal than real, so far as the present question is concerned.

The chief end of human endeavours should be, according to the Stoics, the adaptation of our lives to the Reason that is in the world as well as in ourselves. Follow nature, act virtuously, and let not your action be influenced by any personal consideration such as attainment of pleasure. But is the life of wisdom and virtue a life of misery?—No; virtue is also happiness in so far as it frees a man from being ruffled by the vicissitudes of life; want of external goods does not affect the tranquillity of the wise man. So then, for the purpose of freeing ourselves from the miseries of unreason the Stoics are ready to sacrifice the ephemeral pleasures of a sensuous life. Extinction of pain and attainment of a more stable though less intense pleasure may therefore be said to constitute the highest end of the Stoics, and it is doubtful whether they would have valued the possession of virtue independently of these consequences.

The Epicureans considered pleasure to be the highest good. But one must not attach too much importance to the pleasures of the moment; what is most valuable is the spiritual joy which consists in the imperturbable tranquillity of the wise man. It will thus be seen that the Epicurean conception of the most desirable pleasure is rather negative in its character, for the efforts of an Epicurean sage would

be directed to the extinction of pain rather than in pursuit of positive pleasure.

Among the Philosophers of modern Europe, many have accepted the view that the acquisition of pleasure is the summum bonum of human life. Locke, Hume, Mill, Bain, and Sidgwick are of this opinion. On the other hand, the German Philosopher Hegel and his followers in England have regarded the complete realisation of self as the highest good. "To the self-conscious being," says Prof. Caird, "pleasure is a possible but not an adequate end; by itself, indeed, it cannot be made an end at all except by a selfcontradictory abstraction."*

Kant tried to keep an even balance between happiness and virtue; he regarded the highest good to consist in a conjunction of the two, but failed to establish a necessary connexion between them except by postulating the external interference of an omnipotent God to make the former conform to the latter. The Philosophical inadequacy of such a theory of summum bonum which cannot keep together its two constituent elements otherwise than by the introduction of a *Deus ex machina* is too palpable to require any comment.

We may now consider some of the Indian theories on the subject.

According to the Chárvákas the highest good consists in independence, because dependence impedes

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* Critical Philosophy of Kant by Edward Caird. Vol. II. p. 230.

the acquisition and enjoyment of pleasure ; independence therefore is sought by them not as an end in itself, but as a means directly or indirectly contributing to pleasure. So then if a Chárváka be an optimist he will regard the attainment of the greatest possible amount of pleasure as the summum bonum ; if, on the other hand,he entertain a pessimistic view about the character of this worldly existence, the cessation of misery supposed to be a result of the extinction of life will be looked upon by him as the best possible termination of a miserable existence.

According to the Buddhistic doctrine, as it is generally understood, the annihilation of desires ultimately leading to the extinction of conscious existence (nirváṇa) constitutes the summum bonum. Desires are productive of miseries ; the continuance of individual existence with its abundance of unhappy vicissitudes is due to them. The Buddhists therefore desire the annihilation of desires not on its own account, but as a means to the annihilation of miseries.

The Sáṁkhya, the Nyáya, and the Vaiśeshika Systems agree in holding that the summum bonum consists in the absolute eradication of all sorts of unhappiness ; they differ however as to the means by which it can be attained. In *S*aṁkaravijaya, Mádhaváchúryya seeks to make out that there is a fine distinction between the doctrines of summum bonum as maintained by the Naiyáyika and the Vaiśeshika schools. He says, that according to the Vaiśeshika System, the soul in the state of salvation becomes

absolutely free from all connexion with attributes and subsists like the sky free from all mutations either pleasurable or painful; but that according to the Naiyáyikas, the soul is still attended by ánanda (bliss) and samvid (cognition).* It is however difficult to understand how the position thus ascribed to the Naiyáyikas can be consistently maintained by them. If all connexion with attributes come to an end on the attainment of salvation, and if cognition and enjoyment of bliss be attributes arising, as the Naiyáyikas maintain, from the conjunction of the self and mind, it seemes to follow that salvation involves the cessation of cognition and bliss as well as the extinction of pain. If, however, the extinction of pain be designated as a form of bliss, the distinction between the Naiyáyika and the Vaiśeshika views becomes reduced to a mere verbal difference.

According to Bhaṭṭa, the summum bonum consists in a continuous and unending flow of unsurpassable pleasure. The pleasure thus desiderated is not the nondual bliss which the Vedantists seek to realise, but pleasure depending on the existence of extraneous conditions. This position is open to the objection that the summum bonum thus set forth is an impossible or unrealisable ideal; and it seems to me that if the attainment of conditional pleasure be treated as constituting the essence of the summum bonum, you

* अत्यन्तनाशे गुणसङ्गतेर्या स्थितिर्नभोवत् कणभक्षपक्षे ।
मुक्तिस्तदीये चरणाक्षपक्षे सानन्दसम्वित्सहिता विमुक्तिः ॥

must follow the English Hedonists and make it a matter for quantitative calculation.

The above review seems, on the whole, to justify the assertion that I have made, that extinction of pain, attainment of pleasure, and realisation of self are the three things, which are found, on a careful analysis, to include almost every thing that Philosophers have put forward as constituting the summum bonum. No one can dispute the desirability of each of these as an end of human efforts ; but then if each of these is a *bonum*, the severance of one from the others would entail an element of imperfection, and the solution of the problem of the summum bonum would remain incomplete unless you can either maintain the superiority of one of these over the other two, or combine the three in one harmonious whole.

Most of the Indian Philosophers do not attach much value upon the attainment of worldly pleasures ; they consider that under the normal conditions of a human life there is a preponderance of pain over pleasure. The acquisition of pleasure is generally dependent upon an antecedent effort which is ordinarily attended with pain ; then, further, it presupposes the existence of desire which, so long as it remains unsatisfied, clashes with the tranquillity of mind, and its satisfaction is contingent upon a favourable conjunction of circumstances over which we have no complete control. Moreover, the satisfaction of a desire does not pacify the mind, for while giving rise to a momentary equilibrium, it becomes at the same time

the source of a renewed struggle; present pleasure therefore contains within itself the seed of future pain, and it may be characterised as a transitional state from one pain to another. On the other hand, the sources of pain in this life are innumerable; some are due to the very constitution of human life, some are apparently accidental in their character, and some are obviously of our own creation. So far then as we can see, the quantity of misery far outbalances that of enjoyment, and as to what lies beyond, its mysterious character is not at all calculated to turn the scale. On the whole, therefore, Indian Philosophers such as the Sáṁkhyas and the Naiyáyikas maintain that our effort should be specially directed not to the attainment of such pleasures as are available, but to the complete and absolute extinction of all sorts of unhappiness. The only means whereby they consider that this end can be reached is the acquisition of self-knowledge, and elimination of false ideas about the character and function of the self, for by the adoption of other means you can but temporarily alleviate your unhappiness, but cannot completely eradicate it. It appears, therefore, that on this view, selfrealisation and extinction of pain go together to constitute the summum bonum, for the stability of the bonum being an indispensable factor of the summum bonum that which determines this stability is so closely connected with it as to be almost a part of it. But here arises a difficulty: However much a man conscious of the manifold miseries of life may desire to be free from

them at any cost, one must feel great hesitation in describing an existence without enjoyment as a perfect existence, and the theories of summum bonum which, as shown above, give the highest place to the complete extinction of pain fail to satisfy our mind, as the extinction of pain thus put forward as the most desirable state of existence entails at the same time the total extinction of pleasure.

The question that ultimately arises therefore is :— Is it possible to reconcile a pleasurable existence with the complete extinction of pain ? The Vedantists seek to offer a solution of this problem ; they endeavour to show that selfrealisation, when properly understood, is found to involve the attainment of unconditional and therefore unending bliss, as well as the complete annihilation of all sorts of misery. They maintain that although worldly pleasures are from their very nature attended with or followed by pain, the same impurity does not attach to the bliss arising from the consciousness of the identity of the individual soul with the Absolute Spirit, and in as much as in this consciousness the self realises its proper essence, and as this state when once attained can no longer be lost, it follows that selfrealisation involves the permanent enjoyment of bliss due to the unimpeded allpervading expansion of the true nature of the self.

The primary and universal root of all kinds of sorrows is ignorance or perverted idea about the nature of things. Owing to this, the self forgets its essential identity with Brahman (the Absolute Spirit), and

falsely ascribes to itself attributes which do not properly belong to it ; owing to this, it also fails to comprehend the grand unity of the Real, and comes to view the distinct objects of the world as so many distinct entities essentially different from one another. The self is thus looked upon as an object among other objects subject to the mutations to which they are liable, and estranged as it were from the Supreme Spirit (Brahman) ; hence its existence is narrowed so to say, and it apparently stands bound by relations of attachment, indifference, or antagonism to the rest of existence ; and as these relations easily pass into one another there arises the proverbial vicissitude of human life. Then, further, through ignorance the self fails to discriminate itself from that portion of its environment which in each case seems to be most closely connected with it, and consequently it regards mutations in the environment as essentially affecting itself, and in some cases, as its own mutations. On the whole, therefore, the Vedantists contend that if one can dispel the ignorance, and thereby transcend the narrowness, and realise his identity with Brahman, the various miseries due to the opposition or conflict of the non-ego to the ego at once fall to the ground, for ultimately there is no distinction between the two.* Limitation is the source of sorrow, and conscious freedom from limitation involves a consciousness of

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* यदा सर्व्वाणि भूतानि आत्मैवाभूद्विजानतः।
तत्र को मोहः कः शोक एकत्वमनुपश्यतः॥

perfection which is a consciousness of bliss. When all impediments are merged into the self, and it pervades the whole sphere of existence, there arises an enjoyment which is not contingent upon variable and transitory relations, but is unconditional, self-abiding, and therefore permanent in its character. It has been stated in the Vedas that the true nature of Brahman consists in pure existence, pure reason. and pure bliss ; the individual who can realise his identity with Him can no longer be affected by mutations which have no higher than empirical existence. Ceasing to identify himself specifically with the adjuncts, he becomes free from the sorrows due to erroneous nondiscrimination, and beginning to realise his own essential identity generally with the totality of existence he enjoys a constant flow of pure unconditional bliss, for if the consciousness of a relative expansion of being is attended by pleasure, the highest expansion which takes within its range and merges every thing that seems to have a separate existence cannot fail to bring along with it a neverfailing source of bliss.

The Vedantists therefore conclude that attainment of the self (in knowledge), attainment of Brahman, and attainment of bliss, are but different ways of describing the same thing, and that the bliss thus attained is free from all admixture of unhappiness.* The ideal thus set forth seems to me to be the highest

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* ब्रह्मज्ञः परमाप्नोति शोकं तरति चात्मवित् ।

रसो ब्रह्म रसं लब्ध्वानन्दीभवति नान्यथा ॥ पञ्चदशी ।

and grandest ideal; it transcends other imperfect ideals by combining and unifying them in one harmonious whole. The question that remains to be discussed is, How far can the implications or assumptions of this theory be philosophically justified? It will be seen as we proceed that this discussion opens out the entire spiritualistic doctrine of the Vedánta Philosophy.

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BOOK II.

It will be seen that the Vedántic theory of summum bonum, as explained in the last Book, rests on the assumptions that it is possible for the individual to realise his essential identity with the Supreme Spirit, that it is ignorance that keeps this identity out of sight, and that when this ignorance is dispelled the individual rises above the limitation of dualistic conceptions, and finds that the Real (*Sat*) is one without a second, * and he himself is nondifferent from it. These, then, furnish the cornerstones of the Vedántic doctrine of nondualism. Brahman, the Vedántists maintain, is the sole reality ; the world and the individual souls have no existence apart from Him ; they exist in so far as they participate in His reality, and in so far as they appear to be diverse they are ultimately unreal. The apparent diversity of objects has no better than phenomenal existence ; it is the offspring of Máyá or the multiplying power (बहुभवनशक्ति) of Brahman which spins out an infinite series of names and forms, which clinging round the substratum of reality, reason, and bliss communicated, so to say, from Brahman, give rise to the panorama of the universe. Such, then, is the doctrine of the Vedánta stated in a concise form, and I will proceed to expound it in the rest of this work. For convenience of treatment the subject may be divided into two parts, (1) dealing with the relation of the world to Brahman, and (2) dealing with the relation of individual souls to Him.

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* सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् । छान्दोग्योपनिषत् ।

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

Brahman and the World.

In discussing what the Vedántists understand by Brahman, it will not be out of place to commence by making a few observations about the nature of definition or lakshaṇa as understood by them. Lakshaṇa or definition is of two kinds: swarûpa lakshaṇa (essential difinition), and taṭastha lakshaṇa (relative or accidental definition). Swarûpa lakshaṇa seeks to point out the nature of the thing defined as it is in itself, and taṭastha lakshaṇa describes the relation of the thing to other objects. The former unfolds the essential or inherent, and the latter the accidental or extraneous character of an object.* The principal aim of definition is to enable one to identify an object, and this purpose may be fulfilled under certain limitations by either kind of definition. A taṭastha or relative definition, however, may sometimes be based on some separable accident of the object sought to be defined, and may thus be defective, although sufficient for the purpose of identification at the time; the same sort of inadequacy cannot appertain to swarûpa lakshaṇa, for the essence of a thing is constant, as it cannot lose its essence without ceasing to exist.

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* तटस्थं स्वरूपं द्विधालक्षणञ्च स्वरूपे प्रविष्टं स्वरूपे निविष्टम् ।

The above classification may, however, be objected to on two grounds. (1) It may be said that an essential definition is unattainable, because the essence of an object can never be known. Our knowledge is exclusively relative knowledge, so that to talk about a thing as it is in itself is to talk about what we do not and and cannot understand. (2) It may also be contended that if you denude the term essence of the very limited meaning indicated above, relative definitions may, in some cases, have a very good claim to be regarded as essential definitions, for relations, or at any rate some of them, often seem to constitute the essence of an object in so far as they serve as constant and unmistakeable marks of the said object.

I will try to answer these objections from the Vedántists' standpoint. The essence of a thing is not unknowable; it is that in the thing which changes not with time; it is the constant amidst mutations; or, to put in another way, it is that in the thing concerning which our understanding remains unalterably fixed. It may be that we often stop short in our endeavour to get at the essence of a thing, and consider that to be ultimately essential which is not really so, assuming that our analysis can proceed no further; but that is not the fault of the enquiry but of the enquirer. To get at the essence of a thing, one has, the Vedántists maintain, to discriminate between the real and unalterable substratum which determines its *existence*, and the accidental attributes which determine the particular name and form (náma-

rûpa) which it temporarily assumes. Ultimately this process of discrimination leads one to differentiate the absolute and immutable substratum of existence from the universal and primary energy from which all names and forms (*i. e.*, mutations) proceed ; the former the Vedántists identify with Brahman, and the latter with the energy of Máyá which they refer back to Brahman as a śakti or power appertaining to Him. The objection based on the unknowableness of the essence is therefore untenable. We may first learn to discriminate the essential from the accidental in our own selves, and by extending this study we may do the same in other objects. What the Vedántists consider to be the result of this enquiry will be fully seen later on.

In answer to the second objection, it may be pointed out that the relations of one object to another are generally temporary and contingent in their character, and even when they proceed from the very nature of the object, and are thus not accidental in the strictest sense of the term, they can at best be designated as derivatively essential (essentialia consecutiva), and not as fundamentally essential (essentialia constitutiva). It is therefore not improper to discriminate fundamentally essential characters as essential in the strictest sense of the term, and to base swarûpa lakshaṇa on them alone.

I will now proceed to state the swarûpa lakshaṇa and the taṭastha lakshaṇa of Brahman according to the Vedánta.

The constitutive characters of Brahman are reality, reason, and bliss (sat-chid-ánandam). This implies that objects, in so far as they are real, derive their reality from Him ; that reason of men and other rational creatures is but a reflection, under the limitations imposed by phenomenal adjuncts, of His reason ; and that ánanda or happiness, in so far as it exhibits itself under the conditions of our life, is but a shadow of the eternal bliss which attends the infinitude of His nature. Brahman is the sole reality without a second ; objects are real in so far as they participate in His reality ; men are rational through a communication of His reason ; and pure happiness is only attainable through perfect selfknowledge which takes away the veil of ignorance that conceals the essential identity between Him and the Jîvas. The reason which justifies us in formulating our definition of Brahman in this way is that reality and reason cannot be regarded as the products of mutation, for the very existence of mutation presupposes their existence ; they furnish the constant substratum on which the passing phenomena may have their play, and therefore cannot be discarded as nonessential ; as regards bliss (ánandam), we have already seen that it is but another name for infinitude or limitlessness ; so that the Vedántists themselves have sometimes adopted सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तम् (reality, reason, and infinitude) as constituting an alternative defintion.

I now pass on to the taṭastha or relative definition of Brahman. From this standpoint Brahman may

be regarded as the cause of the origination, sustenance, and dissolution of the universe which comprises within its scope the totality of mutations. The universe proceeds from Brahman, its continued existence is maintained by Him, and in the end it reverts to Him.*

Causality, however, is of two kinds according to the Vedantic view : efficient causality (निमित्तकारणता), and material or rather constitutive causality (उपादानकारणता). It has to be seen, therefore, in what sense is Brahman the cause of the universe. The Vedántists maintain that He is the cause in both the senses. Not only is He the efficient regulator of the world-process, but the process itself is grounded on and sustained by Him. This doctrine is in opposition to the atomic theory of the Vaiśeshikas and the Naiyáyikas which maintains the coeternal existence of atoms for an intelligent creator to work upon ; it is also in opposition to the Sáṁkhya doctrine which sets up Prakriti as an independent initial principle, and takes away from Purusha all active connexion with the cosmical process. Brahman is neither a mechanic, nor a *mere* looker-on.

The position indicated above is supported by the Vedántists on the authority of revelation. So long, however, as its real import is not clearly understood, the doctrine that Brahman is the constitutive cause of the world may seem to be open to serious

* यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते येन जातानि जीवन्ति यत् प्रयन्त्यभिसम्विशन्ति तद्विजिज्ञासस्वतद्ब्रह्म। तैत्तिरीयोपनिषत् ।

objections. For instance, it generally happens that an effect partakes of the nature of the cause, but there is no community of nature between Brahman (the Supreme Reason) and Jagat (the insentient world); hence it may be argued that the world either came into form out of a concourse of insentient atoms, or sprang out of nothing. To this it has been answered that those who assert that Brahman is the sole cause of the world are not bound to maintain that there is no diversity in nature between them; an effect is never a complete reproduction of the cause, for, were it not so, you could never detect a transition from the cause to the effect. The world may be characterised as the totality of phenomenal mutations; but the mutations must be grounded on something unalterable and permanent; the phenomena imply a noumenon as their substratum. Through all its changes the world exists; that which furnishes the basis of this permanent existence changes not; the reality of the world is a borrowed reality, and whence could it have arisen but from the supreme reality of Brahman? It has however been said that this really amounts to an attempt to trace out causal connexion by reference to reality or existence which may serve as a universal predicate of everything that is, and that therefore this attempt must necessarily be invalid; for if the common possession of existence may establish causal relation between objects, anything may be put forward as the cause of anything else. This objection,

however, seems to me to be based on what is called an *ignoratio elenchi*. The Vedántists do not hold that Brahman is *a* real object among other real objects, but they maintain on the authority of the Vedas that reality belongs to His essence ; now, an analysis of the nature of the world shows that although it contains a continuous process of mutations, there must be something permanent to furnish a basis for them ; they therefore hold that Brahman is the noumenal support of the phenomenal world-process. If, then, any one objects to the causality of Brahman thus understood on the ground that there is a complete diversity of nature between Him and the world, the Vedántists rejoin that there is at least one point of unity, for the world participates in reality. If, on the other hand, the insentiency of the world be taken to imply insentiency of the initial cause, it becomes difficult to escape from atomism, which reduces Brahman to the position of an external contriver, trenches upon His perfection, and breaks the logical rule, "Entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatum."

But perhaps the real reason why people find it so very difficult to accede to the proposition that Brahman is the constitutive cause of the world is to be found in the fact that it is thought that it implies that He is the cause of the world in the same sense in which earth is the cause of earthen-wares. The difficulty which this view very naturally suggests to an ordinary mind is noticed in the Vedánta Sûtras in the aphorism "कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिर्निरवयवत्वशब्दकोपो वा".

The objection indicated by this aphorism may be thus amplified :—If God be the constitutive cause of the world, then either the whole of His being enters into the world-process, or only a part. The former alternative contradicts the transcendence of God, and represents Him as a finite and limited factor in the constitution of the universe. If to avoid these difficulties you adopt the latter alternative, and maintain that only a part of His being enters into the cosmical transformation, then by implication you ascribe form to Him, for nothing formless can be said to have parts, and this also conflicts with *S*ruti and contradicts His immutability.

The Vedántists answer that this objection is due to a misapprehension of the sense in which Brahman is said to be the constitutive cause of the world. It is wrong to suppose that Brahman undergoes a transformation which touches His essense in originating and sustaining the world. It must not be supposed that it is impossible for a substance to constitute the foundation of a seemingly new object while in reality it remains what it was ; for instance, in the absence of proper light people often mistake a rope for a serpent ; here, although the substance of the rope does not undergo any transformation, it may yet be said to be the constitutive cause of the serpent, or of the serpent as cognised. Just so in the case of Brahman and the world ; the apparent diversity of the world is but empirically real ; from a transcendental standpoint there is nothing

real but Brahman himself. The phenomenal diversity of names and forms takes its rise from máyá, or the diversifying power of Brahman, but this flowing diversity can have its play only upon the solid substratum of reality communicated by Him. The apparent diversity and mutability of the phenomenal world cannot however be predicated to Him; even a shadow or an illusion must have a background; but the background does not enter into its composition in such a manner as to be modified with its modifications. If through defect of eyesight a man sees the moon as double, that would be no reason for holding that there are two moons. True knowledge consists in seeing the unity that lies underneath the veil of Máyá, the One Indivisible Infinite Reality that pervades the entire universe. As it has been very pithily expressed in one of the Upanishads, "Whatever exists in this universe, whatever is there, is to be covered with the Lord."*

The above exposition suggests the distinction which the Vedántists have drawn between evolution by way of *vivarta* and transformation by way of *vikára*. The former does not, while the latter does imply a mutation in the substance of the cause for the evolution of the effect. The doctrine of vivarta is a special feature of the Vedánta distinguishing its theory of creation from that adopted in the Sáṁkhya System of Philosophy. It is indeed

* ईशावास्यमिदं सर्व्वं यत् किञ्च जगत्यां जगत्--ईशावास्योपनिषत्।

true that it requires a good deal of effort to appreciate this position; the reason is plain:—When we proceed regressively to trace out the initial cause of the world, the nature of our experience makes it very difficult for us to carry on the process of elimination beyond a certain stage; hence some Philosophers, such as the Vaiśeshikas, have found it impossible to conceive the antecedent absence of atoms, and therefore maintained their coeternal existence; others again, for example Dr. Martineau, have receded a step further, and contented themselves with maintaining the coeternal existence of space as furnishing a sphere for the creative agency of God.* But these limitations of our conceptive faculty are but the results of association, and they cannot establish the falsity of the Vedántic doctrine. The authors of Pañchadaśî thus combat an objection of this type:—

"ननु भूम्यादिकं माभूत् परमाण्वन्तनाशतः ।
कथन्ते वियतोऽसत्त्वं बुद्धिमारोहतीति चेत् ॥
अत्यन्तं निर्जगद्व्योम यथा ते बुद्धिमाश्रितं ।
तथैव सन्निराकाशं कथं नाश्रयते मतिम् ॥
निर्जगद्व्योम दृष्टञ्चेत् प्रकाशतमसोर्विना ।
क्व दृष्टं किञ्च ते पक्षे न प्रत्यक्षं वियत् खलु ॥"

"An objector may say, that although it may be possible to conceive the nonexistence of earth, etc., owing to their destruction (destructible character)

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* See Martineau's Study of Religion, vol. II, p. 106, First Edition.

up to the very atoms, it is impossible to conceive the nonexistence of space ; to this we return,—if it be possible to conceive space without the world, why should it be impossible to think of the Real apart from a coexisting space? If the impossibility were to arise from the constant perception of space, it should extend further, for space is never perceived without something sensible to fill it up, as, even according to the objector, it is imperceptible by itself."

The impropriety of basing an objection against the doctrine of the Vedánta upon an argument of this character will become further apparent, when we remember that, according to the great German Philosopher Kant, space is devoid of any transcendental reality, being but a form of intuition supplied by the mind to make experience possible by combining the manifold of sense. Its universality and necessity arise, according to him, from its being a necessary factor in the constitution of experience, so that its reality is no better than empirical. Is it not curious that Martineau should maintain that the existence of space is even independent of God, while Kant does not credit it with transcendental reality at all? And does it not illustrate the insecurity of a conclusion, about an ultimate question of this kind, based on no other ground than the nature of our ordinary conceptions? The Vedántists maintain that space is as much a result of the working of Máyá or the diversifying power of

Brahman as anything else, and this position can hardly be assailed upon the ground that we find it hard to conceive its nonexistence.

There may be some who are ready to admit that Brahman is the efficient cause of the world, but are not prepared to accede to the view that He is also the constitutive cause, on the ground that infinite as His powers are, He may have created the world entirely out of nothing, so that the cosmical phenomena may not possess any derivative reality communicated from Him. I am, however, unable to understand why this view should commend itself to the mind of the thoughtful enquirer in preference to that put forward by the Vedántists. If the Vedántic view is somewhat difficult to comprehend, the creation of the world out of nothing, and the existence of mutations except on the basis of some constant substratum are at least equally hard to conceive. Moreover, the Vedántic view does not, as we have already explained, materialise the nature of Brahman; all that is meant by asserting that He is the constitutive cause of the world is that His pure existence upholds and sustains the impure and mutable appearance of the world, or, to adopt the Vedántic phraseology, upholds and sustains the diverse names and forms, which, in their turn, owe their origin, interrelation, and constant succession to the operation of Máyá or His diversifying power. On the other hand, the view that God has created the world out of nothing is open to many objections.

Some of these have been thus stated by Principal Caird in his admirable "Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion." "Against such a conception," says he, "it may be justly objected that it is essentially dualistic. Not only is the God who is conceived as an external Creator or Contriver reduced to something finite; but the link between Him and the world is made a purely arbitrary one, and the world itself is left without any real unity. You cannot begin with the existence of matter or the material world, and then pass by a leap to the existence of a spiritual intelligent Being conceived of as its external cause or contriver. Betwixt two things thus heterogeneous the category of causation establishes no necessary bond. Nor again can you give real or systematic unity to the world by any theory of it which requires repeated interpositions of a purely arbitrary power." Such a conception of God is anthropomorphic, and proves itself to be defective even when tested on that footing. For instance, let us consider the position from another standpoint. If God be the external cause or contriver of the world, the act of creation must have been purposive, and a purpose of this sort which cannot find satisfaction within the range of the pre-existent implies want or imperfection. Why did God create the world? Was He weary with His inactivity, or did He want to have something to please His eyes that He was led to contrive the world? Questions like these based upon an anthropomorphic conception might

well be urged, and have been urged by Spinoza and others against the ordinary dualistic idea of God. You cannot meet these questions by maintaining that God was by His very nature led to create the world, for, on your view, there is such a heterogeneity between an external creator and the created world, that you cannot, unless you maintain that the creative energy was impelled by something superior to God himself, establish the necessity of a causal nexus between the two. And, further, the theory of a creation out of nothing by an external creator implies creation having a beginning in time which is repugnant to the idea that it proceeds from the necessity of divine nature, for what proceeds necessarily from the eternal nature of God must be coeternal. It is useless, however, to multiply objections; suffice it to say that the Vedántic position, when properly understood, seems on the whole to be preferable to the ordinary dualistic conception of creation.

It remains to be seen how far the objection noticed above, that the admission of a purposive action implies want of perfection, tells against the Vedántic doctrine. This objection is noticed by the Author of the Vedánta Sûtras in the aphorism, 'न प्रयोजनवत्त्वात्' and he attempts to refute it in the next aphorism 'लोकवत्तु लीलाकैवल्यम्'. Let us see how the commentator Śaṁkara states the objection and its answer. He thus states the objection in the first place, "अन्यथा पुनश्चेतनकर्तृकत्वं जगत आक्षिपति। न खलु चेतनः परमात्मेदं

जगद्बिम्बं विरचयितुमर्हति—कुतः प्रयोजनवत्वात् प्रवृत्तीनाम् । * * * यदीयमपि प्रवृत्तिश्चेतनस्य परमात्मनः आत्मप्रयोजनोपयोगिनी परिकल्प्येत—परितृप्तत्वं परमात्मनः श्रयमाणं बाध्येत । प्रयोजनाभावे वा प्रवृत्त्यभावोऽपि स्यात् ।"

"The view that the world has been created by an intelligent creator is further objected to on another ground. It is said that the intelligent Supreme Spirit cannot be regarded as having contrived this shadow of the world. Why? Because inclination to action is always purposive. If it be supposed that in this case the inclination to action of the intelligent Supreme Spirit was intended to serve some purpose of His own, that would contradict the self-satisfaction of the Supreme Spirit as inculcated in the Vedas. On the other hand, in the absence of purpose there would be an absence of inclination to action."

It will be seen that the above objection seeks to make out, that if there be any difficulty in accepting the operation of Supreme Intelligence as the determining cause of the world, on the ground that the action of an intelligent Being must be purposive, and that the existence of a purpose shows that the agent is in quest of something that he wants, it will press equally against the Vedántic view as against the ordinary theistic view above criticised. Let us see how the Vedántists endeavour to escape from this objection.

In his commentary on the aphorism "लोकवत्तु लीलाकैवल्यम्" *S*aṁkara thus meets the objection :—"यथा चौष्कासे

प्रश्वासादयोऽनभिसन्धाय वाह्यं किञ्चित् प्रयोजनान्तरं स्वभावादेव भवन्ति. एवमीश्वरस्याप्यनपेक्ष्य किञ्चित्प्रयोजनान्तरं स्वभावादेव केवलं लीलारूपा प्रवृत्तिर्भविष्यति। नहीश्वरस्य प्रयोजनान्तरं निरूप्यमाणं न्यायतःश्रुतितो वा सम्भवति। न च स्वभावः पर्यनुयोक्तुं शक्यते।" "Just as the processes of breathing in and breathing out, and so forth, proceed from the very nature of the organism without conscious reference to any external end, so the process of creative emanation takes place from the very nature of God, like a sportful effort, without reference to any other ulterior purpose. It is not possible to ascertain any purpose of God either by argument or from revelation. And, furthermore, you cannot scrutinise the why of nature." This position finds support also from the Vedas; thus, for instance, the Manduka Sruti says:—"देवस्यैव स्वभावोऽयमाप्तकामस्य का स्पृहा" "The creative emanation is but the nature of the Lord; how can there be any desire of Him who is allsufficient?" Lest the use of the word लीला, which literally signifies sportful action, lead one to suspect that the Vedántists mean to assert that the creative emanations are in the nature of spasmodic efforts devoid of permanence, so that the continuation of the world as well as its dissolution is accidental, Ánanda Giri, the commentator on Samkara's gloss, points out that the word लीला here signifies the mysterious Máyá or avidyá, the diversifying power which appertains to the very nature of the Supreme Lord. The creative emanation is not therefore accidental. "In consequence of His (Brahman's) conjunction with Máyá," says Govindá-

nanda "the creation is unavoidable." In keeping with this position, the Vedántists maintain that the stream of creative evolution is without a commencement in time, and this is what enables them to repel the charge, which those who maintain the theory of external creation find so difficult to meet, that the process of creation implies a want of perfection in the Creator.

Collecting, then, the strings of the above exposition we find that the world, according to the Vedántists, consists of two distinct kinds of elements. On the one hand, it contains a stream of mutations, of diverse names and forms interconnected by a causal nexus; on the other, there is behind these mutations the solid substratum of reality which upholds and sustains them, and furnishes, so to say, a basis for their play.* The series of mutations and their interconnexion are determined by Máyá or the divine power which is the ultimate spring of all diversity as well as of causal unity amidst this diversity; the substratum of reality is due to the communication or immanence of the absolute reality of Brahman which pervades the entire universe. Viewed from either side, therefore, Brahman is the constitutive cause of the world; and He, again, by virtue of His rational nature, is the efficient cause of the world, for the operation of Máyá may be

* अस्ति भाति प्रियं नामरूपञ्चेत्यंशपञ्चकम् ।
आद्यत्रयं ब्रह्मरूपं जगद्रूपं ततो द्वयम् ॥ श्रीवाक्यसुधा ।

viewed as superintended, so to say, by the Lord whose power it is. The Vedántic position is thus ultimately established, first on the authority of the Vedas, secondly by its consonance with reason, and thirdly by its satisfying the essential demand of reason which commands us to seek for unity.

To facilitate the conception of a cause which, while remaining unaffected, brings out of itself the constitutive elements of the effect, the Vedántists make use of the analogy of a spider which produces its web out of itself. The aptness of the analogy appears stronger when we remember how the meshes of the world hold fast the individual souls, and keep them off from real insight into the nature of things. Some foreign writer, who wanted to pose as a critic without taking the trouble of acquainting himself with the doctrine to be criticised, stumbled on this analogy, and asserted that the Brahmins represent their God as a huge spider, apparently with the object of holding the doctrine up to ridicule ; but derision flung out in this way turns back on the critic himself.

But perhaps we need hardly dilate on the errors of ignorant and arrogant critics of this type, when such a high-thinking philosopher as the late Principal Caird has displayed an unexpected combination of ignorance, hastiness, and prejudice in passing strictures upon Brahmanism and Brahmanic Philosophy. One would expect that a man of his position would not undertake to censure a system of Religion

and Philosophy which has been revered from time immemorial by a people who have not been stigmatised even by their worst enemies as incapable or undesirous of entering into the depth of metaphysical and spiritual enquiries, without taking the trouble of acquainting himself wlth its real and proper nature. But we are sorry to find this expectation rudely shaken, when in the last chapter of his "Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion," he proceeds to illustrate his theory of the organic unity of religions by reference to the religions of India, and therein exhibits an amount of prejudice which is highly to be regretted when it finds place in a philosopher of his calibre however imbued he may be with sectarian zeal. Dr. Caird maintains that the true and complete idea of the nature of God unfolds itself by a process of gradual evolution, so that human spirit has to pass through successive stages from imperfect to gradually higher and more perfect conceptions of the object of religion, and that an exhaustive study of the data of History shows that it is possible to trace out the several stages in this evolution in the various positive religions, so that the study of the Philosophy of Religions and the study of the History of Religions reciprocally aid and further each other. Stating in this way his theory in the abstract, Dr. Caird very candidly admits that a complete verification of this principle of organic development in the province of religion requires a detailed enquiry into the history of the

various positive religions, a task which is beyond the limits of his work. But this does not deter him from attempting to illustrate his position by reference to the successive phenomena of the religions in India. One would think that here Dr. Caird was undertaking a task for which he was but insufficiently trained; the history of religions in India is a vast subject; even an Indian, who has made it the subject of his lifelong study with a full knowledge of the languages and the sentiments of the people, can hardly venture to affirm that he has been able to comprehend it in all its aspects, for here in India religion is not an exotic growth dating its origin a few centuries back, but is like a perennial spring pouring out its waters from a time beyond hnman memory in various directions and in numberless combinations. From a time when the ancestors of Dr. Caird were perhaps grovelling in the dark, the Sages of India have been grappling with the ultimate problems of religion, and meditating how knowledge, devotion, and volition, the three chief factors in the constitution of a religious life, should be attuned and harmonised so as to lead to final emancipation, the ultimate goal of spiritual existence; and they not only theorised, but practically realised in their lives the fruitfulness of the methods they proposed, and the doctrines they upheld. Does it not then seem to be somewhat presumptuous for a foreigner who is scarcely acquainted with the rudiments of the Sanskrit language to come forward

as a censor of Brahmanic religion and philosophy, as if he had studied them in their entirety and found them reducible to one or two tenets? An attempt like this reminds one of the blind men in the fable who went to ascertain what an elephant was like; each of them touched a single part of the elephant's body, and thought that that was all.

And what does Dr. Caird say? He says that leaving Fetishism out of consideration, the first two stages in the development of religion have exhibited themselves in India. The first is polytheistic nature-worship, the worship, that is, of a number of distinct divinities identified with different natural objects, which meets us in the Vedic hymns, although an effort to blend the particular divinities in one fluent indivisible whole became visible towards the close of this epoch. The second movement of religious thought finds its expression in the Brahmanic conception of God as simple Being carrying within it the bare negation of the phenomenal world; that such is the nature of the Brahmanic conception of God, Dr. Caird attempts to show by extracting from Bunsen's *Gott in der Geschichte* the translation of two passages, one from Kaṭhopanishad, and the other from Saṁkara. He then depicts a deplorable picture of the moral and religious state of the Brahmins of India, and maintains that this depravity is due to their defective conception of God as indicated above. "A pantheistic, or rather acosmic, idea of God," says he, "such as that of Brahmanism

not only offers no hindrance to idolatry and immorality, but may be said even to lead to them by a logical necessity ;" and he winds up with a panegyric on the beauty, grandeur, and fulness of Christianity.

Now, I have no relish for ferreting out the faults of any established religion ; I believe that the very existence of a religion indicates its excellence, whatever in the abstract its defects may be, and that it is not always profitable to harp on these defects. I therefore refrain from pointing out what seem to me to be the obvious defects and shortcomings of Christianity as compared with the Vedántic religion of India. But leaving that aside, may we not be permitted to say that immorality is not the monopoly of the Indians, and that it is at least as much prevalent in a Christian country as in Brahmanic India? We do not, however, hold the religion responsible for this, and we affirm that the immorality of the Christians is not due to Christianity, but that it exists in spite of Christianity. National character is moulded not by religion alone, but by circumstances which sometimes subdue and override the influence of religion. Those who have carefully studied the national character of the Brahmanic Indians of the present time are forced to admit that the chief defects in their character are due to weakness and want of independence which can be explained by reference to political exigencies rather than to religious conceptions, and that obedience to sense of duty and silent self-sacrifice are much more frequent among them

than in any other nation, though there is wanting a corresponding development of an exacting sense of right which, somewhat carried to an excess, is perhaps the most notable feature of the English character. Dr. Caird makes a sweeping assertion; does he mean to say that the Brahmanic conception of God has taken away from the Aryans of India the power of discriminating right from wrong, or that a Hindu does a wrong act because his religion has, as Dr. Caird maintains, illegitimately consecrated the finite? A clearer example of ignorance-begotten prejudice and prejudice-begotten ignorance can hardly be conceived. As regards idolatry of which Dr. Caird makes a point, we protest against the use of a question-begging epithet like that which carries to most minds an invidious association. We never worship the inanimate idol; to most minds it serves as a symbol to call up spiritual ideas, and infuse warmth and ardour into devotion; and even if the idol itself is considered as sanctified, where is the harm in that? In an act of devotional worship the most important things are the predicates applied to the object of worship, for they concentrate and fasten the movements of the heart. As it has been tersely put by an Indian Philosopher in this very connexion :—

"समारोप्यस्य रूपेण विषयो रूपवान् भवेत् ।
विषयस्य तु रूपेण समारोप्यं न रूपवत् ॥"

"The object takes its form from the predicates you apply to it, but the predicates do not borrow

their form from the object." So far as I am aware, there is no religion which entirely discards the use of symbols as a help to devotion ; the Hindus perhaps go beyond others in the variety of their selection, and that is to a certain extent due to the fact that their sentiments towards God are not limited to one or two types. The Christians, for instance, look upon God as the father, the Mahommedans as the master ; but to the Hindus God is father, mother, friend, and master at the same time. It seems to me that it is to a certain extent due to the exclusion of these symbols that 'Bhakti-yoga' or the 'union of devotion' has not found the same amount of development among other people as among the Hindus. It is true, there may be people who do not stand in need of symbols at all ; it is also true that there are those who vainly think that they do not stand in need of them; but there is no reason why people who require them should shrink from taking the benefit of their assistance for fear of wounding the susceptibilities of ignorant and fastidious critics. It is true that with people having a lower order of mind the worship of God with the aid of symbols may sometimes degenerate into a very low form of worship ; but it must not be forgotten that if it were not for these symbols, they, in all probability, would not have worshipped at all. Critics of Practical Religion, in their zeal for criticism, are often apt to ignore the fact that the same cap cannot fit the heads of all. It is puerile to attempt to give a lesson on the practice

of religion in India which has been the cradle of the most ancient religions of the world.

Let us now turn to the materials on which Dr. Caird bases his view regarding the Brahmanic conception of God. As we have said he relies on the translation of two passages by Bunsen; we have not been able to verify the correctness of the second extract, or read it in connexion with the context, as he gives no definite reference; the first extract, however, is an obvious mistranslation of a passage in the Kaṭhopanishad, and its inaccuracy can be easily detected by any one who has the slightest acquaintance with the Sanskrit language. As quoted by Dr. Caird the extract runs thus:—"Not by words can we attain unto it, not by the heart, not by the eye. He alone attains to it who exclaims 'It is, it is.' Thus may it be perceived and apprehended in its essence." The passage in the original is this:—

"नैव वाचा न मनसा प्राप्तुं शक्यो न चक्षुषा ।
अस्तीति ब्रुवतोऽन्यत्र कथं तदुपलभ्यते ॥
अस्तीत्येवोपलब्धव्यस्तत्त्वभावेन चोभयोः ।
अस्तीत्येवोपलब्धस्य तत्त्वभावः प्रसीदति ॥"

I will now translate the passage literally:—"Verily not by words, not by the mind can he be attained, not by the eye. How can his essence be apprehended where he is not spoken of as existent? He has to be apprehended as existing beyond doubts, and also in his essential character; among the two (modes of apprehension) his essence is known when he has

already been apprehended as existing." Even this bare translation shows that Dr. Caird, as well as his translator, has entirely misunderstood the passage. I will however proceed to explain the purport of the passage with reference to the context. In preceding passages it is said that God is not an object of sensuous perception, but that He can only be apprehended when the heart, the mind, and the understanding act together with undiverted concentration. This concerntration or retraction from interfering cogitations is known as *yoga*. But then there arises a doubt in this connexion ; Is He not unattainable by words, etc. as he transcends the reach of sensuous perception ? It is answered that He is ; but still the world, in so far as it exists, enables one to say that He exists, for it is His existence that determines the emanation and sustenance of the world. Then it is pointed out that it is not enough to go so far and stop there, for this sort of knowledge is but indirect and mediate ; but though inadequate, it is yet necessary as a preliminary step to the attainment of perfect knowledge, which requires that you should know Him in His essence, and realise your unity with Him. It is hardly necessary to say that in the above exposition I have followed the lead of authoritative commentators, and I think it is also unnecessary to point out the points of inaccuracy in the translation adopted by Dr. Caird, for they are too manifest to require any comment. It is upon a garbled translation of this character that Dr. Caird takes

upon himself to vilify an established religion, and with the greatest deference I say that he should have been sorry that he had done it. It may be said that Dr. Caird was not responsible for the mistranslation, for he had adopted it from another; but on that very account he ought to have been very careful before he rushed into writing.

I may also add that I am unable to follow clearly Dr. Caird's view regarding the organic unity of religions. If he means to assert that a historical study of the various positive religions from a philosophic standpoint shows that they exhibit at different stages of development the attempts of the human mind to comprehend the ultimate religious truth, his assertion is perfectly correct and unobjectionable; if, however, he wishes to maintain, as he seems to do, and as the expression 'organic' unity undoubtedly suggests, that there is a historical interconnexion between the several positive religions, so that the earlier religions are stages in one organic process leading towards the highest religion which transmutes and transcends them, the position is historically untenable and theoretically fanciful. There is no historical evidence that the Prechristian Brahmanic Religion either immediately or mediately formed a factor in the development of Christianity which, according to Dr. Caird, is the highest religion of the world; and you cannot without absurdity talk of an organic unity between things entirely isolated from one another. It will be remembered that M.

Comte had attempted to point out a continuous course of development in intellectual and religious evolution through the polytheistic culture of Greece and Rome, the monotheism of Medieval Catholicism, and the metaphysical tendency of Protestant reformation leading towards the Positivism advocated by himself. Dr. Martineau stigmatises this view as opposed to History, and maintains that Christianity cannot be affiliated to the religions of Old Greece and Rome.* If there is so much objection to Comte's theory, how can Brahmanism and Buddhism be treated as leading towards the monotheism of Jewish religion, and higher pantheism, as Dr. Caird puts it, of Christianity ? Surely this mode of affiliation is more curious and far less justifiable than the above, and has nothing to recommend it except perhaps the fact that here the highest place is reserved for Christianity.

I think I have devoted too much space to controvert the unwarrantable strictures of Dr. Caird, but the respect I have always entertained towards him for his merits as a philosopher made it impossible for me to ignore his opinion with silent disregard, although it was based upon scanty materials. I will now revert to the main subject of my enquiry.

We have seen that the taṭastha lakshaṇa of Brahman deals with His relation to the world, or views Him as related to the world through the all-pervading energy of máyá, and that the swarûpa lakshaṇa

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* See Martneau's Types of Ethical Theory, Vol. I,page 488.

shows what He is irrespective of all relations. Viewed in conjunction with the adjunct of Máyá Brahman is designated as I'śwara, the Lord. To I'śwara you may predicate all the attributes which appertain to the character of the creator and regulator of the universe: He is active, omniscient, omnipotent; His will moulds the universe; He is the Supreme Lord regulating all that happens in time, the supreme and intelligent cause of the evolution, sustenance, and dissolution of the cosmos. When however viewed without reference to Máyá, Brahman is devoid of attributes, free from agency, and pure and perfect in Himself. Out of these two kinds of views, the Vedántists maintain the superiority of the nonrelative knowledge of Brahman which leaving behind the phenomenal world passes at once to the pure reality, pure reason, and pure bliss in which the individual soul finds its own ultimate essence. The reason for this is that in its result nonrelative knowledge leads to final emancipation, whereas relative knowledge, being essentially dualistic in its character, can only elevate the faculties and powers of the person who meditates upon it, and cannot free him from the trammels of dualistic or limited existence.

This position, however, has not met with the approval of Rámánuja, the chief expositor of Viśishṭádwaitaváda or the theory of qualified nondualism. If Brahman were really devoid of attributes, why, asks he, did Sruti ascribe to Him qualities importing supreme excellence, knowledge, power, and so forth?

The real import, according to him, of those texts which seem to deny the possibility of ascribing diverse qualities to Brahman is to shut out the ascription of those qualities that are too low to be attributed to Him, for were it otherwise, they would be inconsistent with those other texts which represent Him as the omnipotent, omniscient, and allpervading regulator of the entire universe. It will, however, appear that Rámáunja's way of explaining the texts that represent Brahman as transcending all qualities is not a very happy attempt, for he has to strain the passages a little too much in order to make them fall in with his system; on the other hand, *S*aṁkara can very well maintain that having regard to the fact that it is not open to many people to realise what he regards as the highest form of knowledge, the teaching contained in the Vedas might have been so modulated as to meet the requirements of people occupying different stations in the line of spiritual evolution. There cannot be much doubt that this latter method of explanation furnishes the best way of reconciling and harmonising the apparently conflicting texts. The authority of revelation is, therefore, in favour of *S*aṁkara's doctrine, and it does, on its practical side, contain a method for preparing lower minds to attain, by a process of gradual and progressive ascent, the highest summit of spiritual knowledge.

I have now explained in what sense the Vedántists regard Brahman as the cause of the world. It remains now to indicate the order of cosmical evolution accord-

ing to the Vedántists which differs materially from the Sáṁkhya theory on the point. From a spiritualistic standpoint the importance of this enquiry does not seem to be very great, for whatever may be the position of a thing in the scale of cosmical evolution, it stands along with the rest as an object of knowledge, and any difference of view as to the order of evolution does not affect the solution of the ultimate problems of spiritual philosophy. The enquiry, however, has a historical interest, as it shows that the Sáṁkhya theory is not the only theory of cosmical evolution that found its place in the Indian Systems of Philosophy. It may be premised that, according to the Vedántists, the totality of objects includes mind and understanding, although they are not objects but conditions of sensuous perception; the reason why they are classified together with perceptible objects is that they are, at any rate, objects of knowledge liable to undergo mutations, and these characters contradistinguish them from the knowers or subjects of knowledge. Existences are thus classified by the Vedántists into two primary kinds: the knowers (द्रष्टा) and the knowables (दृश्य). The knowables are subdivided into two kinds: avyákrita (unmodified) and vyákrita (modified). By avyákrita is meant prakriti or the initial unevolved energy which is the root of the diversities of the world, but is not itself diversified. Vyákrita includes mind and understanding (*i. e.*, the internal organs of knowledge), the external organs of sense-percep-

tion (Jñánendriyas), the motor impulses (Práṇas), the organs of movement (Karmendriyas), as well as the objects of senseperception. Avyákrita or prakriti, which may be identified with Máyá, has three distinct tendencies of operation within it, and from the continuous and conjoint action of these tendencies arise in due order the different classes of vyákrita or modified objects. The course of this evolution in all its details is not to be found in the Vedánta Sûtras, but is dealt with by the later Vedántists. I will here give my readers a sketch of the process as laid down by the authors of Pañchadaśî a wellknown dissertation on the Vedánta Philosophy.

As I have observed above, Avyákrita or prakriti has three distinct tendencies of operation within it. One of these tendencies is characterised by a movement towards expansion or complete manifestation, and is known as *sattwa* ; the second is characterised by an impulse towards activity, and is called *rajas* ; the third shows inanity as its distinguishing mark, and goes under the name of *tamas*. The first is an illuminating, the second a dynamical, and the third a statical principle. Prakriti with inanity as its preponderating element gives rise to the five mahábhûtas or the five germinal formative elements of objective existence ; the fivefold classification corresponds to the fivefold aspects of senseperception (*viz.*, sound, touch, sight, taste, and smell). From these five formative elements in a state of lightness

and purity (*i. e.*, unimpeded manifestation or sattwa) proceed severally the five external organs of sense. The internal organ of knowledge (antaḥkaraṇa) is a product of the conjunction of those elements acting with a preponderance of sattwa, as explained above, and is, in accordance with functional difference, sometimes known as mind (manas), and sometimes as understanding (buddhi). Similarly, again, from those five elements in a state of activity or struggle towards manifestation (rajas) proceed severally the several organs of movement, and from their conjoint action arise the práṇas which may perhaps be described as the motor or nervo-vital energies. In the gross material objects there is manifestly a preponderance of inanity or incomplete manifestation (tamas), but they must not be identified with the formative elements themselves; in these gross objects there is an intermixture of all the five elements, their growth being due to a process of composition known as pañchíkaraṇa, so that each of the elements enters into the composition of every material object; the character of the object (solidity, liquidity, etc.) is however determined by the nature of the preponderating element in its composition.

I do not wish to dwell any further on this subject. A theory on a topic like this must at best be a hypothesis incapable of complete verification; regarded in this light the Vedantic theory may find a place along with others in our consideration, and it seems to be free from some of the difficulties

attending the Sáṁkhya theory of cosmical evolution.

The chapter has grown too long, and may be finished at this place. In the next chapter I will deal separately with some of the corollaries which flow out of the doctrine expounded in this chapter, as they have given rise to much misapprehension, and been the subject of much adverse criticism.

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CHAPTER II.

THE FALSITY OF THE WORLD.

From the nature of the world and its relation to Brahman as explained in the last Chapter the Vedántists draw two conclusions :—(1) that the essence of the world is to be found in Brahman, and (2) that considered apart from Brahman the world is devoid of essence, and therefore unreal. A slight consideration will show that these two propositions are but two aspects of the same truth that Brahman is the constitutive cause of the world, and that the apparent diversities of name and form which seem to characterise the world are but appearances due to the operation of Máyá, and consequently devoid of permanent and immutable existence. It is wellknown that these two propositions, which, when properly understood, seem to be quite harmless, have been the subject of much adverse criticism, and stigmatised as almost absurd.

It is said that by denying the reality of the world the Vedántists flatly contradict the testimony of perception. Whoever has read the Vedánta Sûtras, and Śaṁkara's commentary on the aphorism "नाभाव उपलब्धेः" will, however, think twice before making such criticism, for there in refuting the Bauddha

Yogáchára doctrine, a doctrine very similar to the Subjective Idealism of Berkeley, the great commentator strongly controverts all attempts to maintain that the world does not exist as an object of perception, and advocates a theory much akin to Natural Realism. I will, for the satisfaction of my readers, extract a portion of the commentary which will show how unhesitatingly *S*aṁkara asserts the existence of external objects :—"न खल्वभावो वाह्यस्यार्थस्याध्यवसितुं शक्यते। कस्मात्। उपलब्धेः। उपलभ्यते हि प्रतिप्रत्ययं वाह्योऽर्थः स्तम्भः, कुड्यं, घटः, पट इति। न च उपलभ्यमानस्यैवाभावो भवितुमर्हति। यथा हि कश्चित् भुञ्जानो भुजिसाध्यायां तृप्तौ स्वयमनुभूयमानायां ब्रूयात् नाहं भुञ्जे न वा तृप्यामीति, तद्वत स्वयमुपलभमान एव वाह्यमर्थं नाहमुपलभे न च सोऽस्तीति ब्रुवन् कथमुपादेयवचनः स्यात्। ननु नाहमेवं ब्रवीमि न किञ्चिदर्थमुपलभ इति, किन्तूपलब्धिव्यतिरिक्तं नोपलभइति ब्रवीमि। वाढमेवं ब्रवीषि निरङ्कुशत्वात् ते तुण्डस्य, न तु युक्त्युपेतं ब्रवीषि। यत उपलब्धिव्यतिरेकोऽपि बलादर्थस्याभ्युपगन्तव्यः। नहि कश्चिदुपलब्धिमेव स्तम्भः कुड्यञ्चेत्युपलभते। उपलब्धिविषयत्वेनैव तु स्तम्भकुड्यादीन् सर्व्वे लौकिका उपलभन्ते। प्रत्याचक्षाणा अपि वाह्यमर्थमेवाचक्षते यदन्तर्ज्ञेयं तद्वहिर्वदवभासते इति। तेऽपि हि सर्वलोकप्रसिद्धां वहिरवभासां सम्विदं प्रतिलभमाणाः प्रत्याख्यातुकामाश्च वाह्यमर्थं वहिर्वदिति वत्कारं कुर्व्वन्ति। न हि विष्णुमित्रो वन्ध्यापुत्रवदवभासत इति कश्चिदाचक्षीत। ननु बाह्यस्यार्थस्यासम्भवात् वहिर्वदवभासत इत्यध्यवसितम्। नायं साधुरध्यवसायः यतः प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्तिपूर्व्वकौ सम्भवासम्भवौ अवधार्य्येते, न पुनः सम्भवासम्भवपूर्व्वके प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्ती। यद्धि प्रत्यक्षादीनामन्यतमेनापि प्रमाणेनोपलभ्यते तत् सम्भवति। यत्तु न तन्न सम्भवति।" इत्यादि।

The extract may be thus rendered into English :— "It is impossible to maintain the nonexistence of an external object. Why ? Because it is perceived. An external object is perceived in each individual case of perception, whether it be, say, a post, a wall, a jar, or a piece of cloth, and a thing which is being perceived cannot itself be nonexistent. How should the words of a man, who, while perceiving an external object himself, says that he is not perceiving it and that it does not exist, be acceptable any more than those of one who, while eating and feeling consequent satisfaction, says that he is neither eating nor feeling any satisfaction ? The opponent may rejoin that he is not saying that he does not perceive any thing, but that he does not perceive any thing distinct from the perception. To this we reply, true, you say so, for no one can restrain your mouth ; but you do not say what is reasonable, for one is forced to admit the existence of objects as distinguished from the perception. Surely no one perceives the *perception itself* as a pillar or a wall, but all people perceive these things as *objects* of perception. The opponents also, in maintaining that what is internally perceived appears as it were an external object, speak of external objects ; so they also recognise the universally admitted consciousness of exernal objects, but being desirous to repudiate them make use of the particle 'like', and say that they are 'like' external objects. Certainly no one would say that Vishṇumitra appears like the son of a barren woman. It may be contended that owing to the

impossibility of the existence of external objects one may speak of things appearing as if they were external; but this contention is not sound, for possibility or impossibility has to be ascertained by reference to the existence or nonexistence of proof; the existence or nonexistence of proof should not, on the contrary, be determined on a previous assumption of possibility or impossibility. Certainly that which is secured by any of the several modes of proof, such as direct perception and so forth, is possible; that which is not so secured is not possible." On these and on many other grounds *S*aṁkara controverts the Subjective Idealism of the Yogáchára School, and maintains the existence of external objects, and he strongly condemns all attempts to deny this position as being attempts in falsification of the testimony of one's own consciousness. Is it then too much to hope that my readers will at once see the ignorance of those self-constituted critics who want to make out that in maintaining the nonreality of the world *S*aṁkara contradicted the testimony of consciousness? May we not say, on the contrary, that no one has more strenuously fought in support of the integrity of the testimony of perceptive consciousness, as it is naturally understood, than he has done?

Yet *S*aṁkara undoubtedly asserts that the world is not real. The question is, what does he mean by that? In this connexion it has to be noticed that *S*aṁkara draws a distinction between empirical (vyavahárika) reality and transcendental (páramá-

rthika) reality. In maintaining that the world exists in as much it is perceived *S*aṁkara clearly asserts that it is empirically real, because the opposition or antithesis between the individual soul (Jîva) and the knowable world is a condition of the possibility of experience. The objective world is therefore at least as real as the internal ideas ; nay, in one sense, it is more real than those ideas, for it is relatively more permanent than they are. But it should be observed that this permanence also is only relative ; the existence of the world is dependent on the existence of duality, and duality is but a phenomenal result of the operation of Máyá which flings out in a course of constant succession a fleeting series of everchanging 'names' and 'forms' that furnish components in the constitution of the world. The world thus conditioned and constituted cannot, therefore, be said to have transcendental reality or reality in the highest sense of the term. Let us see how *S*aṁkara defines the terms 'real' and 'unreal.' He says that that is real in respect of which your understanding remains steadfast, or, in other words, which you comprehend as constant and immutable, whereas that which is comprehended as mutable and transitory is unreal. (यद्विषया बुद्धि र्न व्यभिचरति तत् सत्, यद्विषया बुद्धिर्व्यभिचरति तदसत्) Even a reference to the use of the two words (real and unreal) in relation to empirical objects shows that the distinction thus laid down is not altogether fanciful. Let us, for instance, consider a few cases of objects which are undoubtedly regarded by us as

unreal. The objects perceived in a dream are, on all hands, regarded as unreal; but why are they so regarded? It cannot be questioned that at the moment of perception they appear to be as real as any object perceived in a wakeful state, and, that being so, it must be admitted that the mere act of perception is insufficient to clothe an object with indubitable ultimate reality. What, then, constitutes the distinction between an object perceived in a dream, and an object perceived in a wakeful state? So far as we can see, the most important point of difference consists in the relative permanence of the latter in comparison with the former; and having regard to this, is it improper to say that that is most real which is comprehended as unalterably fixed? If a breach in the continuity of preception is, in some cases, sufficient to justify us in characterising an object of perception as unreal, I fail to see why we should not be allowed to extend, broaden, and universalise our definition of reality, and say that there can be no reality apart from substantial unity, and unalterable continuity of existence. Take, again, the example of mirage: it is regarded as unreal, because it disappears when you approach the site of its location where you find dry ground but no water. The same remark holds good with regard to images flung out by the tricks of a magician; and all these instances support *S*aṁkara's view that you cannot predicate reality, in the strict sense of the word, to a thing whose existence is limited by the conditions of time and

place, and determined by relation to other things similarly mutable and contingent in their character. Greater permanence, therefore, being, from the relative standpoint, the test of greater reality, it follows that absolute permanence may, without impropriety, be regarded as an index of absolute reality. Applying this test, then, let us see whether *S*aṁkara is not justified in his view, that on a thoroughgoing examination it is found that all objects of experience (driśya) which go to constitute the objective world have no reality apart from their fundamental substratum or constitutive cause which, as we have seen in the last Chapter, he finds in Brahman or Supreme Spirit. Start, for instance, with the case of an earthen jar; the particular form of the jar, its colour, and its other properties akin to these are accidental and mutable in their character; while, in comparison with these, the elements furnished in its constitution by its material cause, *viz.*, clay, are of a more permanent and abiding character; for although the jar may be broken, or its colour may undergo variation, its material cause, clay, remains there all the same; from this standpoint, therefore, we may say, that, in an earthen jar, the particular and mutable elements of name and form are unreal, while the stable substratum furnished by clay is alone real. * But it must not be supposed that this assertion involves a denial of the *empirical* reality of the jar; *empirically* it is

* वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् ।

छान्दोग्योपनिषत् ।

something more than bare clay, for, had it been otherwise, there would have been no room for discriminating between the various objects of which clay is the material cause. The position, therefore, comes to this, viz., that effects have no reality apart from their constitutive causes, so that it is the underlying substratum that lends all the reality that a phenomenal object seems to possess. This, then, being the principle legitimately deducible from a consideration of the nature of reality in so far as it inheres in objects of experience, the Vedántists maintain that it follows from an exhaustive application of this principle that the entire objective world is unreal, and that its subsistence is due to a communication of the reality of Brahman, so that there is nothing real but Brahman himself.

A thoroughgoing analysis of the nature of the world shows that its constitution is due to a combination of two different kinds of elements; on the one hand, we find a fluent stream of various interconnected names and forms, transitory and variable in their character; on the other hand, we find the solid substratum of *reality* which supports those names and forms by its constant and invariable inherence. The substratum of reality finds partial manifestation through the constantly flowing appearances; the appearances, in their turn, are grounded on the substratum of reality. The expression 'names and and forms' (नामरूपे) is used to designate phenomenal appearances in general, and these are regarded by the Vedántists

as unreal, because they do not satisfy the definition of the 'real' as explained above. It is true that the Vedántists maintain that the appearances owe their emanation to the operation of Máyá, the diversifying power of Brahman which gives rise to the apparent pulsations of duality and regulates their sequence, but they, from their very nature, are incapable of being regarded as constituting His essence, whereas the substratum of reality supporting those appearances may very well be regarded as a communicated reality, and, being immutable in its character is capable of being referred to Him. As the *Chhándogya Unpanishad* puts it—"सन्मूलाः सोम्येमाः प्रजाः सदायतनाः सत्प्रतिष्ठाः ।" "All these created objects, my child have the 'Real' for their root, habitation, and support."

Not only does the world participate in the reality of Brahman, but it also participates in His two other characters, viz.. reason and bliss, for they also, while being constant and immutable in their own nature, find partial manifestation in and through the phenomena of the world.

The Vedántists make use of various analogies to facilitate the comprehension of the above position. They liken the various 'names and forms', diverse and fleeting in their character, to the foams and waves, and the substratum of 'reality, reason, and bliss' to the calm ocean beneath ; so, again, they compare the names and forms to a group of fleeting pictures, and the unchanging substratum to the canvas on which they are painted. It

must be admitted, that however appropriate these analogies may be, they are still inadequate, in as much as they do not suggest that the names and forms are themselves the effects of the operation of Máyá or the inscrutable power of Brahman which keeps up the panorama of the world ; but this inadequacy is insuperable, for there is nothing in the world which can exactly typify the process to which the world owes its existence, and the usefulness of these analogies as aids to meditation is not much affected by this inadequacy, provided we donot forget the purpose which they are intended to serve.

The above exposition, I hope, will elucidate the sense in which the Vedántists deny the reality of the world and yct assert that its essence is nondifferent from Brahman. The two propositions are, in their opinion, only two aspects of the same proposition, for what they really mean to affirm is, that apart from the reality of Brahman which constitutes the essence of the world, it has no reality of its own. As the great Sureśwarácháryya has put it in his ‘ Swárájyasiddhi :’—

“सत्प्रसूतमिदं सति स्थितमस्तमेति सति स्वतःसत्तया परिहीण-
मित्यखिलं सदेव पृथङ् मृषा ।”

“ This world has come out of the ‘ Real,’ abides in the ‘Real,’ and loses itself in the ‘Real’; it has no reality of its own (apart from what it derives from its constitutive cause) ; so, this entire world is real, but viewed apart (from its cause *viz.* Brahman) is false.” It will be observed, that the unreality of the world, thus understood, does not contradict its empirical reality,

for, to experience, this world appears as a concatenation of phenomena linked together by an orderly connexion following a uniform rule of coexistence and sequence, and the reality of the world, so far as experience is concerned, is shown by the existence, in the world, of this orderly connexion. An object is *empirically* real if it finds a place in our experience in conformity with the rules of orderly connexion which determine the *reality* of the world, and thus render experience possible; it is unreal, if it refuses to enter into that "context of experience," and thus remains severed from the main stream of phenomena which in their totality constitute the world. It is in this way that dreams and mere imaginations are distinguished from realities from the standpoint of experience; from a transcendental standpoint, as we have shown above, they may all be said to be equally unreal, for viewed on their phenomenal aspect none of them has a constant and immutable existence, their diversity, as well as their mutual interrelation, being due to the operation of Máyá which gives rise to and regulates the evolution of all names and forms (नामरूपव्याकरण).

We may perhaps arrive at the same conclusion by approaching the question from a slightly different standpoint. Experience, in all its forms, depends on the antithesis of the individual souls, as the knowers, and the objects of the world, as the knowables. From this antithetic position they enter into mutual relation, and thus appear as subjects and objects of knowledge. We have already indicated

that the differentiation of names and forms is due to the operation of Máyá, and hence it follows that the differentiation of the objects must be traced to the same source; and when we have advanced so far, it requires only another step in the same line to see that the differentiation of the subjects, as well as their opposition to the objects, is no less due to the same cause, for all diversity is but diversity in 'names and forms.' Máyá is the divine power which manifests itself in diverse ways, but the nature of its operation has this constant characteristic that it brings about diversity ((*bheda*) out of unity (*abheda*); the opposition which it sets up between the subject and the object may be compared to the action of a magnetic force which lets off opposite kinds of magnetism at the two poles of a magnet; and, to borrow an expression form the Physical Science, the process may be designated as the polarisation of Máyá. Having regard, therefore, to the intimate relation that exists between the subject and the object, their juxtaposition in opposition to one another being due to an indivisible act of the dualising force of Máyá, we may say that, in one sense, the objects exist for the self; and considering all these points, we may arrive at the following conclusions:—

(1.) The opposition of the subject to the object is a primary condition of all experience, and, that being so, it is impossible to deny the empirical reality of objects.

(2.) The differentiation of the subjects from the

objects is so inextricably interwoven with the differentiation of the objects among themselves that the two things are bound to stand and fall together.

(3.) The differentiation of the subject from the object is due to the operation of Máyá, and, as such, is transcendentally unreal, though its reality from an empirical standpoint can never be gainsaid, it being an indispensable condition of the possibility of experience; a similar remark holds good about the world considered as the totality of diverse objects. The Vedántic position that the world is transcendentally unreal, but empirically real, is not, as it is supposed by some, self-contradictory.

(4.) When the soul realises the ultimate unreality of the distinction between the subject and the object, and fully comprehends the essential unity of itself, as well as of everything that seems to have a separate existence, with Brahman, its goal is reached; thenceforward it does not become affected by the false imputation of mutations which are foreign to its own nature, and attains an everlasting infinitude in the infinitude of Brahman by participating in the pure existence, pure reason, and pure bliss which characterise divine nature. If we have designated the origin of the differentiation of the subject from the object as the polarisation of Máyá, this last process which annuls that differentiation may be characterised as the neutralisation of Máyá so far as the individual who attains this stage is concerned. Selfrealisation being thus dependent on the realisation of ultimate unity

which presupposes the preexistence of difference, the apprehension of the world as a totality of separate entities in antithesis to individual souls similarly regarded as distinct from one another may, in one sense, be viewed as a moment in the attainment of selfrealisation.

It will appear from the above exposition, that the criticism that the Vedántists in repudiating the reality of the world contradict the testimony of consciousness is based on an entire misapprehension of their doctrine. The same remark also applies to the criticism that the Vedántists are Crypto-Budhists (Prachchhanna Baudha.)

Before I conclude this Chapter, I may also refer to a particular piece of criticism of Rámánuja based on the same misapprehension, as it illustrates how the judgment of even a competent critic may be warped by his own bias against an antagonistic theory. He says :—"ये तु कार्य्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वं कार्य्यस्य मिथ्यात्वाश्रयेण वर्णयन्ति न तेषां कार्य्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वं सिध्यति सत्यमिथ्यार्थयोरैक्यानुपपत्तेः। तथा सति ब्रह्मणो मिथ्यात्वं जगतः सत्यत्वं वा स्यात्।"—"Those, however, who maintain the nondifference of an effect from its cause on the ground that the effect is unreal, cannot establish the nondifference they seek to make out, for there can be no identity between what is true and what is false. If it were as they maintain, Brahman would be unreal, or the world would be real." It is apparent that this criticism misses the point altogether. The Vedántists never intended to maintain that Brahman, who is above all mutations,

is, at the same time, nondifferent from the mutations constituting the world ; nor did they wish to maintain, simply because they characterised the phenomenal world as unreal, that the noumenal Brahman who supports and sustains the totality of phenomena was equally unreal. When a person, through defect of eyesight, mistakes a rope for a serpent, may not another person, who does not suffer from that visual aberration, very properly correct him by saying that your serpent is unreal, and has no independent existence apart from the rope ? And if there is nothing objectionable in that statement, I fail to appreciate why the Vedántists should not be allowed to maintain that the phenomenal world is unreal, *i. e.*, has no real existence apart from Brahman whose reality constitutes its essence, and thus supports and sustains its appearance ? Owing to defect of insight, we are apt to forget that the fleeting 'names and forms' which seem to us to constitute the world, are by themselves devoid of reality, and that they can have their play only because the substratum of reality communicated, so to say, from above supports them from behind. The Vedántist, therefore, wants us to see Brahman in the world by emphasising the fact that apart from Him it is unreal. I therefore venture to request the numerous would-be-critics of the Vedánta Philosophy to think themselves into the System before they aspire to take up the lofty position of a critic, because, I believe that much of the misapprehension that prevails about it is due to an abrupt and hasty

desire to criticise before thoroughly understanding the real import of its doctrines, which, by the way, is so much above our ordinary modes of thought, that few persons can measure the distance at a leap without incurring the risk of tumbling down.

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PART II.

CHAPTER I.

The individual souls and their relation to the Absolute Spirit.

I now pass on to another branch of my subject, viz., the relation of the individual souls to the Absolute Spirit. Whoever has carefully thought over the Vedántic view as to the relation of the world to the Absolute Spirit, as explained in the preceding Chapters, will, I hope, find it less difficult to follow this branch of the enquiry, for although the subjects may, at first sight, seem to have no intimate connexion with each other, they are really two sides of one comprehensive discussion. In the last Chapter I have indicated, that according to the Vedántists, Máyá is the principle of diversity ; through its operation, one undifferentiated reality apparently divaricates itself into two antithetic, and yet correlated, spheres of manifestation, viz., the subjects and the objects of knowledge ; but through this appearance of diversity, the original unity maintains itself, as well as supports the apparent diversity. This position implies that not only is the world, by which is meant the totality of objects of knowledge, the result of the onward process of *máyic* evolution, but that the subjects of knowledge, *i.e.*, the individual souls also owe their limitation to the same source, and are essentially

nondifferent from Brahman. Being the source of diversity, Máyá is the ultimate cause of limitation ; out of it spring the conditioned forms of intelligence, in the inner, and the conditioned forms of objective existence in the outer sphere of the empirical (vyavahárika) world. The basis of all these appearances, however, is to be found in the eternal reason and infinite reality of Brahman, so that the appearance of the individual souls is as much a *vivarta* of the Absolute Spirit as the appearance of the objective world. It may therefore be asserted that the same mode of enquiry which led us to ascribe unreality to the world, and to affirm the existence of essential unity between it and Brahman, would, if further pursued, lead to a similar conclusion with regard to the individual souls ; and in the result the theory of nondualism would be ultimately established, for the annulment of difference from these two standpoints involves the annulment of difference from every possible standpoint. The fundamental types of difference with which we start on our enquiry are five in number :—(1) Difference between the objects of the world and God, (2) Difference between the objects themselves, (3) Difference between the individual souls and God, (4) Difference between the individuals themselves, and (5) Difference between the individual souls and the objects of the world. We have already shown that according to the Vedántists the first two types of difference are ultimately unreal ; if we can now establish that the third form of difference is also unreal in the same way, it will

follow by necessary implication that the other two types of difference are equally unreal; for if there be any ultimate difference between the individual souls themselves, they can in no conceivable sense be maintained to be nondifferent from God, while, on the contrary, if they are essentially nondiffernt from God, it follows that they are also essentially nondifferent from the world which derives its reality, as we have already seen, from His allpervading reality. It is the same Reality underneath which partially manifests itself through the world and the individual souls, but the appearance of difference brought forth by Máyá conceals this ultimate unity like a veil which shuts out the light that lies behind.

In a former Chapter I have stated that when viewed in relation to the world Brahman appears in the aspect of I'śwara or the Lord; as a relation of this sort presupposes duality, the conception of I'śwara is, from its very nature, dualistic; starting, then, from a dualistic standpoint in discussing the relation of the individual souls to Him, you are at the very outset placed face to face with a vast amount of difference which makes any attempt at identification seem altogether absurd and ridiculous. He is the supreme omniscient allpowerful Creator of the universe; the Jîvas (individual souls) are insignificant creatures gifted with a modicum of knowledge and power limited in every direction; there seems to be as much difference between Him and an individual soul, says an Indian poet, as between the great ocean

and a drop of water, the great Himálaya and a particle of dust. Yet the Vedántists, in their high spiritual flight, boldly assert, that ultimately there is no difference between the two, the apparent difference being but the outcome of a limited view. "In absolute reality there is neither the function of the Creator nor the fact of the creation." One unconditioned Being alone exists, and in him I'świara as well as the Jîvas find their unification. The Jîvas are so many ripples on the surface of the ocean of absolute reason; I'śwara is the ocean itself as opposed and yet related to the ripples; if the ocean seems to cast off the ripples, and makes them look small, the ripples, in their turn, seem to limit the ocean and trench upon its boundlessness. Relationing implies mutual limitation; from the ultimate absolute standpoint there is but one infinite ocean of pure reason in which all forms of difference lose themselves; when this point is reached, off goes that character of the individual soul by which he is an individual creature, as well as that character of I'śwara by which He is the creator, and there shines the indivisible infinite beatific Reason free from all limitations and conditions.

The Vedántists, therefore, endeavour to establish that there is no ultimate difference between I'śwara and the individual souls, and in support of this position they adduce the testimony of the Vedas. For instance, we find the following passage in the Chhándogya Upanishad where A'ruṇi is teaching his son Swetaketu the nature of that thing which

being known everything else is known :—"ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्व्वं तत् सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो" "That one being is the soul of everything that is ; that is alone ultimately real—the soul of the universe—O *S*wetaketu, that art thou ;" and various analogies are there made use of to elucidate this position. Similar passages are also found in other Upanishads ; thus, in one place, it is said that the soul of the Universe is one, although it appears manifold according to the diversity of objects which it permeates, just as the fire (heat) entering into the world is really one, although it seems to be manifold according to the variety of objects through which it manifests itself ;* thus, again, it is pointed out that just as the selfluminous sun, although one, appears to be manifold, if instead of looking at it as it is you follow up its manifold reflections into water, so this unborn selfluminous soul manifesting itself through a variety of bodies appears manifold by reason of the multiplicity of its adjuncts.† It is scarcely necessary to multiply citations, for I do not think that any one can seriously contend that the doctrine of nondualism finds no support from the Vedas. It is indeed true that the opponents of the doctrine attempt to construe the passages supporting nondualism in a different manner, but these attempts are seldom

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* अग्निर्यथैको भुवनं प्रविष्टो रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव ।
एकस्तथा सर्व्वभूतान्तरात्मा रूपं रूप प्रतिरूपो बभूव ॥

† यथा ह्ययं ज्योतिरात्मा विवस्वानपोभिन्ना बहुधैकोऽनुगच्छन् ।
उपाधिना क्रियते भेदरूपो देवः क्षेत्रेष्वेवमजोऽयमात्मा ॥

found to be satisfactory; it is a wellknown canon of construction that the plain meaning of a passage, if possible, should not be rejected in favour of a strained interpretation,—"न मुख्ये सम्भवत्यर्थे जघन्या वृत्तिरिष्यते"—and that being so, I have no hesitation to say that the Vedas do declare that the Jîvas are essentially nondifferent from Brahman, and that the apprehension of this identity leads to salvation.

I may here mention that in the Vedánta Sûtras themselves we find three different methods of justifying the assertion of nondifference between the Jîvas and Brahman; one of these methods adopts a rigorous nondualism, and the other two are more or less dualistic in their character, but not so rigorously dualistic as to leave no room whatsoever for the assertion of a qualified or conditional nondualism. The consistency or reasonableness of these latter positions, however, will be examined later on.

One of these views is known as Bhedábhedaváda, and is ascribed in the Vedánta Sûtras to A'swarathya. It lays down that there are both nondifference and difference between Brahman on the one hand, and the Jîvas on the other. The Jîvas are not totally different from Brahman in so far as the former have sprung out of the latter, and are consequently endowed with reason which ultimately belongs to Brahman and goes to constitute His essence; at the same time the existence of some amount of difference must be allowed, for, if it did not exist, the discrimination of one individual from another would be impossible,

and all individuals would be equally omniscient. The existence of such a complex relation combining unity and difference may be illustrated by reference to the relation of a spark to the fire whence it flies off, for it is neither totally different from nor absolutely identical with the fire which is the source of its origination. Hence A'śwarathya maintains that those texts that assert the identity of Brahman and the Jîvas really lay stress on the element of unity which actually subsists between them, but are not intended to lay down that they are absolutely nondifferent.

A second view, more openly dualistic than the above, is ascribed to Audulomi. In more recent time it has found its expression in Pûrṇa-prajña-darśana of which A'nandatîrtha was one of the chief expositors ; it has also found favour with the followers of Chaitanya among whom one Baladeva Vidyábhûshaṇa has written a commentary on the Vedánta Sûtras known as Govinda Bháshya supporting the doctrine of dualism. A similar view is also entertained by the Páñcharátrika Vaishṇavas. According to this view the Jîvas are essentially different from God ; it is their duty to serve Him, and obey His commands, as He is their Lord. Owing to their connexion with body and mind, they become subject to impure ideas from which they can free themselves only by the acquisition of selfknowledge and the performance of devotional meditation ; and when they are so purified they attain salvation and become one with God. The nondifference which is sometimes laid down in the scripture does, on this view,

refer to a possible future state, viz. the state of salvation.

The third view, which accords with the theory of nondualism properly socalled, is ascribed to Káśakritsna. *S*aṁkara and his followers have adopted this view as their own. This maintains that it is Paramátmá or the Supreme Spirit that manifests itself under the various names and forms cast out by Máyá in the aspect of individual souls. These are not the created effects of the Absolute Spirit newly brought into existence, for, on that view, they would be mutable in their character, and consequently their reversion into original cause would mean their annihilation ; then there would be no difference between salvation and destruction, whereas salvation really consists in the conscious realisation of immortality. The mutable names and forms do not appertain to the essence of the individual souls, but are really separable adjuncts erroneously imputed to them. Hence, it follows, that if the scripture sometimes ascribe origination to the Jîvas, it is to be understood that it has reference to the adjuncts, and not to the essence ; in reality there is no ultimate difference between the individual souls and the Absolute Spirit, for, if it were otherwise, all instructions calculated to impress upon them that they are essentially identical with the Absolute Spirit would be futile, for a real difference can never be eliminated by any amount of false instruction. The conscious attainment of immortality depends upon the knowledge that we are not the poor limited

creatures that we seem to be ; for this purpose, it is necessary to realise that we are divinities upon earth appearing under the conditions of time and space which can only fetter us so long as we remain ignorant of our real nature, just as a Prince brought up in the house of a poor man remains unconscious of his royal dignity so long as he labours under the false impression that he is the poor man's son. Let us know what we really are, and, in a matter like this, knowing means becoming. He who knows in his inner spirit that he is essentially nondifferent from Brahman does, by that act of knowledge, leave behind the limitations which formerly seemed to clog his infinitude ; then the veil of ignorance is lifted up, and he is no longer a mere individual among other individuals, but infinite existence, infinite reason, and infinite bliss dawn upon his being, and he becomes consciously what he always was.

The doctrine of Rámánuja which is generally known as Viśishṭádwaitaváda or Qualified nondualism has considerable affinity with Bhedábhedaváda ascribed to A'śwarathya in the Vedánta Sûtras. The prominence which this view has attained among the Indian Philosophers makes it proper that we should endeavour to give a short account of it at this place. According to Rámánuja Brahman is endowed with a number of auspicious qualities. He is the allpervading, allpowerful, allknowing, and allmerciful Lord of the universe : nothing evil can be ascribed to Him ; He transcends all limitations, and controls everything

that is limited. Those passages in the Scripture that seem to lay down that He is devoid of attributes really import that the low and limited attributes appropriate to mundane objects cannot be ascribed to Him. The view of the Pure Nondualists (śuddhadvaitavádî) that the attributes above specified cannot ultimately be ascribed to Him, and that they seem to belong to His nature when we proceed to enquire into the subject from a limited relative standpoint which must eventually make room for a loftier absolute standpoint, cannot be accepted, for no reason can be assigned in support of such a position. There is no absolute identity between Brahman, the world, and the individual souls, as maintained erroneously by the followers of Pure Nondualism, although there is an element of truth in their assertion of nondualism as will be seen from the following exposition. Brahman, according to Rámánuja, comprises within Himself distinct elements of plurality ; these elements, however, are not outside of His nature; prakriti, or the germinal principle of material or nonrational existence, and purusha, or reason containing within itself the potency of individualisation, may be regarded as constituting the body of which He is the soul. It must not be supposed that this statement implies a thoroughgoing dualism, for prakriti and purusha are really His modes (prakàra). They exist, however, in two different conditions : when they remain in a subtle germinal state there is no distinction of individual names and froms ; this is the stage

prior to creative evolution and subsequent to dissolution (*pralaya*). Matter in that state remains unmanifest, and the individual souls can scarcely be spoken of as individuals, since they are without the adjunct of individualised bodies, and their intelligence is in a state of contraction. Brahman is then in his causal condition: the ocean is without its waves. At the beginning of creation His will stirs up the germinal principles of cosmical existence from their inactive state; the state of sleep is, as it were, superseded by a state of wakefulness. Diverse forms of matter then begin to take shape; plurality springs up in every direction, and the souls entering into different bodies become subject to pleasurable and painful experience, and their intelligence undergoes a certain amount of expansion. At the centre, however, of all these is the Lord who controls everything from within; He is immanent regulator (अन्तर्यामी) of the universe. The effect, it will be seen, is nothing but the cause in an expanded or evolved state, and therefore, the individual souls and the material objects are really nondifferent from purusha and prakriti respectively which, as we have seen, Rámánuja neither identifies with nor isolates from Brahman. His doctrine is thus said to be nondualism qualified by dualism, a doctrine which seems to occupy an intermediate position between the rigorous nondualism of *S*aṁkara and the equally rigorous dualism of some of the Vaishṇava schools. With regard to the question of summum bonum, Rámánuja maintains that the devotee, who by constant

meditation upon the auspicious qualities of the Lord attains a clear knowledge of His nature, obtains, by His grace, final emancipation from the troubles of worldly existence, reaches the world of Brahman (ब्रह्मलोक), and there enjoys everlasting bliss. He then participates in all the qualities and powers of the Lord excepting the power of creating, sustaining, and retracting the world.

Having given a short account of the three main conflicting theories that prevailed among the Indian Philosophers on this subject, I may now proceed to indicate, as briefly as I can, a few of the objections that may be urged by the advocates of pure non-dualism against the other theories.

Those who do not admit that individual souls are essentially nondifferent from Brahman or the Supreme Spirit may be asked, whether, in their opinion, the individual souls are coeternal with Brahman or not. If they answer this question in the affirmative, a difficulty naturally suggests itself that the admission of individual souls as existing side by side with Brahman from eternity seems to clash with the position that Brahman is infinite and unlimited in His character, for an unresolved dualism is certainly calculated to negative the unconditional infinitude of its constituent factors. You may, of course, still maintain that one of its factors is preeminently greater than the rest, but this greatness is, at all events, a relative or comparative greatness which in any case falls short of infinitude. So, then, if after adopting this view you

ascribe infinitude or omnipotence to your God, you do so either because in your devoutness you ignore the precise import of your terminology, or because, taking the shelter of a half-conscious hyperbole, you sacrifice precision of language to its grandeur. And yet may it not be said that this ascription of infinitude to God bespeaks a tenacious endeavour of human reason to transcend the narrow limits of dualism by attaining the height of a spiritual monism? It may also be observed that this recognition of pluralism breaks the universally recognised rule of all rational hypotheses,—"Entia non sunt multiplicanda preter necessitatem." Then again there is, apart from these, another difficulty which should also be pointed out in this connexion: Admitting, as you do, the coeternal existence of Brahman and the Jîvas, you have to answer the question,—Is there any coeternal relation between them? You cannot possibly answer this question in the negative, and yet if you answer it in the affirmative and recognise the existence of some form of eternal relation between them, the very existence of this relation becomes an inexplicable mystery in your hand, for how does it encompass the Supreme Spirit and bind it to objects other other than Himself? You can not say that it belongs to the very nature of the Supreme Spirit that He should stand related to the individual souls, for as the former does not, on your view, contain within Himself the reason of the latter's existence, you cannot reasonably maintain that His essence should involve a relation to objects whose

existence it does not warrant, nor can you say that the relation is a nonessential, extraneous, or accidental relation, for an eternal accident subjecting unborn spirits to itself, and having its sway over the Supreme Spirit himself surpasses our conception, and its admission would detract from the perfection of God.

You cannot extricate yourself from these difficulties by going over to the side of Qualified Nondualism, for whatever may be the intrinsic merit of this view, it is after all either a dualism or a nondualism; you cannot steer between the two, and find out a *via media*, and the attempt to gain this end by having recourse to obscure metaphors, and maintaining that the individual souls constitute the body of the Supreme Spirit is an attempt to mystify the real issue involved in the discussion.

Then, again, a further difficulty presents itself when we come to consider the bearing of a dualistic theory as indicated above on the question of salvation. The difference between the individual souls and the Supreme Spirit being, on this view, ultimate and real, the possibility of maintaining that salvation consists in the return of the former into the latter is at an end. The consequence is that a theory of salvation advanced from this standpoint, whatever its form may be, is bound to be inadequate to satisfy the requirements of a philosophical doctrine of summum bonum.

So far we have been dealing with the theory that individual souls are different from and coeternal with Brahman, and pointing out some of the objections that

may be urged against it. The adoption of the other alternative that the individual souls had a beginning in time, and owed their existence to the creative activity of God is equally open to serious objections. A thing having a beginning is likely to have an end, for extinction is but the reverse process of origination ; if a thing can come into existence out of nothing, it has only to retrace its steps to revert to nothing ; stepping into existence and stepping out of it stand exactly on the same footing ; the former being recognised, theoretically I can see no impediment absolutely debarring the possibility of the latter. If, however, it be said that pure rational souls are, from their very nature, incapable of extinction, may it not be said with equal reason that they are also free from origination ? The admission that a thing had a beginning in time implies that its existence is determined by a conjunction of conditions, so that the withdrawal of some of the conditions would entail its extinction. Immortality of soul is thus hardly compatible with the denial of its eternal existence.

Then, again, why did an individual soul come into being for the first time at a particular moment of time, and not at another ? There is nothing peculiar in any particular moment in the stream of time-continuum by reference to which you can explain why in particular it should be the starting-point of the creation of souls ; time in itself is indifferent to this great transition. The only way, therefore, of meeting this problem is by saying that the creation of the individual

souls being purposive, it took place when the necessary materials for the fulfilment of that purpose became available ; but a little consideration shows the untenability of these positions. In the first place, the ascription of creative purpose to God carries with it the ascription of mutability to His nature, and implies, furthermore, that He may have a want which requires to be satisfied ; in the second place, a thing which owes its existence to an external purpose may cease to exist with the cessation of that purpose : '*cessante ratione cessat et effectus*' ; in the third place, how can you ascribe any purpose to God ? He can have no purpose of His own directed towards an unrealised end, for He is ever perfect, and the view of the Naiyáyikas that He created the individual souls out of grace seems to carry its own refutation, for *ex hypothesi*, there did not exist prior to such creation any object of grace save Himself. For these and other reasons I find considerable difficulty to accept the position of ordinary Theism that on a fine morning God said let there be so many individual souls and forthwith they came into existence.

The difficulty appears still more insuperable when we come to deal with the problem of the inequality of human happiness. All persons are not equally happy, and it can hardly be denied that this inequality is, to a great extent, determined by the differences in the conditions, capacities, and susceptibilities characterising different individuals from the very outset. Now, if the Jivas are beings created by God, these pri-

mordial or connate differences require some justification or explanation, in the absence of which, it may very well be contended that the Creator is neither impartial nor merciful. You cannot get over the difficulty by saying that although the differences, so far as the present life is concerned, appear to be primordial, they are really derivative being the effects of differences in actions performed in the past lives, for, assuming that the individual souls had an origin in time, the difficulty is sure to recur a few steps back ; thus the problem is only shifted but not solved, for if you admit an original diversity in the conditions, capacities, and dispositions of different individuals affecting their happiness in the course of life, the impartiality of the Creator remains as questionable as ever. Then, again, it has always been a matter of serious dispute as to whether there is a preponderance of happiness or misery in this wordly life ; oriental philosophers have generally maintained that there is ordinarily a preponderance of misery, and the position seems to be in keeping with the experience of most persons ; but whatever may be the difficulties in the way of a comparative estimate of this character, and whatever may be the real truth about this matter, it is at any rate indubitable that subjection to some amount of misery is the inevitable result of a worldly life ; now, if that be so, and if the individual beings are but creatures set afloat by the Creator, it seems to be at least questionable whether the epithet 'merciful' is properly applicable to Him. In the next place,

considering the limited character of individual existence, as maintained in this system, one may suspect that if salvation involves complete freedom from pain as one of its constituent elements, the individual souls cannot, on this view, attain that state except by undergoing complete annihilation. If the individuals sprang out of nothing they may ultimately revert to it, and this is a prospect which is certainly neither covetable nor encouraging.

On these and other grounds I feel great hesitation to accept the view of the Dualists, and I believe that these considerations had a potent influence in inducing the Vedántists to adopt the theory of nondualism which, as I have already indicated, finds considerable support from the Scripture. It must, however, be admitted that there is a great initial difficulty in accepting the theory of nondualism, for it apparently overturns the ordinary conceptions with which we start on our enquiry ; to the ordinary mind, the position that the individual souls are essentially identical with the Supreme Spirit seems to be too absurd to require any refutation, for neither in knowledge nor in power can the individuals be compared to God who is the omniscient, omnipotent, and allpervading Lord of the universe. But can it be supposed that the Vedantists were unaware of such an obvious difficulty, and had no answer for it ? The truth is that the real import of the proposition that the individual souls are nondifferent from God is ordinarily misunderstood ; the Vedántists maintain that the

nondifference which they seek to establish between the individual souls and God is grounded on the unity of essence after elimination of the elements of difference as relative adjuncts which may, for the purpose of this enquiry, be ignored. This process (*i. e.* the process of recognition of unity after elimination of elements of difference) is technically known as **भागलक्षणा**. The mere fact that there are elements of difference between two terms of a comparison does not necessarily imply that they cannot be essentially identical ; on the other hand, complete identity without difference may be unhesitatingly pronounced to be a rather rare commodity, for it can only exist where there is a total absence of development. For instance, even in the ordinary case where we recognise a person as identical with some one whom we knew before, the recognition of identity does not imply that there are no elements of difference between the person as he was in the past and the same person as he is in the present ; but in asserting identity we disregard those elements as indifferent to the question, and confine our attention to the fundamental unity of essence which maintains itself through them. In the same way, when the Vedantists assert the essential identity of I'śwara and the Jívas, they cast aside the relative attributes which are imputed to them as they have only a relative existence, and maintain that they are identical in their essence which consists of pure existence, pure reason, and pure bliss. Apparent limitation is but a creation of Máyá ; it has no immutable reality, for although máyá spins out a number

of fleeting adjuncts which seem to differentiate the individual souls severally from one another, and collectively from the Supreme Spirit, the real substratum around which these adjuncts appear to cling for their support is furnished by the indivisible and infinite reason which is without a second. From an empirical and relative standpoint the individual souls are different from God, so much so that the former dwindle into utter insignificance in comparison with the latter ; from a transcendental standpoint the difference vanishes into insignificance, and one Beatific Reason shines forth without a second. A fuller exposition of this position is reserved for the next two chapters. Suffice it to say for the present, that according to the Vedantists the position above set forth is not a mere theory having no bearing on our spiritual destiny ; they maintain that ignorance of the ultimate unity of the individual soul with the Absolute Spirit, and the concomitant erroneous idea that our existence is limited by the conditions of time, space, and so forth, are the causes of all wordly misery ; salvation is only attainable from a conscious realisation of the unity of ourselves with the Supreme Spirit who is above all limitations and mutations.

When this state is reached, the wise man abides in himself, for there is nothing beyond him, and enjoys unconditional bliss in his own company, for he then consciously realises his oneness with the infinite ocean of bliss, call it by whatever name you please.

"स वा एष एवं पश्यन्नेवं मन्वान एवं विजानन्नात्मरतिरात्मक्रीड़ आत्म-मिथन आत्मानन्दः स स्वराट् भवति ।"

CHAPTER II.

The ultimate unity of Brahman with the Jivas.

The totality of relations involving an incessant series of changes is the formative constituent of the universe. The Vedántists, as we have seen, regard it as due to the operation of máyá viewed in relation to which Brahman assumes the character of I'śwara or the Lord of the universe, for, through His máyá, He is regarded as controlling and moulding the entire universe. Whatever happens has its *ratio gnascendi* in the past ; an effect must necessarily be preceded by a cause. There is thus an infinite series of causes and effects, and the totality of these causes and effects goes under the name of universe. Then arise the questions, why should there be a change at all, and why should a particular effect be connected with a particular cause ? In one sense a change is an illusion, for it only touches the outside of a thing, and there must always remain something unalterable at its core which supports the transformation. Yet, if it be an illusion, it is a strange illusion having a uniform order of evolution, and ultimately involving a comprehensive system of correlation. An event is not a mere isolated event, but it is an inseverable link in the chain constituting the history of the universe ; a thing is not a small insignificant thing, but it bears the impress of every thing that is. The wonderful

mind of the Vedántist at once sums these up, and behind the stream of incessant changes observes the constant operation of one transforming and yet concatenating energy, the energy of máyá. It will be seen that the functions assigned by the Vedántists to Máyá are somewhat akin to those assigned by the Sáṁkhyas to Prakriti, but there is this cardinal difference that Máyá is not regarded as a blind independent source of evolution, but is considered to be an adjunct of the Eternal Infinite Reason (Brahman.)

It may be objected that this admission of máyá involves a renunciation of the standpoint nondualism; but that is not so, for, being a śakti or power of Brahman máyá cannot be counted as a separate entity; does anybody regard the power by which fire burns fuel as an entity over and above the fire itself? Certainly not. It must, however, be observed that that does not entitle us to do away with it altogether by ignoring its existence, and that therefore those who assert that according to the Vedántists Máyá signifies an illusion and is consequently unreal do not understand their position at all, for it would be an instance of extreme ignorance to say that the eternal śakti of Brahman is a mere illusion. The true Vedántic position, therefore, is, that it is real but has no reality apart from Brahman, so that you can define it neither by the word 'real' nor by the word 'unreal' (सदसद्भ्यामनिर्व्वचनीया).

The functioning of Máyá produces a twofold result. It evolves, on the one hand, a variety of 'names and

forms' which in their totality go under the appellation of Jagat (the universe) ; it conceals, on the other, the eternal Brahman, the partial manifestation of whose essence in and through the universe it envelops under a cluster of mutations. It thus results in the concealment (आवरण) of the real, and the emanation (विक्षेप) of the unreal, and is therefore sometimes called the initial ignorance (अज्ञान, अविद्या).

The limiting adjunct of the individual soul is generally known as avidyá or ignorance. Its function is analogous to that of Máyá, for like Máyá it may be said to have a twofold operation ; on the one hand, it conceals the real nature of the ego, and its ultimate unity with the Supreme Spirit ; on the other hand, it leads to an erroneous fusion of the self with at least a portion of the not-self which apparently curbs its infinitude and is indirectly the source of all its miseries. It individualises the ego, and fuses it with a portion of the nonego, *i. e.*, it makes us ascribe a number of attributes to ourselves which are incompatible with the real nature of the self. Egoity is the source of bondage ; freedom from egoity or the attainment of universality leads to salvation.

It will appear from the above exposition that ignorance about the nature of Brahman is due to the operation of Máyá, and ignorance about the real nature of the self is due to avidyá. It must not however be supposed that avidyá is intrinsically different from Máyá, for it is no other than a subsidiary result of Máyá limiting and, in one sense, creating

the individual souls. When Brahman is viewed in His relative aspect, *i. e.* in the aspect of I'śwara, He is viewed as having a necessary relation with the cosmos, and this view makes us ascribe to I'śwara a power (śakti) which upholds and sustains the entire universe. This power, when regarded as an adjunct somehow limiting* or conditioning the Absolute Supreme Spirit receives the name of Máyá. As a result of the operation of this power, one indivisible Reason, which is ever manifesting itself, seems to divide itself into a multitude of individuals by entering into a sort of relationship with a multitude of separate clusters of adjuncts, such as understanding (Buddhi), mind (manas), body, and so forth ; the multiplicity of adjuncts is also, it may be noted, a result of the operation of Máyá, so that the apparent severance of individual souls from the Absolute Spirit may likewise be traced to the same source. Individuality, however, must be conscious individuality, for individuals who are unconscious of their individual or separate existence are not, in one sense, individuals at all, and if selfrealisation means the conscious annulment of individuality, it must necessarily presuppose the latter, for a thing must exist before it may be annulled. Now, this consciousness of individuality is believed to have a basis in reality owing to the ignorance of the real nature of the self, and the erroneous ascription to it of attributes which really belong to the nature of the limiting

* मीयते परिच्छिद्यते अनयेति माया ।

adjuncts ; the source from which this error proceeds is denominated by the Vedántists as Avidyá, which may consequently be regarded as the limiting adjunct (उपाधि) of the individual souls. Máyá may thus be likened to the central agitating force, and avidyá to a ripple on the surface, and underneath rests the unfathomable ocean of pure reason and pure bliss.

In order to understand the true import of the proposition that the individual souls are ultimately nondifferent from the Supreme Spirit, one must ignore or eliminate the adjuncts which seem to individualise them and thus differentiate them from one another. This process of elimination, therefore, forms a preliminary step to the realisation of all-pervading unity ; it consists in differentiating the self from that portion of the not-self with which we often erroneously identify it, and when we succeed in doing that we find that the self, in its true nature, is no other than immutable reason (कूटस्थचैतन्य), and are thus gradually led to realise ultimate unity in essence that exists between it and the Supreme Spirit. It will perhaps be remembered that we have pointed out that the ultimate teaching of the Sáṁkhya Philosophy was to differentiate Prakriti from Purusha ; properly speaking there is very little difference between प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेक of the Sáṁkhyas, and आत्मानात्मविवेक of the Vedántists. But the Vedánta proceeds a step further, for it maintains that the differentiation inculcated above is but temporary and provisional, being no more than a stage in a higher identification.

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A word of explanation may be necessary to make it clear that differentiation of the self from the not-self is a necessary preliminary to a higher identification. The popular mind, as we have often stated, starts with an erroneous fusion of the two, so that the attributes of the one are falsely imputed to the other ; so long as this error is not dispelled there can be no possibility of a higher identification, for the ultimate unity of the individual souls with the Supreme Spirit can only be realised when the mutability and impurity ascribed to the former are found to be due to ignorance and want of proper discrimination. Were it otherwise, the impure and mutable souls would stand side by side with the Supreme Spirit as so many separate entities destined for ever to remain subject to the vicissitudes which constantly attend a limited and mutable nature; bondage would then be the natural condition of the Jîvas, and salvation would be impossible. The eradication of this popular erroneous fusion should therefore be the first step in the progress of Vedantic knowledge, and this would lead to the final realisation of unity with Brahman *i. e.* with the eternal infinite and immutable Reason,the substance of Reality and unconditional Bliss. Then let the cloud of Máyá pour out showers of ever-changing phenomena, the spirit, like the sky, will not be affected thereby.*

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* मायामेघो जगन्नीरं वर्षत्वेष यथातथा ।
चिदाकाशस्य नोहानिर्न वालाभ इति स्थितिः ।
पञ्चदशी । कूटस्थदीपः ।

We will now proceed to deal with the process of differentiation by which the self is discriminated from the not-self, and the erroneous ascription of attributes which do not properly belong to the self is eliminated. It needs scarcely be repeated that the neccssity of differentiation presupposes the existence of a previous confusion. This confusion can only exist between the self and its adjuncts by which is meant that portion of the not-self with which the self in its apparent individualised state seems to be intimately connected. These adjuncts have been denominated by the Vedantists as the five sheaths (पञ्चकोष) of the self, from the idea that they conceal the real nature of the latter. I need not enter into a detailed exposition of the nature of the five sheaths; suffice it to say that they may, for all practical purposes, be reduced to three, *viz*, body, mind, and understanding, or if, as *S*aṁkara himself points out, mind (manas) and understanding (buddhi) be regarded as different functions of the same internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa)*, to two, *viz.* body and mind, the latter word being used in its usual more comprehensive sense. It therefore has to be considered how the Vedantists differentiate the self from body and mind.

There are two main lines of arguments by which the Vedantists endeavour to establish the differentiation.

(1) कर्त्तृकर्म्मविरोध (Antithesis between the subject

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* क्वचिच्च वृत्तिविभागेन संशयादिवृत्तिकं मन इत्युच्यते निश्चयादिवृत्तिकं बुद्धिरिति। शाङ्करभाष्यम्।

and the object) and कर्त्तृकरणविरोध (Antithesis between the subject and the instruments)—The proposition that the subject of an action is different from its object is almost axiomatically true; for were it otherwise action itself would be unmeaning, for its presence depends on the antithetic relation of the two. For instance, when we say fire burns fuel, the proposition necessarily implies that fire is different from fuel. The active verb occupying the middle place seperates the subject from the object; this separation is not a mere grammatical contrivance, but is founded on a real distinction to which it gives expression.

So also the subject of an action is necessarily different from its instruments, for instruments imply a worker to whom they are to render assistance, and by whom they are to be utilised.

Starting with these propositions, let us see how the Vedantists make use of them for differentiating the self from its adjuncts. The differentiation of the self from body is comparatively easy. The body is an object of perception, and, as such, must be different from the subject of perception, the self. Our ordinary language also recognises this difference, as the expression '*my* body' indicates.

What is more difficult is to discriminate mind from the self. The Vedantists regard mind as an instrument of knowledge. The functions of mind, such as desire, determination, and so forth are themselves objects of

knowledge ; they therefore imply a knower different from themselves, as well as from mind of which they are the functions. With regard to external perception mind functions as an instrument to bring it about, for there can be no perception without its intervention. On the contact of an external object with a sense-organ mind or intellect takes up an impression which is reduced to the form of knowledge when the self as the subject makes it its own ; * the self is an everpresent witness (साक्षी), but it takes no notice of what is not reflected in the understanding. On this view, therefore, it follows that the self as knower is different from mind as an instrument of knowledge.

But it may be asked that if the self is the ultimate knower what is the use of admitting a mind as an intervening mediator between it and the external objects? To this the Vedantists reply :—

"नित्योपलब्धिप्रसङ्गोऽन्यतरनियमो वा—तस्मैवम्भूतमन्तःकरणमवश्यमस्तीत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम्। अन्यथा नित्योपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गः स्यात्। आत्मेन्द्रियाणामुपलब्धिसाधनानां सन्निधाने सति नित्यमेवोपलब्धिः प्रसज्येत। अथ सत्यपि हेतुसमवधाने फलाभावस्ततोऽपि नित्यमेवानुपलब्धिः प्रसज्येत। न चैवं दृश्यते। अथवान्यतरस्यात्मन इन्द्रियस्य वा शक्तिप्रतिबन्धोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः। न चात्मनः शक्तिप्रतिबन्धः सम्भवति अविक्रियत्वात्। नापीन्द्रियस्य, नहि तस्य

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* Cf. आभासहीनया बुद्ध्या ज्ञातत्वं नैव जन्यते।

पञ्चदशी। कूटस्थदीपः।

पूर्व्वोत्तरयोः क्षणयोरप्रतिबद्धशक्तिकस्य ततोऽकस्माच्छक्तिः प्रतिबध्यते । तस्मात् यस्यावधानानवधानाभ्यामुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी भवतस्तन्मनः ।"—

"An internal organ of this character must be admitted. Otherwise, either constant perception or constant nonperception would follow. The conditions of perception, *viz.*, soul, sense-organs, and objects of perception being constantly present, constancy of perception should be the consequence, or if the conjunction of these conditions were to be fruitless, constant absence of perception should be the result; but nothing like this is actually found. May it be said that this only makes us admit some retardation of the capacity of the self or of the sense-organs in the act of perception? No ; the self being free from mutations there can be no retardation of its power (for it is ever alike); nor can you put forward any retardation of the power of the sense-organs in explanation, for a sudden retardation of the power of the sense-organs, when it was unimpeded a moment ago and a moment after, is not admissible. Therefore it is the attention and inattention of mind that determine perception and absence of perception."

The argument that has been succinctly stated in the above paragraph is intended to show that it is the reflection of the self that illumines the understanding, and that it is the direction of the understanding so enlightened through an act of attention to the object that makes the object an object of knowledge. It therefore follows that the self as the ultimate subject

of knowledge is different from understanding or mind which is an instrument of knowledge in an act of external perception, and, in one sense, an object of knowledge in an act of internal perception.

On the whole, therefore, we are led by this line of arguments to discriminate the self from mind and body, and regard it as a pure unity untouched by the mutations which affect the latter, and incapable of being determined by any of the predicates which we apply to them. In all the acts of knowledge, which are diverse in their character, it manifests itself as the self-same self-luminous knower, and is thus differentiated from everything that is knowable.

(2) *Anvaya-vyatireka*—There is yet another line of argument by which the Vedantists establish the difference of the self from body and mind. It rests on the nature of the different states through which an individual soul passes under the normal conditions of its life, *viz.*, state of wakefulness, state of dream, and state of dreamless sleep. The mode of argument employed is somewhat similar to the method of difference by employing which logicians like John Stuart Mill endeavour to ascertain the existence of causal relation between two phenomena. By employing this method the Vedantists propose to establish the independent existence of the self from the fact that although ordinarily the self and its adjuncts are manifested together, so that it becomes difficult to differentiate them from one another, the non-manifestation of the adjuncts under certain peculiar circum-

stances does not exclude the manifestation of the self. Let us see how this is worked out. In the ordinary state of wakefulness, says the Vedantist, body, mind, as well as the self, manifest themselves together, for their activity is not impeded by any counteracting agency, but in a state of dream, the activity of body (including the sense-organs) remains in abeyance, while mind pursues its own course, creates its own objects, and is affected by them, and these affections are taken up by the self and moulded, through an act of apperception, in the form of knowledge. When, therefore, we compare these two states we are enabled to differentiate body from mind and the self, for we see that the latter can keep up shining* (भान) to the exclusion of the former. Let us then proceed a step further. In the state of dreamless sleep the functions of mind become dormant, and objective knowledge ceases to exist; but even then the self-luminous self does not undergo any alteration, for as soon as the understanding becomes capable of receiving the impression of any object, the self is there to lend its aid and become the subject of knowledge. The conclusion which the Vedantists seek to draw from this is that the self is different from mind, and capable of having an independent existence.

* There is some difficulty in finding a corresponding English word to the Sanskrit word भान. Literally it means shining, and I have here adopted that word. Sometimes I have used the word manifestation although there seems to be a tinge of foreign association about it.

If in the state of dreamless sleep the real nature of the self as self-luminous reason does not properly unfold itself owing to the preponderance of *tamas* (darkness or ignorance) characterising a state of sleep, the discrimination becomes clearer, says the Vedantist, when in a state of *Samádhi* (or meditative self-absorption) the perturbations of the understanding are kept off, the veil of darkness is lifted up, and the individual soul consciously realises its unity with Absolute Reason. In that state the conscious antagonism of the knower and the knowable which characterises every act of dualistic knowledge disappears, and the self feels its infinitude and enjoys unconditional bliss.

Now let us collect the strings of the argument and see how it stands. What the Vedantist seeks to point out is this:—Through the diverse states of an individual life there can be no exception to the constant presence of the self; it undergoes no expansion or contraction, for it shines on ever the same; but it is otherwise with its adjuncts, for in some of these states they undergo a sort of retraction, and cease to exercise their functions. Therefore, says the Vedantist, you can very well discriminate the self from its adjuncts, and understand how the existence of the self is not at all dependent on the existence of its adjuncts, and when you do that you will no longer ascribe to the self attributes which do not properly belong to it, but are adventitious in their character being due to the *máyic* connection between it and its adjuncts.

With reference to the above argument it may be

said that the Vedantic analysis of the states of deep sleep and *Samádhi* is at least doubtful in its character, and hardly capable of being put on a more secure footing. The theories relating to the existence of unconscious or sub-conscious or faintly conscious mental modifications (during deep sleep) are wellknown to students of western Psychology, and if it is difficult to prove these theories, it is equally difficult to refute them. With reference to the state of *Samádhi* it may be said that from its very nature it shuts out the possibility of introspection at the time, so that an analysis of the state based entirely upon vague recollection cannot be implicitly relied on. The main point of the argument, however, is based on the constant presence of the self as the subject of every act of knowledge, and the relative variability of its adjuncts, and it seems that the objections noted above do not impair the argument in the main although they may raise some doubt as to some portion of the details.

We have already said that, according to the Vedantists, the differentiation of the self from the not-self is but a step towards a higher identification. This differentiation results in freeing the self from miseries which arise from erroneously ascribing to it attributes implying mutation which do not properly belong to it. The result thus attained is in one sense a negative result, for while showing what the self is not, it stops there and fails to bring out the real nature of the self and its essential unity with Brahman. The

final attempt of the Vedantists is therefore directed towards establishing this higher identification ; for were it otherwise, the differentiation above maintained would be final and thus exclude the possibility of establishing a theory of non-dualism. It will be noticed that this is one of the cardinal points which distinguish the Philosophy of the Vedánta from the other systems of Indian Philosophy, and I will next proceed to deal with it.

I have already shown in what way the Vedantists try to make out the non-difference of the world from Brahman. If it can next be shown that the individual souls are also non-different from them, the doctrine of non-dualism will be finally established, and the appearances of diversity and difference will be relegated to the region of the unreal.

The cosmical evolution, including the evolution or emanation of the individuals, is regarded by the Vedantists as a twofold process, consisting of the evolution of the world on the one hand, and the emanation of the individual souls on the other. In reality, however, there is nothing real but the Supreme Spirit, the basis of the manifold appearances which owe their origin to the pluralising power of Máyá. "In the beginning", says the author of Pañchadaśî, "the Supreme Spirit without a second, blissful, and absolutely perfect, Himself became the world (assumed the form of the world), and Himself entered into it assuming the form of individual souls through the instrumentality of His own

Máyá",* so that an individual soul is in its essence non-different from Brahman, its individuality being due to the apparent limitation which it derives from being reflected, as it were, into a limited understanding, and thus differentiated from other individual souls, as well as from the diverse objects of knowledge. Bondage consists in the consciousness of limitation, and freedom from this consciousness is real freedom. This freedom can only be attained by acquisition of self-knowledge, which dispels the ignorance setting illusory limits to the infinitude of the self by concealing its unity with the Supreme Spirit and therfore with everything that is. In self-knowledge, therefore, the self consciously returns to itself ; salvation is self-realisation.

The point which arises for consideration is, how does the spirit which by its very nature is no other than *chit* or absolute reason assume the form of a *jíva* or an empirical ego limited and individualised in its character. We have said that according to the Vedantists it is the adjunct of *avidyá* or ignorance which apparently limits the infinitude of the self, confines it, so to say, within the narrow bounds of a limited understanding, and thereby reduces it to the position of an individual among other individuals and makes it the knower of objects which seem to be different from and, in one sense, antagonistic to itself. It is now necessary to consider this position a little more carefully.

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* परमात्माऽद्वयानन्दपूर्णः पूर्व्वं स्वमायया ।
स्वयमेव जगद्भूत्वा प्राविशत् जीवरूपतः ।
पञ्चदशी । नाटकदीपः ।

We have seen that in an act of objective knowledge understanding plays the part of an instrument, and the self takes up the position of the subject. Without the presence of the self to illuminate the understanding the latter would be incompetent to centralise the diverse impressions so as to combine, and, if I may say so, idealise them into an object of knowledge. The Vedantists assert that understanding, in itself, is inert (जड़) ; it is the reflection of the self that infuses into it the light of reason, and, in one sense, makes it the instrument of knowledge, for an instrument would be no instrument without a subject. The self, in its essence, says the Vedantist, is non-different from the Absolute Reason or Brahman ; it is absolute, and, as such, incapable of undergoing mutations, for were it otherwise the intrinsic mutability of the ultimate knower would affect the universality of knowledge, and make it arbitrary and disjointed. The question then arises at once, what is the nature of a *jîva* or an individual soul? And the answer of the Vedantists is, that it is no other than Brahman (or the absolute reason) conditioned or limited by its adjuncts, the most important among them being understanding. The individuality of the *jîvas* is thus a borrowed and, in one sense, an illusory individuality ; the limitation is empirical (vyavahárika), but not real (páramárthika).

From their very nature, the socalled adjuncts of the *jîvas* are manifold, limited, and liable to mutations. When we view the jîvas as limited by them we are naturally led to forget their real identity with absolute

reason, aud impute to them attributes of a mixed character. A little consideration will enable us to understand how this may take place: the adjuncts are manifold, and hence arises the multiplicity of the individual souls conditioned by them; they are limited, and consequently the individuals are also regarded as incapable of rising above limitations in knowledge, power, and so forth; they are subject to mutations, lying, as they do, within the range of the *mayic* process of cosmical evolution, and so the individual souls are also considered as liable to be affected by mutations especially under the forms of agency and fruition.

The Vedantists characterise the empirical ego as reflected reason (chidábhása), and make use of various analogies in order to facilitate the conception and justify the description. For instance, they liken the reflection of the absolute reason into understanding to the reflection of the sun into water. The sun is self-luminous; so in one sense is the self. The sun is one, while its reflected images appear to be diverse; so the absolute reason (the Supreme Spirit) is without a second, but its reflections into different understandings appear as different individuals. When the water into which the image is cast is perturbed, the image itself appears as affected by the perturbation although the sun is in no way touched by it; just in the same way when the understanding undergoes transformation, the transformation seems to affect the individual soul, although in reality the absolute reason which forms its essence remains as immutable as ever. When therefore the

Vedantists characterise an individual soul as reflected reason (chidábhása) they do not mean to do anything more than lay stress on these points of resemblance.

There are, however, people who seem incapable to appreciate the force of these analogies or figurative expressions ; they object that the expression 'reflected reason' is improper, for reason has no form and is therefore incapable of casting any image. An objection of this type assumes that you cannot make use of any analogy unless you are prepared to point out complete resemblance. But this assumption is not justifiable. As Samkaráchárya himself points out—युक्त एव त्वयं दृष्टान्तो विवक्षितांशसम्भवात्। नहि दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकयोः क्वचित् किञ्चिद्विवक्षितमंशमुक्त्वा सर्व्वसारूप्यं केनचिद्दर्शयितुं शक्यते। सर्व्वसारूप्ये हि दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकभावोच्छेद एव स्यात्। (शारीरकभाष्यम् ३ अ, २ पा, २१ सू)—This analogy is proper as there are points of resemblance to be referred to. Nobody can show complete resemblance between an object to be likened and that to which it is likened, but all that is meant is to point out resemblance in certain particular portions, for complete resemblance would involve the annulment of the relation of resemblance.

Whoever has carefully considered the arguments by which the Vedantists differentiate the self from its adjuncts will see that it is not really touched by the mutations which are usually attributed to it, for the self, they say, is the witness (साक्षी) of all mutations, and, as such, transcend them all being their constant and immutable (कूटस्थ) subject. But this does not go far enough ; for, as an individual soul is defferentiated

from its particular group of adjuncts, its individuality may still be supposed to adhere to it, as it is even then viewed in relation to and therefore as conditioned by those adjuncts. It is therefore necessary to proceed a step further in order to dispel this vestige of original ignorance. Absolute Reason is everywhere the same : as the sun casts its reflection on different surfaces, the reason (chit) also seems to manifest itself in the form of individuals through distinct groups of adjuncts, but this apparent diversity of manifestation (स्फुरण) does not prove the diversity (नानात्व) of Reason, just as the diversity of images does not establish the plurality of the sun. The first step in the progress towards selfknowledge consists, as we have observed, in differentiating the self from its adjuncts ; it liberates the self from supposed mutation, but it does not liberate it from supposed limitation (अवच्छेद). It will thus be seen that the *S*aṁkhyas, whose theory stopped with the discrimination of the self from understanding (सत्त्व-पुरुषान्यथाख्याति) as the ultimate goal of knowlege, did not repudiate the multiplicity of the selves.

But the Vedantists maintain that the supposed limitation is as unreal as the supposed mutation. The reason why the Supreme Spirit seems to be different from the individual soul is to be found in the different startingpoints from which we proceed to form our conceptions :* the reason which manifests

* जगत्तदेकदेशाख्य समारोप्यस्य भेदतः ।
तत्त्वम्पदार्थौ भिन्नौस्तौ वस्तुतस्त्वेकता चितः ।
पञ्चदशी । कूटस्थदीप ।

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itself in and through the universe and sustains its phenomenal existence affords the startingpoint for forming the conception of Brahman, while the reason which infuses light into the understanding and its cluster of adjuncts, and thus becomes the selfconscious knower of phenomena is known, when viewed as limited by those adjuncts, as the individual soul. As their spheres of manifestation are distinct, it is supposed that they are also different from each other. But the Vedantists maintain that the difference between the immutable reason (which furnishes the essence of an individual soul) and the Supreme Spirit is no more than nominal, just as the space confined within a jar has no existence apart from the all-embracing space.* When the jar is broken, the space within it, without undergoing any alteration, becomes one with the space around; similarly the immutable reason that manifests itself through particular groups of adjuncts loses its distinction from the Absolute Reason when it is seen that the limiting adjuncts themselves are in *reality* devoid of independent separate existence. The diversity of adjuncts is, as we have seen, a result of the operation of máyá whence proceeds the variety of names and forms which clinging around the eternal reality communicated from above constitute the objective world. As the diversity of selfconscious subjects rests on the diversity of their adjuncts, it follows

* कूटस्थ ब्रह्मणोर्भेदो नाममात्रादृते नहि ।
घटाकाशमहाकाशौ वियुज्येते नहि क्वचित् । पञ्चदशी ।

that it is no less a result of the operation of máyá. We may, therefore, considering all this, at once rise above our ordinary limited conception about the nature of the self and the world, and observe behind the appearance of all diversity the manifestation of one indivisible eternal Reason (Brahman) which through its own máyá (or the power by which it brings about the appearance of of diversity *) reveals the world of knowables and enters into it as so many knowers. From an empirical standpoint, the knowers are different from one another, as well as from the knowables, for these differences furnish the basis of experience ; but from a transcendental standpoint, the appearance of diversity is devoid of ultimate reality, and the individual souls are essentially nondifferent from the Supreme Spirit. For a selfconscious spirit limitation exists only so long as it fails to attain the knowledge of its true and ultimate nature ; ignorance being the source of limitation, it is transcended in knowledge which

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* Those who are not satisfied about the correctness of the above exposition may compare the following texts :

तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय ।

इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते ।

रूपं रूपं मघवा बोभवीति मायां कृण्वानः तन्वः परि स्वाम् ।

It seems to me that Dr. Thibaut is not correct in his view that the Doctrine of Máyá, as expounded by the later Vedantists of *S*aṁkara's school, is not in accordance with the teaching of the Upanishads The germ of the Doctrine is certainly to be found in the Upanishads, although fuller and more luminous exposition was due to *S*aṁkara and his followers.

annuls all difference between the knowers and the knowables, and unifies them all in the supreme reality of Eternal Reason.

The first step, therefore, in the attainment of self-knowledge consists in differentiating the knower from the knowable; the next step is taken when you recognise that this difference is but the outcome of *mayic* dualisation, and that ultimately there is nothing real apart from Brahman from whom is communicated the reality of the universe, whose reason shines through individuals, and who, while maintaining these, transcends them all.

The process of argument by which the individual souls are maintained to be nondifferent in essence from the Supreme Spirit is not dissimilar to that by which it was shown that the world had no reality apart from Him. It is a process of elimination by which the nonessential and variable elements in the constitution of the world in the one case, and of the individual soul in the other, are cast off, and the residual constant elements are then maintained to be due to the communication or manifestation of the divine essence. With regard to the world, we have seen that it may be mentally decomposed into two elements: (1) a flowing stream of names and forms transitory and variable in their character, and (2) the permanent and unchangeable substratum of Reality around which these names and forms cling for their support; the Vedántists then leave the former element out of consideration, as *mayic* or phenomenal,

and maintain that the world is real in so far as it participates in the reality of Brahman, and therefore has no existence or reality apart from Him. Similarly an individual soul seems to be characterised (1) by attributes involving mutability (विकारवत्त्व) and attachment (ससङ्गत्व) which make it appear as the worker of actions (कर्त्ता), and enjoyer of pleasure and pain (भोक्ता), and (2) by intelligence which is constant, indivisible, and immutable in its nature, and through which it takes up the position of a knower (ज्ञाता); eliminating, then, the former group of attributes out of consideration as having no essential connection with the nature of the self in as much as they are due to avidyá or nescience which brings about a transitory interplay between the self and a group of adjuncts foremost among which is understanding (buddhi), the Vedántists maintain that intelligence (chid), which finds a sort of specialised manifestation through these adjuncts and constitutes the essence of the self, is not different from the indivisible infinite Reason, or, in other words, from Brahman himself.

The identification thus sought to be established is based, as we have seen, on the elimination of relative attributes on the ground that the relations which give rise to their ascription are the results of máyá and, therefore, temporary and in one sense unreal. When all these relative attributes are left out of consideration, the individuality of the individual souls, the 'Jîvatwa' of the Jîvas, is gone, so that in unifying

them with Brahman the Vedantists do not seek to individualise the latter but rather to universalise the former. It is one immanent Reason that illumines the knowers, the knowables, and the instruments of knowledge, but the knowers alone are capable of self-knowledge, for in them the reason assumes a reflective form. To realise the oneness of this immanent Reason with the Absolute Reason in the Supreme Spirit (Brahman), to see His presence everywhere, and above all in ourselves, is to rise above all limitations. When this state is reached, the self abides in itself, and knowing its oneness with Infinite Existence and Eternal Reason becomes one with it, for, in a matter like this, knowing is becoming and selfknowledge is selfrealisation.

This, then, is the goal of Vedantic knowledge, for it is the direct and immediate source of salvation. The other Systems of Philosophy are commendable in so far as they prepare us for the reception of this highest knowledge, and are suited to the requirements of those who are unable to appreciate the Vedantic doctrine of nondualism. Their relative value may therefore be judged by reference to their approximation to it : they are ultimately to be accepted in so far as they lead to the attainment of self-knowledge, and rejected where they retard its growth ; but they are never to be despised, for, in most cases, they are the outcomes of honest efforts to unravel the mystery of the universe, and thereby to lend a helping hand to the toiling spirits who are groping their way upwards to the abode of eternal bliss.



CHAPTER III.

Consideration of objections containing incidentally a short treatment of the Vedantic doctrine of karma.

In the preceding pages I have tried to explain the main features of the Vedánta Philosophy from the standpoint of rigorous nondualism. I will now proceed to consider some of the principal objections which have been raised against this doctrine, and I hope that this separate treatment of a few of the leading objections advanced by the followers of other Schools will be conducive to clear up points which may have been left obscure in the foregoing exposition.

Perhaps no objection is more frequently raised against the Vedantic doctrine of nondualism than that it involves a repudiation of differences which are undoubtedly recognised in our worldly conduct. This objection, however, is based on a total want of appreciation or a total forgetfulness of the distinction which the Vedantists draw between an empirical (vyavahárika) and a transcendental (páramárthika) standpoint. The Vedántists fully recognise that *empirically* the individual subjects are different from one another, as well as from the diverse objects of knowledge, and that these objects are also different from one another in as much as they are perceived as such, and no one, they say, who has the slightest pretension of being a reasonable being should contro-

vert the testimony of his own consciousness.* But, then, they point out that the recognition of these empirical differences is by no means inconsistent with the position that ultimately the abiding substratum of phenomenal existence is to be found in Brahman whom they characterise as 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तम्'; so far as the appearance of diversity is concerned, they do not, it should always be remembered, deny its phenomenal existence, but only try to explain it by referring it to its initial cause, the operation of máyá or the dualising power of Brahman himself. I have already tried to explain, as well as I can within the short compass of this work, the real import of these propositions, and I have no doubt that those who will take the trouble of going through my exposition carefully will at least refrain from ascribing to the Vedantists the absurdity of repudiating all empirical differences.

But, then, it is said by the objectors that if you recognise these empirical differences, you cannot, at the same time, support your doctrine of nondualism, and we will now proceed to test some of the arguments by which they seek to make out the untenability of the Vedantic position.

It will be remembered that the Vedantists assert that the world is not real. The objectors take hold of this assertion and contend that, if that be so, the wise man who, according to the Vedantists, realises this unreality should no longer perceive the presence of

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* न च स्वानुभवापलापः प्राज्ञमानिभिर्युक्तः कर्त्तुम् । शाङ्करभाष्यम् ।

the world ; but as it cannot be maintained that anything like that actually takes place, it follows, they say, that the appearance of the world is not due to ignorance. What is the use of saying that the world is false when you cannot by any amount of effort cause its disappearance? To this the Vedantists reply that the continuance of the perception of the world is in no way inconsistent with the knowledge that on ultimate analysis the world, as an entity distinct from Brahman, is found to have no reality at all ; on the other hand, so long as the máyic connection between the reflected self (chidábhása) and understanding subsists, so long as the individual soul cannot free itself from the five sheaths which cling around it and make it an individual, the perception of the world must continue. The Vedantists do not say that a belief in the reality of the world is a condition of its perception, and, that being so, the cessation of that belief cannot cause its dissolution. In a former chapter I have explained the import of the Vedántic position regarding the falsity of the world, and whoever has gone through it will, I hope, find no difficulty in seeing the utter untenability of the objection indicated above. It is possible to cite instances even from our ordinary everyday experience where a belief in the unreality of an apparent object coexists with its perception, as, for example, in the case of a mirage, or of a magician's show ; and if that is so, I fail to understand why the Vedantist should be precluded from maintaining that

the world has no real existence as a separate entity in as much as its abiding essence is to be traced to the reality of Brahman, simply because it is perceived.*

Similarly the Vedantic doctrine that the individual souls are in their essence nondifferent from Brahman (the Supreme Spirit), and therefore from one another, is not inconsistent with the assertion that when considered from a relative standpoint, that is to say, as related to and therefore limited by their adjuncts, they must be regarded as different from one another. Hence it seems to me impossible to refute the Vedantic position merely by pointing out after the manner of the Vaiśeshikas that the individual beings in this world are found endowed with different amounts of knowledge, power, and so forth.† For a fuller exposition of the Vedantic view

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* Cf. यदि विद्यापह्नुवीत जगत् प्रारब्धघातिनी
तदा स्यान्न तु मायात्वबोधेन तदपह्नवः ।
अनपह्नुत्य लोकास्तदिन्द्रजालमिदन्त्विति
जानन्त्येवानपह्नुत्य भोगं मायात्वधीस्तथा ।

पञ्चदशी । तृप्तिदीपः ।

† Cf. The aphorism of Kaṇáda—"व्यवस्थातो नाना"—as explained by *S*aṁkara Miśra—नाना आत्मानः—कुतः व्यवस्थातः—व्यवस्थाप्रतिनियमः, यथा कश्चिदाढ्यः, कश्चिद्रङ्कः, कश्चित् सुखी, कश्चिद्दुःखी, कश्चिदुच्चाभिजनः, कश्चिन्नीचाभिजनः, कश्चिद्विद्वान्, कश्चिज्जाल्मः, इतीयं व्यवस्था आत्मभेदमन्तरेणानुत्पद्यमाना साधयत्यात्मनां भेदम् ।

with reference to this point I refer my readers to the previous chapters of this book.

The objector may still contend that even conceding that the empirical diversity of individual souls is not inconsistent with their ultimate unity in as much as they are essentially nondifferent from the Supreme Spirit, the existence of misery as an almost invariable concomitant of individual existence throws considerable doubt on the assertion of this identity, for does not the Vedantic position imply that in making the individual souls subject to misery the Supreme Spirit has done a mischief to himself ?

To this an answer is furnished in the Vedánta Sûtras in the aphorism—

"अधिकन्तु भेदनिर्द्देशात्"—"यत् सर्व्वज्ञं सर्व्वशक्ति ब्रह्म नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावं शारीरादधिकमन्यत् तद्वयं स्रष्टृ ब्रूमः। न तस्मिन् हिताकरणादयो दोषा प्रसज्यन्ते। नहि तस्य हितं किञ्चित् कर्त्तव्यमस्ति अहितं वा परिहर्त्तव्यं नित्यमुक्तत्वात्। न च तस्य ज्ञानप्रतिबन्धः शक्तिप्रतिबन्धो वा क्वचिदप्यस्ति सर्व्वज्ञत्वात् सर्व्वशक्तित्वाच्च। शारीरस्त्वनेवम्बिधस्तस्मिन् प्रसज्यन्ते हिताकरणादयो दोषाः, न तु तं जगतः स्रष्टारं ब्रूमः। नन्वभेदनिर्द्देशोऽपि दर्शितः तत्त्वमसीत्येवञ्जातीयकः * * नैष दोषः। * * यदा तत्त्वमसीत्येवञ्जातीयकेनाभेदनिर्द्देशेनाभेदः प्रतिबोधितो भवति अपगतम्भवति तदा जीवस्य संसारित्वं ब्रह्मणश्च स्रष्टृत्वं, समस्तस्य मिथ्याज्ञानविजृम्भितस्य भेदव्यवहारस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानेन बाधितत्वात् तत्र कुत एव सृष्टिः कुतो वा हिताकरणादयो दोषाः—

"The Creator, according to us, is separate from the embodied souls, and He is omniscient, omnipotent,

and eternally pure, wise, and free ; the defect of not performing one's own good cannot be ascribed to Him. As He is eternally free (from limitations), He has no good of His own to bring about, nor any evil to avoid. Then, again, there can be no obstruction of His knowledge or power because of His omniscience and omnipotence ; it is to the embodied soul alone who is not so (omniscient and omnipotent) that you can ascribe the defect of not performing one's own good, (for the nonperformance of one's own good can only arise from a defect of knowledge or power), but we do not say that he is the the creator of the world. It may be pointed out that nondifference is also asserted in the (scriptural) saying 'That art thou' and the like, but that does not impair our position. When sayings like 'That art thou' enable a person to realise non-difference, then (viewed from that aspect) off goes the character of an individual soul as a worldly being, as well as the character of Brahman as the creator ; from that standpoint, as the recognition of difference is in its entirety annulled by perfect knowledge, there is neither creation nor any room for ascribing the defect of not bringing about one's own welfare."

It will be seen from the above extract that the Vedantists maintain that neither the empirical nor the transcendental standpoint furnishes any room for contending that the Supreme Spirit has done a mischief to himself because the individual souls are subject to miseries. From the former standpoint, the creator is different from the individual beings ; from

the latter, there is nothing real but Brahman himself, and the individual souls, in so far as they are identical with Him, are above all mutations so that pleasures and pains cannot really touch their essence.

It may however be said that, in spite of all that has been said, no one in his senses can deny the existence of miseries or assert that, as a state of feeling, pain is not antithetic to pleasure, one being the object of aversion (हेय) and the other of desire (उपादेय). Now, when we look about we find that, as a matter of fact, different individuals undergo different amounts of pleasure and pain, so that it is perhaps not too much to say that no two persons are equally happy or equally miserable. The question therefore naturally occurs, does God determine these differences, or do they arise quite independently of Him ? It is not open to the Vedantist to adopt the latter alternative, for although he will say that in reality the self is neither an actor (कर्त्ता) nor an enjoyer (भोक्ता), but is above the mutations which the predication of these terms would imply, and that pleasures and pains are but phenomenal appearances owing their origin to the operation of phenomenal antecedents, still, in so far as individuals are individuals, they undergo pleasures and pains, and, in so far as pleasures and pains are objects of enjoyment, their appearance is ultimately referrible as being due to the operation of the divine power (máyá) which regulates phenomenal appearances in definite orders of causal succession ; that being so, it

seems that the Vedantist must admit that ultimately God is the regulator of pleasures and pains. Now, when you go so far, the opponents may say that you are driven to attribute partiality and cruelty to God ; otherwise, why does He not make all persons equally happy, and equally free from miseries?

This difficulty, however, is by no means peculiar to the Vedánta doctrine. It will be remembered that I have pointed out in a former chapter that it presses very hard against the doctrine of dualism, and is, if I am right, almost insuperable from that position. Let us see how the Vedantists endeavour to solve it. They maintain that you might have imputed partiality and cruelty to God, had He caused pleasures and pains to individuals in an arbitrary way ; but you cannot do that, because, as a matter of fact, these are but results of individual actions. The relation between a particular cause and its effect being an instance of the operation of màyá, you may indeed say that God, viewed from a relative standpoint, is the ultimate regulator of the difference that exists between individuals in respect of pleasures and pains ; but that does not entitle you to maintain that He is either partial or cruel. As you sow so you reap. When different seeds produce different crops, you cannot hold the clouds responsible for the difference, although without showers of rain they might not have fructified.*

* ईश्वरस्तु पर्ज्जन्यवत्द्रष्टव्यः। यथा हि पर्ज्जन्यो व्रीहियवादिसृष्टौ साधारणं कारणं भवति, व्रीहियवादिवैषम्ये तु तत्तद्बीजगतान्येवासाधारणानि

It may next be asked, that conceding that the present differences are due to the vestiges of actions performed in the past, had not these streams of actions a beginning in time? If they had, the difficulty really recurs a few steps back, and, on the whole, remains as insoluble as before, for differences in the initial stage require as much explanation as present differences, and perhaps more, for as they are *ex hypothesi* primordial, you cannot fall back upon the past to account for them. The Vedantists reply that this contention has no force against their doctrine, for they donot admit that the stream of actions had a beginning in time, and that, that being so, they can very well maintain that differences of enjoyment are due to differences in action without fear of being overtaken with primordial differences to explain. In a former chapter I have pointed out the objections which may very well be urged against the view that the *saṁsára* (or the stream of individual existences) had a beginning in time; the position adopted by the Vedantists escapes those objections while affording a natural and reasonable solution of the difficulty discussed above. This position, it will be seen, is also in keeping with the Vedantists' doctrine relating to the evolution of the empirical world, for they say that it is due to the operation of máyá, which being no other than the

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सामग्र्याणि कारणानि भवन्ति, एवमत्रापि देवमनुष्यादिसृष्टौ साधारणं कारणं भवति, देवमनुष्यादिवैषम्येतु तत्तज्जीवगतान्येवासाधारणानि कारणानि भवन्ति। —वेदान्तदर्शने शाङ्करभाष्यम्।

divine power, is necessarily eternal. It follows, that máyá being eternal, its manifestation must also be coeternal, for manifestation may be characterised as the triumph of force which can only be delayed by the obstruction of a counteracting force which, in the present instance, must be taken to be absent. The conclusion, then, at which we arrive is that the least objectionable method of explaining the enigma of differences in individuals is furnished by the Vedantists, while it is not open to their opponents to propose a better solution that cannot be adopted by them.

It must not however be forgotten that neither agency nor enjoyment really touches the essence of the self, so that the problem with which we dealt above was raised from the standpoint of relativity and answered accordingly. In itself the self is beyond attachment and mutation; it is pure self-effulgent reason that brightens the understanding by its reflection, enables it to work with an intelligent purpose, and seems, in its turn, to participate in its mutations. Agency, therefore, is not an essential attribute of the self; were it otherwise, it would have been impossible for the self to get rid of it and attain salvation, for a thing cannot cease to be what it really is. It is a patent fact that agency implies limitation, and is the source of much suffering, so that salvation requires its extinction; that, however, cannot take place if the self be an actor by its very nature. You cannot say that although the self has the power to act, it can get rid of agency by the renunciation of actions, for the power

being there it must manifest itself unless restrained by a counteracting force; this restraint can come, if at all, either from without or from within: a restraint from without, if it counteract the activity which, *ex hypothesi*, is natural to the self, would give rise to unhappiness, while it would not annihilate the conceit of agency; a restraint from within would imply an effort, so that it would amount to nothing more than the restraint of one kind of action by an action of a different kind. In no way, therefore, could the self attain freedom, had agency been one of its essential attributes. Moreover, a forced renunciation of action would at best produce a temporary result, and, therefore, would not deserve to be called freedom which implies an absolute dissolution of the ties of agency and fruition. On the whole, the Vedantists contend that the view that the self is not, in its essence, either an actor or an enjoyer is alone consistent with the highest ideal of spiritual freedom, and that it appears to be an actor and an enjoyer because from an empirical standpoint it is viewed as related to its adjuncts through which it manifests itself as an individual soul. Ultimately, however, all differences may be viewed as unreal, for when you look into the innermost essence of things you find that it is one absolute self-identical reality that is eternally manifesting itself through the stream of everchanging appearances. As Vártikakárá briefly puts it:—The pure substance is not seen so long as the empirical standpoint is predominant; when the pure substance is reached the sway of empiri-

cism is at an end.* The only way, therefore, of obtaining freedom from the fetters of action and fruition is the attainment of true knowledge, so that the Vedánta Philosophy, in inculcating this knowledge, furnishes not a mere theoretical dogma, but a doctrine intended to guide our spiritual destiny towards the highest end of rational existence.

But it seems that the objection that was based on the difference that exists between individuals in respect of pleasure and pain has not yet been fully obviated. We have seen that the Vedantists contend that this difference does not entitle us to ascribe partiality and cruelty to God, because individuals reap the fruits of their own actions; it may next be asked that, if that be so, are not those actions also included within the range of phenomena regulated by fixed and invariable laws determined by the operation of máyá (or divine power)? It is not open to the Vedántists to answer this question in the negative, and it is easy to see the reason why that must be so. It is true that an action implies the determining agency of an individual actor, so that you cannot in any sense assert that God is the worker (कर्त्ता) of our actions, still the direction of your action is regulated, in each individual instance, by the determinate qualities of your character, together with

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* कारकव्यवहारे हि शुद्धं वस्तु न वीक्ष्यते ।
शुद्धे वस्तुनि सिद्धे च कारकव्यापृतिस्तथा ॥

My rendering of this passage, as given above, is not literal, but I hope it is substantially accurate.

other circumstances including the external influences acting on you at the moment, for are not your desires and aversions, as well as your adoption or non-adoption of them as motives to your action in each particular case, determined by the combined operation of those factors? That being so, the conclusion seems irresistible that the nature of your action is always regulated by unvarying laws, so that the Vedantists, in conformity with their general view, must admit that ultimately the actions of an individual are determined and controlled by the operation of divine power (máyá) which is the constant and eternal source of all causal laws. The objection, therefore, which we have been so long trying to meet arises in another shape :—It may be that an individual reaps the fruits of his actions in the past ; but if those actions are not performed independently of the determining power of God, may it not be said that the individual has no good and ill desert at all? The objection seems to be formidable, but perhaps, on a careful consideration, it will not be found to be so formidable as it, at first sight, seems to be. An action, whatever its character may be, must produce its natural consequences determined according to fixed and invariable laws ; it is preposterous to suppose that there is a God who, in each case, goes out of His way to calculate your desert, determine how it should be requited, and carry out the sentence into execution ; the Vedantists, at any rate, donot acknowledge the existence of such a calculating God performing a series of disjointed actions: His laws are working themselves

out, but He is above them all. The individuals, in so far as they forget their essential identity with Him and regard themselves as limited by the máyic adjuncts, seem to be affected by actions and their consequences, although, in reality, they cannot touch him in his ultimate essence ; but these reflected afflictions exist so long as their real nature remains unknown ; in so far as they exist they are the results of uniform and invariable laws, and not of arbitrary caprice, so that you cannot ascribe partiality or cruelty to the Supreme Law-giver ; in reality, however, the self is beyond all afflictions and mutations, for it is essentially identical with the absolute, indivisible, and infinite Reason, and the realisation of this identity is the source of unconditional bliss.

There are a few other points which seem to require a short notice in this connexion in order to elucidate the Vedantic position.

It will be seen that the Vedantic doctrine of 'Karma' implies the admission of a series of births. It is not, however, a peculiarity of the Vedánta, for the doctrine of metempsychosis may be said to constitute an almost universal feature of the Indian Systems of Philosophy excepting of course the Chárváka System. Among the ancient Greek Philosophers, Pythagoras, Plato, and others recognised transmigration. It is, however, somewhat curious that European Philosophers of the modern period donot seem to take much notice of this question. I donot know how far this omission may be accounted for by reference to

the influence of Christian Theology, but it is not altogether improbable that it had much to do with it. It may be said that speculation directed on this question can be no better than hypothetical; but have not hypotheses also a proper place within the region of philosophical discussions? For my part, I am not prepared to banish them altogether, for, as I have once pointed out, there are many questions which from their nature are incapable of solution by the help of positive evidence leading to distinct proof, so that with regard to those questions you must either balance one hypothesis against another, and accept the one which is most consonant with reason and least open to objection, or from the very beginning repel them as insoluble and confine your enquiries within the narrow limits of positive experience. I will therefore ask those who are not averse to adopt the former course to consider whether it is not more reasonable to suppose that the present birth is one among a series of successive births through which an individual passes until he reaches the end of his journey, doffs his individuality, and attains everlasting freedom, than to suppose that the present life is but a brief sojourn, *perhaps* to make acquaintance with this world, which once finished is never to be renewed. I may here notice a few of the reasons which induce me to accord my approval to the doctrine of transmigration :—

In the first place, as I have already stated in other portions of this book, I am not prepared to accept the position that the existence of individual souls had a

commencement at a definite point of time ; I have already stated my reasons for holding this opinion, and it is unnecessary to repeat them at this place. Apart from that, I hold that what we call death does not involve the extinction of the individual soul. The position, therefore, stands thus :—Is it reasonable to suppose that during the course of its existence an individual soul enters into this world or, in other words, becomes embodied only once? I maintain that it is not. To hold otherwise would mean to hold that this world is the scene of a constant flow of new individuals, so that he who comes into it never came before, and, when once out of it, will never return. Certainly this advent into the world should be held to have a determining cause, and also a final end ; if it has a cause, is it unreasonable to suppose that it may operate more than once to determine a series of births ? And if it has an end, is it unreasonable to think that it may not be realised within the short space of a single life ? The Vedantists maintain that so long as an individual cannot free himself from the sway of limited worldly desires, those desires would lead to the recurrence of a worldly life, and that this course of metempsychosis can only be put an end to by the attainment of knowledge which enables the individual to realise his real nature and thus extricate himself from the ties of desires. It seems to me that this view furnishes a very reasonable hypothesis, and ought not to be discarded in favour of the other view which makes wordly life appear as a sport of accident.

Then, again, the problem relating to differences that exist among individuals with which we were dealing so long receives the best solution on the assumption of transmigration; if any body dispute that position, let him furnish a better from the standpoint that an individual assumes an embodied state only once. When a man is born, then on the assumption that an individual is born only once, you have either to say that this birth furnishes the commencement of his existence which will continue after death but that there will be no renewal of birth or re-assumption of body, or to maintain that the individual soul existed in a disembodied state before this birth and will so exist after death so that only once in the midst of this course of existence it enters into the arena of the world. Both these alternatives seem to me to be equally objectionable; some objections have been already noticed, let us take a few more. To deal with the former alternative first: it is an indubitable fact that the circumstances under which a man is born together with his connate dispositions exercise a potent influence upon his subsequent conduct; it can also be hardly denied that this conduct does, to a considerable extent, determine his pleasures and pains in this life; if, then, you hold that this birth constitutes the commencement of his existence, what justification can you advance for the inequalities that exist among different individuals both at the moment of birth and in the course of subsequent life? You cannot say that these inequalities will be mended after death, so that

so far as pleasures and pains to be undergone by different individuals are concerned there will be an equality on the whole, for to say so would imply that a person who is less happy than another in this life will be happier in the life to come irrespective of the nature of their conduct, a position which is absolutely untenable. The latter alternative also seems to be equally untenable, for if an individual soul exists in a disembodied state during the whole course of its existence excepting a short interval of time in the middle, what was there to determine this short-lived transformation? Unless the opponents could suggest a cause which would operate only at one particular moment of time during the entire stream of time-continuum, and exhaust itself by producing a single birth, I think I should be justified in rejecting this hypothesis as untenable; to do otherwise would, in my opinion, be to allow that the entrance of individual souls into this world is accidental or capricious.

On these grounds, then, I maintain that the doctrine of metempsychosis furnishes a very reasonable hypothesis which ought not to be summarily rejected, as some European Philosophers seem to do, as an instance of obsolete speculation.

It has been said that the idea that we reap in this life the fruits of our actions in the past is not in keeping with our notion of justice, for, as we donot remember our actions in the past life, it is not just that we should be either rewarded or punished for them. I must confess that I am unable to appreciate

this criticism, for I donot see why the vestiges of past actions should not produce their effect simply because there has been a breach in the consciousness of personal identity ; on the other hand, it seems to me that the supposition that different persons are from their birth placed under unequal circumstances and endowed with different capacities and dispositions irrespective of their actions and dispositions in the past is itself inconsonant with our idea of justice, and assumes the introduction of groundless differences among individuals affecting their pleasures and pains. Moreover, it is scarcely reasonable to suppose that, if we had a past, its influence should be lost upon us from the moment of our birth so as to make it all the same if we had a past or not. It is however unnecessary to enlarge on this topic any further, for I think that enough has been said to make it appear to every thoughtful mind that the admission of metempsychosis is not an unwarranted assumption, but is perhaps more reasonable and less objectionable than any other hypothesis that can be advanced in its stead.

Let us now pass on to the consideration of another doubt which may arise in this connection. It may be asked that if prenatal influences exercise, in accordance with determinate divine laws, a determining influence on our past actions, what is the use of our having injunctions and prohibitions showing what actions should be done and what avoided ? A little consideration will enable us to see the futility of the above objection. The Vedantists do not deny the influence

of motives and inclinations in determining our conduct ; whatever, then, furnishes a motive for a particular mode of action or stirs up our inclination in a particular way may be said to exercise a determining influence on our conduct. God does not directly and violently regulate our conduct in the present life with reference to our actions in the past. He does not, as Váchaspati Miśra puts it, drive us like a hurricane to pursue a predetermined course of conduct ; but in the regular course of causal sequence, under determinate divine laws, our actions in the past life exercise an indirect influence on our present conduct by giving rise to particular inclinations and dispositions and making us peculiarly amenable to particular desires and aversions.* The admission of prenatal influence, therefore, does no more than furnish a link in explaining the cast of our character, and it does not take out the ground of ethical deliberation, for, as Prof. Sidgwick rightly observes, "it is with the grounds or reasons of rational action, and not with the causes of irrational action that Ethics is primarily concerned ; it is only concerned with the causes of irrational action as forces the operation of which rational action should be partly directed to avoid and counteract."† The

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* नहीश्वरः प्रबलतरपवन इव जन्तून् प्रवर्त्तयति, अपि तु तच्चैतन्यमनुरुध्यमानो रागाद्युपहारमुखेन, एवञ्चेष्टानिष्टपरिहारार्थिनो विधिनिषेधावर्थवन्तौ भवतः ।—भामती ।

† Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics, p. 68. (Fourth Edition.)

judgment that prenatal influences go a long way to mould the cast of our present life is but an extension of the admission which must be made by every person, *viz.*, that in this life our past actions exercise a determining influence on our future conduct ; a judgment like this does not militate against the division of actions into right and wrong, rational and irrational, for whatever may be one's view of the influences that go to determine one's conduct, that does not affect the question as to what is right or reasonable for one to do. Moreover, the discrimination between right and wrong actions has also a practical utility, for in rational beings the cognition or judgment that one action is right and another wrong gives an impulse or motive to do one and avoid the other, though, as Prof. Sidgwick correctly observes, "in human beings this is only one motive among others which are liable to conflict with it and is not always-perhaps not usually-a predominant motive."

After what we have said above, it will be hardly contended that the admission that our conduct is influenced by the effect of our actions in the previous life takes away the motive for exerting ourselves, so that we may remain inactive giving up all efforts for the attainment of what we consider to be good, knowing that we shall have it and can only have it if our actions in the past life would, according to fixed and invariable divine laws, lead to this result. Nevertheless, we are aware that many persons entertain

an idea that this is the logical consequence of what they characterise as the doctrine of prenatal determinism (अदृष्टवाद) ; it is therefore proper that I should add a few words to expose the fallacy of this idea. It is admitted on all sides that it is possible for us to discriminate between right and wrong, and to ascertain what leads to happiness and what to its reverse : it is not denied by the Vedantists that the adoption of the right course of action and the attainment of consequent happiness depend to a considerable extent upon our own exertions, for knowing the end we can also fix upon the means that will tend to bring it about ; the admission of the influence of prenatal actions upon our present conduct does not, as I have already shown, imply the admission of the existence of anything like external compulsion violently driving us towards a predetermined end in an arbitrary fashion in contravention of the regular course of antecedents and sequents which leads up to this end ; it only implies that the present life is not altogether severed from the past, so that post natal dispositions, capacities, etc., may to a considerable extent be determined by the vestiges of actions performed in the past life ; but the exact measure of this influence in each individual case is unknown, and we may almost ignore its existence for the practical regulation of our conduct. If we want to be happy, we must adopt the requisite means, no matter what our native inclinations may be ; if those inclinations are adverse, the more should we exert ourselves to

counteract them. Sometimes, indeed, our efforts may prove infructuous and adverse inclinations may prevail, but would it be otherwise if we did not exert ourselves? Certainly not. An apprehension that my exertion may, in a particular case, fail to bring about the desired end can never be considered as a justification for my not making the exertion. Moreover, it is a mistake to suppose that inactivity necessarily implies want of exertion, for when you are by nature and circumstances prompted to act, it requires a strong effort to remain inactive, so that a determination to remain inactive often really amounts to a determination to exert oneself not to adopt the means of one's improvement; it is therefore either an open rebellion aganist the laws of goodness or a barren selfdelusive excuse for indolence. On the whole, therefore, I conclude that whatever may be one's view as to the influence of prenatal conduct upon one's present life, every man ought to exert himself, as far as in him lies, to follow the course which leads to supreme happiness, and to avoid the opposite path. If he does this, he does his all, and as for the result, he may leave it to the divine laws to work it out; objectively his efforts may not always be successful, but subjectively a good effort can never go for nothing, for it leaves its mark upon his mind, and gives him a lift in the scale of spiritual existence.

It may be asked what is the position of the Vedánta with regard to the question of Free Will. It is true that this question has not been agitated by

Indian Philosophers with as much ardour as by the Philosophers of Modern Europe ; but the fact will appear less startling when we remember that "no Greek-speaking people has ever felt itself seriously perplexed by the great question of Free-will and Necessity." There seems to be considerable truth in Sir Henry Maine's observation that "Legal Science is a Roman creation, and the problem of Free-will arises when we contemplate a metaphysical conception under a legal aspect."* But, now that the question has attained its present prominence, it seems proper that I should try to indicate in a definite form how the Vedantists would answer it, although, I suppose, that may be gathered from a careful study of the foregoing exposition. The intricacy of the problem is really enhanced by the indefinite and ambiguous manner in which it has been placed by some of the leading Philosophers of Europe ; indeed, it is not too much to say that it has been faced by different Philosophers from standpoints differing from one another to such an extent that one feels it difficult to maintain that they have throughout dealt with the same problem. It is therefore necessary, if we endeavour to indicate the Vedantic position, to discriminate between these different standpoints, so that our answer may be free from ambiguity and apparent vacillation. In the first place, it will be remembered that, according to the Vedantists, agency is not an attribute belonging to the essence of the self ; it is from a relative standpoint

* Sir Henry Maine's Ancient Law, Chap. IV.

that you can ascribe agency to the individual soul, but not otherwise, for without relation to understanding and the rest of individualising adjuncts, the soul would be nondifferent from the Absolute Reason to which you cannot ascribe agency or any other kind of mutation. It is indeed true that but for the presence of the reflected reason there would be no consciousness, still it is understanding (buddhi) that is affected by the objects around and undergoes mutation in the form of desire or aversion, while the selfluminous Reason remains as immutable as ever. Therefore, if the controversy between libertarianism and determinism involves the question as to whether self-activity is free from causal determination or not, it may be answered that the question does not arise at all, for the self in itself being free *from* activity you cannot properly ask whether it is free *in* its activity or not. But, then, it is impossible to dispute that the question does arise in another shape; for although desires and aversions are functions of the understanding, still they lead to conscious exertion of activity in so far as they are taken up by the self and made its own by virtue of the *mayic* relation which conditions the self by its adjuncts and reduces it, as it were, to an individual being. The question therefore reduces itself to this :—Is the growth of desires and aversions at a particular moment completely determined by existing circumstances external and internal, and is the determination which finally settles the course of action by transforming one of these desires

or aversions into the form of motive (or a moving cause of action) similarly determined? The Vedantists would answer both parts of this question in the affirmative, for they hold that the growth of conflicting desires and aversions, as well as the act of determination leading to the acceptance of one to the exclusion of the rest, is not outside the operation of causal law which has its sway throughout the entire range of *mayic* or, to use a more usual expression, phenomenal existence. It is useless to attempt to refute this conclusion by the analysis of human action, for whatever may be your crucial instance you cannot say that you have got all the strings of causal chain within your hand so that you can count them over and point out that in the instance at hand they are insufficient to explain its occurrence. It may, therefore, be said that in one sense the Vedantists are advocates of Determinism, but that in another and a higher sense they maintain the freedom of the self. It may be useful to indicate the practical bearing of this position. In so far as the Vedantists are advocates of Determinism, they maintain that in order to control our actions and make them subservient to the ultimate end of existence we should endeavour to adopt the means which would tend to produce the desired result. The theory of Determinism, understood in the sense explained above, does not make it reasonable that we should "tranquilly acquiesce in any weakness;" on the other hand, it impresses upon us more clearly than the opposite theory "that it is unreasonable that

we should deceive ourselves as to the extent of our weakness, or ignore it in the forecast of our conduct, or suppose it more easily remediable than it really is." In so far, however, as the Vedantists maintain the freedom of the self, they say that we should try to escape from the conceit of agency by constantly meditating on the nature of the self as pointed out in the Vedánta, for when this conceit loses its hold upon us, we consciously realise our everlasting freedom from the fetters of action. The position is thus concisely summed up in the Bhagavadgîtá :—

"कर्मण्यकर्म यः पश्येदकर्मणि च कर्म यः।
स बुद्धिमान् मनुष्येषु स युक्तः कृत्स्नकर्मकृत्॥"

"He who sees inaction in action, and action in inaction (or mere indolence) is wise among men ; he is a *yogî* though he does not renounce any of his actions." I cannot explain this passage better than by quoting a stanza from "Song of the Sannyásin" by the late Swámî Vivekánanda too early taken away from our midst :—

"Who sows must reap," they say, "and cause must bring
The sure effect. Good, good ; bad bad ; and none
Escape the law. But whoso wears a form
Must wear the chain." Too true ; but far beyond
Both name and form is Átman, ever free,
Know thou art That, Sannyásin bold ! say,
"Om tat sat, Om !"

It may be asked, why should the wise man, who

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sees that the self has no essential connexion with action, continue to act? For if this view be correct, such a man has through his knowledge transcended the sphere of Ethics, so that it does not matter any the least for him whether and how he acts. But may it not be asked in return, why should the wise man cease to act simply because he sees that the self has no essential connexion with action, if he be convinced that by his exertions he may be able to confer a a considerable amount of benefit upon his fellow-creatures? It is indeed true that he may not always think it necessary to abide by the injunctions and prohibitions laid down for the edification of ordinary men; but it cannot be said that the knowledge that activity does not appertain to the essence of the self takes away all motives for action; all that can be said is that their character may undergo some amount of alteration, so that his course of conduct may in certain respects vary from that of ordinary men. Nay, in some cases, the wise man may think it proper to continue the old line of action which he found serviceable during the period anterior to the attainment of knowledge, although it has since become fruitless to him, for fear that if he discontinues it, other persons, who still stand in need of pursuing that course, may lose their faith and follow his example in abandoning it; for, so far as he himself is concerned, it is indifferent whether he acts in this way or that, so that he may freely adopt either course if it be conducive to the welfare of his

fellow-beings. On the whole, I fail to see any reason why the attainment of Vedantic knowledge should tend to make a man cease performing good actions; if it really does anything, it destroys the influence of sordid selfseeking motives and thereby leaves the wise man freer to pursue his beneficent avocations than an ordinary man of the world; I have therefore been not a little surprised to find that some writers who ought to have known better have asserted that the Vedantic doctrine of nondualism is adverse to an active arduous life; the old Vedantic A'cháryyas knew better, for they said that the wise man could mix with the secular concerns of life even so far as to engage himself in governing a kingdom*, and instances are not wanting in India of persons who did so.

Let me now endeavour to sum up the positions adopted by the Vedantists. Our knowledge ordinarily leans upon the distinction between the subject and the object or, in other words, between the knowers (drik) and the objects of knowledge (driśya). So long as we are unable to realise the higher identity that annuls their mutual antithetic character, the deeper unity that embraces them within its range, they seem to oppose and limit one another; when the knowers are confronted with these limitations, they strive to

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* तदित्थं तत्त्वविज्ञाने साधनानुपमर्द्दनः।
ज्ञानिनाचरितुं शक्यं सम्यग्राज्यादिलौकिकम्॥
पञ्चदशी।

subdue them, and thence arise the struggles which make a worldly life the scene of incessant wants and recurring disappointments. The question therefore is, Is it possible to transcend these limitations and thereby supplant the vicissitudes of a worldly existence? The Vedantists answer that if these limitations be real and ultimate you cannot possibly get over them, for no amount of effort can transmute what is into what is not. The task, however, they say, is not so hopeless as it at first may seem to be, for these limitations are devoid of ultimate reality. In half a śloke, they say, we may summarise what has been detailed in innumerable books: Brahman is alone real, the world is unreal, and the Jîvas are no other than Brahman himself.* It is owing to the constant flow of varied names and forms set up by máyá that we ordinarily remain unconscious of this, and conceive ourselves to be petty creatures cast afloat upon the tide of time, and whirled around by the waves of causality; it should, however, be our endeavour to realise that we are divinities upon the world, that in our innermost essence we are one with the Infinite Brahman, and that where He is there is neither time, nor space, nor causality, but eternal Reason, infinite Reality, and unconditional Bliss. When we see Him in ourselves, and ourselves in Him, the knots of heart that tie us down to the ephemeral objects of the world are dis-

* श्लोकार्द्धेन प्रवक्ष्यामि यदुक्तं ग्रन्थकोटिभिः ।
ब्रह्म सत्यं जगन्मिथ्या जीवो ब्रह्मैव नापरः ॥

severed, all doubts are dispelled, and actions, which are no longer *our* actions, cease to produce our fruition.* He is alone real, the one without a second, though through His máyá He appears as manifold. He is alone self-luminous ; everything else shines after Him, for His light illumines the universe. He is the eternal Bliss, and His touch sweetens everything that seems to give us pleasure. He is above, He is below, He is all around, and He is within ourselves. In the region of Empiricism everything seems to be held fast under the limits set up by time, space, and causality ; this is the standpoint of Science which busies itself with counting the threads spread out by máyá, but finds them inexhaustible. But beyond all these is the sphere of Philosophic Religion which seeks to impart a knowledge which, when attained, makes it indifferent whether you know anything else or not, for when you know the Supreme Spirit you know the soul of everything that is. He is the infinite ocean, and worlds upon worlds rise up like little eddies and sink back in Him. Who would have breathed, who would have lived but for His presence? Look inwards, He is within you ; look outwards, He is outside you ; He is all in all.

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* भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिश्छिद्यन्ते सर्व्वसंशयाः ।
क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्म्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे ॥

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END.

